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1.Introduction
Sub-Saharan Africa, along with the Indian subcontinent, is one of the
two regions of the world where poverty is most extensive and the only
region where it continues to worsen not only absolutely but relatively
as well. The main purpose of this paper is to explore the
interrelationship between absolute poverty and malnutrition. The
availability of anthropometric data for 19 countries accounting for 70%
of the region's population (excluding South Africa) from Demographic
and Health Surveys (DHS) makes it possible to compare and contrast
estimates of absolute poverty for these countries (based on income and
expenditure surveys or living standard measurement surveys) with
estimates of malnutrition derived from DHS. In a more general sense,
the availability of DHS has led to a renewal of interest in analyzing
malnutrition in the Third World (Smith and Haddad, 2000). There are
good reasons for using nutritional indicators as an important dimension
and reflection of absolute poverty.
First, the use of nutrition as a measure of poverty is consistent with
Amartya Sen's (1985, 1987) notion of defining poverty based on
capabilities and functionings. These concepts reflect deprivation better
than moneymetric measures based on household income or
expenditures. Secondly, a major advantage of nutritional indicators is
that they reflect an actual individual outcome (such as a given weight
for age score) rather than a mean, which would be the case for
household total income or expenditures. If the household has a total
income that, in principle, would be sufficient to yield all of its
members with a diet sufficient to provide the necessary nutrients to
guarantee a healthy life, the actual allocation of that income may be
such as to deprive some, or all, of its members from the required
calories and nutrients for good health. Income can be thought of as an
input variable, while, a nutritional indicator is clearly an output
variable. Thirdly, nutritional indicators measure the status of
individuals whereas moneymetric measures are derived from
household level observations that have to be converted into individual
measures by way of equivalence scales. There is a rich literature on
equivalence scales but no general agreement on the best method. The
range of equivalence scales goes from per capita to scales based on age
and gender-specific caloric requirements. The existence of family
economies of scale is another complication that needs to be taken into
account before individual consumption estimates of household
members can be arrived at. Given how little is known about the intra
household food allocation, individual welfare inferences drawn from
household level data amount to approximations, at best.10
The starting point of this paper is to equate poor health due to
malnutrition with poverty. First, we are considering as poor, those
households whose children suffer from poor health because their food
needs and health care are not met. Clearly, since poverty is highly
multidimensional other criteria, such as education, could have been
added. Our analysis limits itself to food and health care needed for an
individual to be in good health.
This paper consists of the following sections. Section 2 explores the
relationship between absolute poverty and average income. Section 3 is
devoted to anthropometric data and malnutrition. Section 4 analyzes
the interrelationship between malnutrition and poverty. Section 5
compares alternative methods of estimating malnutrition and Section 6
concludes.
2. Relationship between Absolute Poverty and Average
Income
The concept of absolute poverty is anchored to nutritional
requirements, as is made clear in a recent study by Ravallion (1998).
There are two methods of determining a poverty line for a given
population. The first method is the so-called Food-Energy-Intake (FEI)
approach that estimates the relationship between the value of food
consumption (including the imputed value of production for self
consumption) and the calories consumed at the household level from
survey information. Once this relationship has been estimated
empirically a minimal calorie threshold (corresponding to the
recommended dietary intake for that population) can be established.
For each individual, the working capacity and the maintenance of a
healthy life is a function of food consumption and individual
characteristics such as age, gender, and occupation. Different age
groups and occupations require different levels of energy intake
depending on the level of energy expenditure required to perform their
various tasks. Hence, the poverty line is defined as the monetary value
of the minimal food consumption necessary to maintain good health
and function in society.
The FEI approach has been known for a long time (Dandekar and Rath,
1971) and has been used in many countries. Greer and Thorbecke
(1986) provide a good illustration of its application to Kenya where the
relationship between caloric consumption and the value of food
consumption was estimated for six provinces. One advantage of this
method is that it reflects the actual behavior of households in a specific
setting, given their tastes, preferences and the relative prices, which11
they face. Empirical studies agree on the nature of the relationship
between caloric consumption and the value of food consumption; the
former is an increasing, non-linear (concave) function of the latter
1.
Given the caloric Recommended Dietary Allowance (RDA) for the
population under consideration the corresponding value of food
consumption is deduced from the function. Since individuals cannot
live from bread alone and have other needs than just nutrition, an
additional amount has to be added for other basic needs to obtain the
overall poverty line rather than just the food poverty line as above.
Since budget surveys give both food and non food consumption one
can derive the total expenditure corresponding to the poverty line (z)
by regressing the value of total expenditures on that of food
expenditures.
The second method of deriving the poverty line is the Cost of Basic
Needs (CBN) method. Under the CBN approach a bundle of food items
meeting an exogenously defined normative nutritional (caloric)
requirement is specified. For example, in the case of the World Bank
poverty profile of Bangladesh, the food bundle consisted of fixed
quantities (expressed in grams) of 11 different food items (Wodon,
1996). The same diet is assumed to be consumed by all households in
every region and every socioeconomic group. The CBN diet is
essentially a normative diet, which is imposed on all subsets of the
population.
A critical principle postulated by the proponents of the CBN method
(i.e. Ravallion and Bidani, 1994) in preferring it to the FEI approach is
that of "consistency", i.e. a poverty profile is "consistent" when a given
standard of living does not depend on which subgroup in the poverty
profile the person with that standard of living happens to belong. The
contrasting principle mentioned by the authors is that of "specificity",
i.e. when the choice of the poverty line reflects "local perceptions of
what constitutes poverty" which would be the case with the FEI
approach. The important issue here is that both methods are anchored
on the food consumption providing adequate nutrition for the
fulfillment of a healthy and productive life, and allowing individuals to
function in their communities.
1 Strauss and Thomas (1995, pp. 1893-1908) present an exhaustive picture of this
empirical relationship and conclude that this function is increasing and concave up
to some level of expenditure where there is no longer any correlation: the
consumption of calories is the same whatever the expenditure. If only lowincome
families are considered, the elasticity of caloric consumption in relation to
expenditure is neither 1, as some suggest, nor close to 0 as others have asserted, but
it varies around 0,3-0,5, according to Strauss and Thomas.12
Typically national authorities derive the poverty line on the basis of
either one of these two methods. The cost of a basket of goods
satisfying food requirements grows with GDP per capita for several
reasons: such as, changes in the range of goods consumed as income
increases, rising prices of basic foodstuffs compared to prices of other
goods, increasing proportion of population in urban areas where
foodstuffs maybe be more expensive than in rural areas, gradual
disappearance of subsistence farming. These factors lead to the concept
of a flexible or adjustable absolute poverty line. Thus, from a sample of
48 developing countries (of which 16 are in Sub-Saharan Africa), Ali
and Thorbecke (2000) estimated the relationship between mean income
µ and the poverty line z derived in these countries based on the best
and most comparable studies available. This procedure yielded the
following equation (with the absolute values of t statistics given
between parentheses):
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Table 1. Poverty Line and GDP Per Capita


































Note: according to the relationship of Ali and Thorbecke
For any given mean income we can thus derive the corresponding
poverty line (Zat) following the Ali-Thorbecke method as Table 113
shows for the 19 countries in our sample
2. In order to estimate the
percentage of poor in the population we need to know the income
distributions of these 19 countries, in addition to their mean incomes.
We use the known income distributions for 11 of these countries
(Bourguignon and Morrisson, 1998) and assume likely distributions for
the other eight countries
3. Thus, the percentage of poor Po (which in
the remainder of the paper refers to the headcount ratio derived
according to the Ali-Thorbecke, 2000 procedure), in a country is
determined by three factors, the poverty line, Zat, mean income, g, and
the prevailing income distribution. Table 2 gives the values of Po for
19 countries derived according to the above procedure
4.
2 This specification has the advantage that for low-income countries the elasticity
of the poverty line with respect to mean income is low, thus, for example, for
Tanzania with a mean income of $302 in 1993 the elasticity is 0.39 while for
Ghana (with a per capita income of $796) the elasticity approaches the maximum
and is equal to 0.82. Table 1 shows the values of the poverty line (z) as a function
of mean income (µ). In the poorest countries like Niger z clearly exceeds the
average income ($200). The two values are equivalent for W=$280. Subsequently
the z/µratio falls below unity. Thus for dote d'Ivoire (g. -$660) the ratio amounts
to 0.65.
3 More specifically, we assume that Benin, Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger have the
same income distributions as that of Togo. Likewise we assumed that Nigeria and
Tanzania have the same distribution as that of Senegal, that Cameroon's
distribution corresponded to that of Cdte d'Ivoire and Rwanda's distribution was
equivalent to that of Burundi.
Note that since the DHS that we are subsequently using to derive nutritional
indicators were undertaken in different years, we computed the mean per capita
income of the five years preceding the year of the survey on the assumption that a
child's nutritional status at one point in time is influenced by the evolution of
household income in the previous five years. Furthermore, given the staggering
variability of mean incomes in SSA countries from year to year we took the
average of the above value and per capita income in 1996 to yield µ.14




















Note: according to the method of Ali and Thorbecke
3. Anthropometric Data and Malnutrition
Demographic and Health Surveys cover infants under six years of age
and mothers. The anthropometric data that these surveys yield have
several recognized advantages. First, as indicated previously, the unit
of observation is that of the individual infant or mother, in contrast
with income and expenditure survey or Living Standard Measurement
(LSMS) household surveys where the unit of observation is the
household. Specific information on the nutritional and health status of
an individual infant or mother overcomes the need to make (somewhat
arbitrary) assumptions regarding the distribution of foodstuffs among
household members. Furthermore, it is easier to measure the height or
weight of an individual than his or her consumption of calories. The
cost of measuring height or weight are small and these measurements
can be made without difficulty even in a poor rural area. The indicator
of nutritional (health) status used in this paper is a standardized
height-for-age of children 5-59 months of age. The
height-for-age-score z score (HAz) is an indicator of a child's
long-term nutritional (health) status. Children who are "stunted" are
those whose past chronic nutritional deprivations leave them shorter
than expected for their age and gender cohorts in the reference
population. More specifically, the zscore is defined as follows:
x






Where xi is height for child i, xmedian, is the median height for a healthy
wellnourished child from a reference population of the same age and15
gender, x δ is the standard deviation from the mean of the reference
population. The percentage of the given population with a z-score that
falls two standard deviations below the mean reference population is
said to be malnourished. As recommended by the World Health
Organization (WHO, 1995), the standard reference population used
here is that of the United States National Center for Health Statistics.
Studies such as Martorell and Habicht (1986), which found that less
than 10% worldwide variance in height is due to differences in genetics
or race among children of the same sex under the age of ten, provide a
strong rationale for using such a reference population.
The DHS provide information on the height and weight of children
under six years old in 19 SSA countries and the Quetelet Index (the
weight in kilograms divided by the square of the height in meters) for
mothers in 9 SSA countries. For children the height-for-age (HAz)
indicator reflects living conditions since birth. For example, a
four-year-old child nourished appropriately at the present time can be
short because he or she suffered from malnutrition between the ages of
1 and 3. On the other hand, the weight-for-age (WAz) score reflects the
current nutritional conditions. It does not distinguish between children
that weigh less or are underfed because they are of short stature. The
same distinction applies to indicators of mother's health: height is
related to past nutrition and care while the Quetelet index expresses
current nutritional conditions
5.
Having chosen as the criterion of poverty the appropriate nutrition of
children, all families whose children suffer from serious malnutrition
(i.e. displaying z scores below two standard deviations of the median
of the reference population) will be considered as poor. In Table 3 we
present the estimates of the percentages of children affected by
malnutrition according to three different indicators, i.e. height-for-age
z-score, HAz; weight-for-age z-score, WAz; and the average of the
above two indicators. Since the HAz indicator is the best indicator of
malnutrition, it will be mostly, but not exclusively, used in the analysis
that follows. We denote the three corresponding malnutrition
headcount ratios as Mo(HA), Mo(WA), and Mo*, respectively.
5 However, these indicators can sometime be misleading. Recent, prolonged illness
can lead to a person being underweight for several reasons (lack of appetite,
intestinal parasites, and diarrhea), even if, in theory, the person consumed a
sufficient food ration. Deficiencies of certain specific products (like zinc) can
affect height even if sufficient calories are consumed. Finally, a satisfactory weight
(between _+ two standard deviations) does not guarantee that an individual is
capable of actually performing the necessary physical activity, as the level of
activity and energy expenditure may adjust downward to equal energy intake
without necessarily affecting individuals' weight16
Table 3: Malnutrition Indicators
(% of children below 2 standard deviations of median of
reference population, height-for-age-z-scores: HAz and
WAz indicators)

































































































a Mo* is the average of Mo (HA) and Mo (WA)
An examination of the data in Table 3 suggests the following
observations: First, it is not surprising that the Mo(HA) ratio tends to
be higher than the corresponding Mo(WA) ratio in the majority of
countries since the former reflects the cumulative effects of
malnutrition since birth and not only the current conditions; secondly,
it can be seen that the range of malnutrition according to Mo(HA) goes
from a low of 24.7% in Zimbabwe to a high of 58.3% in Madagascar;
thirdly, it is known that infant mortality tends to be much higher in
those countries where the proportion of children suffering from
malnutrition is large. Thus, in Madagascar and Niger, the percentage of
children characterized by serious malnutrition (below three standard
deviation) is approximately the same, 20% (compared to only 5% in
Zimbabwe) and it is certain that many of the deaths are attributable to
this malnutrition. But malnutrition is not the only reason yielding high
mortality rates, since in these two countries where the nutritional17
conditions appear to be similar, the death rate varies by a factor of one
to two. Other variables, such as health services, can explain these
differences as will be seen subsequently.
The children who are classified as being malnourished in terms of
height for age, or weight for age suffer from the following handicaps.
First, from the end of the breast-feeding, until five years of age (the
maximum age of the population surveyed), diet limited to cereals like
millet and sorghum is unbalanced, because it does not contain enough
lipids and protein
6. Such an unbalanced diet can create a vicious circle:
the child is more vulnerable to infection, and when this occurs, the
infection lasts much longer. Since poor families cannot afford a
balanced diet (which costs significantly more than a millet-based diet,
for example) the children suffer from deficiencies which both
contribute to slow down growth and to infections. Secondly, practically
all children suffer from infantile pathologies (e.g. infected wombs,
diarrheas, intestinal parasites, cough, fever) which can lead to weight
losses and height stagnation if they are not treated properly and
effectively. Poor families often lack the means to pay for care and
medicines
7. These frequent and poorly treated pathologies have a
negative effect on the weight and height of a child which is lasting,
because it takes several years for the child to reach the weight and
height corresponding to his or her age in the reference population
(Martorell and Habicht, 1986). Height or weight lags among children
can have different causes. Either the quantity of food is insufficient or
the diet is inadequate because it is unbalanced (a problem of quality
and not quantity) and there is also a lack of care and medicines.
A comparison of anthropometric data of children with that of adults
reveals that the percentage of mothers having a weight below two
standard deviations from the mean of the reference population is much
less in Africa than that of children so classified. This would suggest
that the primary cause of malnutrition among children is an unbalanced
diet and household incomes too low to provide the necessary health
care and required drugs. This observation has led Pelletier (1998) to
argue that anthropometric data, in this context, are intrinsically more
significant than the measurement of the quantity of food consumed
because they reflect the combined effects of the diet and pathologies on
an individual's health. Moreover, they reflect conditions obtaining over
the long-term; in contrast, information on food consumption is only
6 Martorell and Habicht (1986) show the decisive contribution of protein to the
height of children until age three.
7 The poorer the families are, the more numerous are the factors responsible for
those pathologies, such as an interior earthen floor instead of cement, a lack of
potable water and so forth.18
available in the short run. Thus, the fact that 20 to 50% of the children
under six show signs of serious malnutrition does not mean that all of
these children, or at least those between three and five years of age,
have suffered from insufficient intake diet (even if this is true for
some). Malnutrition is just as likely to reflect the poverty of the parents
who cannot buy the necessary elements of a balanced diet at a critical
age and cannot adequately cope with all infantile pathologies
8.
In short, it can be argued that anthropometric data for infants turn out
to be a better indicator of poverty than those for adolescents or adults
9.
For the latter, a sufficient supply of cereals can prevent serious
malnutrition, while it is necessary to spend more on other foodstuffs
and services to insure normal growth in an infant. Therefore, signs of
serious malnutrition among infants may reasonably be considered a
significant indicator of a household's poverty as the following
classification suggests
10:
HA or WA of Children [of mother] Circumstances of parents
Between -1 (σ )e t- 2( σ )
Sufficient potential income but
inequitable intra-household
allocation and other negative
socioeconomic characteristics
Poverty Line
Between -2 (σ ) and -3 (σ )
Less than -3 (δ )
Poor
Extremely poor
8 In some instances the state provides some health and nutritional benefits to
households. It is important in such cases to add the imputed value of those benefits
to the incomes of household receiving those services. This is particularly important
in comparing across countries and regions (rural areas are often discriminated
against and urban areas favored in a relative sense).
9 The fact that our poverty indicator (Po) varies between 50 and 80 percent for the
countries in our sample (see Table 2) while the range of infant varies between 20
and 50 percent is due to the adoption of two different criteria for poverty and
malnutrition, respectively. Clearly the two indicators would be closer if one had
adopted as the malnutrition treshold one, rather than two standard deviations below
the median of the reference population.
10 This indicator is only an approximation. Actually, there are a number of reasons
why a precise mutual relationship between the health of young children and the
division of the population between poor and nonpoor cannot be expressed exactly:
there are poor families (or isolated individuals) who do not have young children,
and children can suffer from malnutrition even though their father has enough
income for their proper nutrition (e.g. because he spends a large part of his wages
outside the household or because there is an inequitable distribution of foodstuffs
in the household to the father's benefit).19
The first category consist of the extremely poor households, i.e. those
that cannot insure a minimal consumption of cereals for all its
members. Consequently, a lot of adults have a Quetelet index of less
than, or equal to 18.5 and because of their physical frailty, they cannot
do more than three or four hours of physical labor per day. They are
caught in a poverty trap from which they cannot escape because of a
their low productivity. Such misery corresponds to serious malnutrition
among infants so that many die particularly those below three standard
deviations in terms of HAz or WAz. It should be noted that in
middle-income African countries, like Zimbabwe, there are few
extremely poor families (only 2-3% of the children are below -3
standard deviations). In countries at the bottom of the scale, like Niger,
there is a relatively much larger number of such families (17% of the
children have a WAz score less than -3 standard deviations).
The second category, i.e. poor households, can satisfy the dietary needs
of adults, but lack the means to raise children properly, that is, to pay
for the goods and services necessary for normal growth, which leads to
serious lags in HAz and WAz (between -2 and -3 standard deviations).
The final category would be those households with sufficient potential
income but suffering from inequitable intrahousehold allocation and
unfavorable socioeconomic characteristics. In some instances, these
households can probably look after their children but are not always
able to buy medicines or specific foodstuffs, at the times they are
required. In these families other factors such as a low level of maternal
education can play a role. An absence of care in the event of disease, or
food necessary for a balanced diet, can result from ignorance rather
than a lack of resources when mothers are illiterate. In this category
children display significant lags in HAz and WAz ranging between -1
and -2 standard deviations.
The above classification of malnutrition and poverty according to the
anthropometric data of Table 3 leads to distinguishing between three
categories of countries: middle-income countries, poor countries and
extremely poor countries. Zimbabwe, Cameroon, Cote d'Ivoire and
Senegal are in the first group, with Zimbabwe significantly ahead of
the other three. In these countries, extremely poor families (HAz and
WAz less than -3 standard deviations) are uncommon, on average 5%
or less. On the other hand, between 12 and 20% of the households are
poor (HAz and WAz between -2 and -3 standard deviations).
In the extremely poor countries, like Madagascar or Niger, the situation
is much more serious, since between 10 and 30% of the children are
classified as below -3 standard deviations. These figures reflect real
food shortages, especially in rural areas; furthermore, about one-third
of the children are classified between -2 and -3 standard deviations.20
Half of the population is below the malnutrition poverty line defined
by -2 standard deviation, compared to about one-fifths in the middle
income countries.
The other 13 countries fall in the category of poor countries.
4. The Interrelationship Between Malnutrition and
Poverty
In the analysis that follows we shall use the FGT class of poverty





















α = a poverty aversion parameter
n = total number of individuals in population
q = total number of poor individuals
z = poverty line
yi = income (or expenditure) of the ith individual below the poverty
line where i equals 1,2,...q
As is well known Po is the head count ratio (i.e. the percentage of the
population below the poverty line); P1 is the poverty gap; and P2 is the
poverty gap square.
In order to compare poverty based on the money metric income criteria
with poverty based on the nutritional and health status of infants we
derive a malnutrition measure that is the analogue of the FGT poverty
measure and can be applied to any continuous distribution of nutrition
outcomes (e.g. HAz or WAz).
where
Yref= malnutrition line (e.g. -2 standard deviations below mean of
reference population)
Yi= nutrition outcome of malnourished child (defined as child with Yi<
Yref)
α = malnutrition aversion parameter
N = total number of children in the sample
q = total number of malnourished children (as defined above)
Note:21
If α =0 thenM
q
N
o = i.e. percentage of children malnourished.












1 i.e. malnutrition gap













M i.e. malnutrition gap squared
Table 4a. Poverty and Malnutrition Measures
(based on FGT Pα and Mα Classes)


























































































































































(ascending order from poorest to least poor)

























































































































































Table 4a gives the poverty and malnutrition estimates, for the 19
countries in our sample, for Po,P 1,P 2,M o,M 1, and M2, respectively. In
turn, Table 4b provides the country rankings in ascending order from
the poorest to the least poor for these six measures. Based on the data
in Table 4 the correlation coefficients between pairs of Mα and Pα were
computed in Table 5. It can be seen that the correlation coefficient
between Mo and Po is relatively high, i.e. 0.80 (the corresponding
Spearman Rank correlation coefficient is 0.82). The correlation
coefficients between M1 and P1, and M2 and P2 were all around
0.45-0.47, respectively Figure 1 reveals graphically the plot of Mo and
Po. While an upward sloping regression can be read into this plot, it is
also interesting to note that there are significant differences in the level
of malnutrition (Mo) for the five countries that display poverty head
count ratios (Po) around 70% (i.e. Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, Nigeria,
and Rwanda). The range of malnutrition in these five countries (with
approximately equivalent poverty headcount ratios) is from 35.7% in
Mali to 52.7% in Rwanda. Clearly, other factors besides income affect
malnutrition and health as will be made clear subsequently.23
Table 5. Correlation between Mα and Pα
Between Mo and Po M1 and P1 M2 and P2
Correlation Coefficient 0.80 0.46 0.47
Spearman Rank
Correlation Coefficient 0.82 0.47 0.45
The relatively high coefficient of correlation between Po and Mo
appears to be directly related to the use of a flexible absolute poverty
line. This concordance may seem normal, but it does not occur when
Mo is correlated with other poverty indicators and macroeconomic
data, appearing in Table 6. This issue is discussed in some detail
subsequently in a subsequent section.































In Table 7, we also compute the correlation between Mo (HA) and Po
and the log of Mo (HA) and the log of Po obtaining an R square of
0.64 in both cases (the coefficients of this linear function are also
significant). The utility of this functional form is obvious: the
coefficient of Po indicates the elasticity of malnutrition with respect to
poverty (Po). At a threshold of –2 standard deviation it reaches 1.64;
thus a 10% increase in the proportion of the poor increases by 16.4%
the proportion of children suffering from serious malnutrition.24













note: Po in log form
this table and those which follow give the absolute value of the t
statistics in parentheses.
We saw in an earlier section how a lack of care and medicine impedes
normal growth. Infantile pathologies can last months if a child is not
looked after and during this period and his or her height and weight can
stagnate. Thus, it can be assumed that countries that spend more on
health care are more successful in avoiding severe malnutrition among
infants. This assumption is tested by introducing a variable h, which
corresponds to the share of expenditures in GDP, or, alternatively, a
dummy variable which take the value of one for the countries where h
is higher than the average in the countries included in the same
grouping of GDP per capita or zero, otherwise
11. Thus in Table 8 Mo*
and logMo*, respectively are regressed on Po, h, a health dummy
variable and the percentage of households having access to potable
water. The R
2 's range between 0.63 and .87. Including a health
variable and potable water increases the explanatory power of
malnutrition.







































11 If statistics were available for all the countries in our sample it would be more
accurate to use primary health expenditures (e.g. for health centers, first aid
centers, rural clinics and dispensiaries, etc.) rather than total health expenditures
since expenditures for modern hospitals –particularly in urban areas-have no
effects on the treatment of simple infantile pathologies in rural areas.25
Having shown that malnutrition depends on the percentage Po which,
in turn, depends on µ, a direct relationship between malnutrition and
per capita income can be simulated. Knowing that Po is a function of g,
and the distribution of income, if one abstracts from differences in
distributions, one obtains: indicator of malnutrition (e.g. Mo(HA)) =
f(Po); and since Po = µ(g) (which has a quadratic form); it follows that
an indicator of malnutrition (e.g. Mo(HA)) = h(g).
A function h(g) is sought which fits the anthropometric data best. This
relationship is not linear, yielding a convex curve towards the origin
when the x-axis represents an indicator of malnutrition and y is the
abscissa. Using the following equation:
Log Mo (HA) (or logMo*) = ao +a 1µ.+a 2µ
2 ,( 5 )
gives such a relationship, where
() ()
2




The estimated results obtained from the above regression are
satisfactory since the coefficients of g are highly significant and the
values of R2 range between 0.6 and 0.8 (cf. Table 9 top panel). If it is
assumed that these two variables reflect approximately the percentages
of the poor, these two regressions (which have coefficients very close
to each other) indicate a satisfactory relationship between average
income and poverty.\
Having shown that health expenditures have a significant effect on
malnutrition, we then verified the role of this variable by adding this
dummy variable as an explanatory variable of log of Mo (HA) and
Mo* in the regression equation (see table 9, lowest panel). The
importance of health expenditures is confirmed: the coefficients of the
dummy variable are significant and relatively large. For example, when
µis equal to $400, the value of Mo (HA) drops from 33 to 30% if the
level of health expenditures is higher than the average.26












































b) the health dummy variable takes the value of 1 for the countries
where the proportion of health expenditures to GDP (h) is higher
than the average in the countries included in the same grouping of
GDP per capita and zero otherwise.
5. Comparisions of Alternative Methods of Estimating
Malnutrition
We found that our estimates of poverty based on an adjustable absolute
poverty line were relatively closely correlated with observed infant
malnutrition indicators derived from DHS. The next question we
address is to compare the extent to which other estimates of poverty,
such as those of the World Bank (1998) and UNDP (1998), and more
direct estimates of malnutrition among the overall population (FAO,
1996) are correlated with the observed infant malnutrition indicators
presented in this paper (see Table 6). The World Bank has established,
somewhat arbitrarily, two poverty lines of $1 and $2 a day per capita,
respectively. These two poverty lines have been used to calculate the
percentage of poor in each country
12. We denote these two poverty
lines as Po (WB $1) and Po (WB $2), respectively. The correlation
between the lower World Bank poverty line and the malnutrition
indicators was rather weak with R
2's of (0.37 and 0.19, respectively).
The correlation was slightly higher for the higher of the two World
Bank poverty lines (0.41 and 0.45).
Next we use a modified Human Poverty Index (from the UNDP). This
index combines different indicators including life expectancy (with a
12 For example, in the World Bank, World Development Indicators 1998, the tables
on poverty present the percentage of poor by country according to the two poverty
lines above in addition to the poverty lines defined by the respective national
statistical services. Thus these thresholds have an official status and are a reference
source for poverty analysis.27
weight of one-third) and an indicator of malnutrition among children
(assigned a weight of one-ninth). We excluded these two variables and
retained the others, i.e. the proportion of individuals who are illiterate,
who have access to potable water and have access to health services,
respectively. This yielded a modified poverty index denoted as HPI*.
As the 1998 UNDP Report only gives these figures for 14 of the 19
countries in our sample, the regressions that were run between Mo
(HA) and HDI* and between Mo* and HDI* were limited to 14
countries. It can be seen from Table 6 that the corresponding R
2 are
extremely low.
The percentage of the total population affected by malnutrition, Po
(FAO), is estimated by the FAO on the basis of three variables: (1), the
quantity of calories per capita available in each country, c(FAO); (2),
the distribution of calories among households; and (3), a country
specific caloric threshold specified by the FAO below which
malnutrition occurs. We estimated the R
2 between our Mo (HA) on the
other hand, and Po (FAO) and c (FAO), on the other hand,
respectively. The same regressions were run for Mo*. As can be seen
from Table 6 the R
2 obtained were very low ranging from 0.04 to 0.24.
It appears clear that the FAO estimates of malnutrition for the whole
population hardly appear to have any relationship with estimates of
malnutrition observed among infants under six years of age.
Finally, the correlation between the proportion of the population with
access to potable water and our two malnutrition indicators was of the
same magnitude as that between Po (WB $2) and our two malnutrition
indicators.
What the above results demonstrate is that of all the variables we have
used as predictors of observed malnutrition among infants based on the
DHS surveys (namely, our Mo (HA) and Mo* indicators), the one that
performed by far best is the poverty head count ratio derived according
to the AliThorbecke adjustable absolute poverty line, method, i.e. Po
(AT). It is noteworthy that the two World Bank poverty measures, the
two FAO malnutrition measures, the modified Human Development
Indicator and the share of the population having access to potable
water performed significantly worse in predicting infant malnutrition
than Po (AT).
6. Conclusions
The criterion of poverty selected in this paper is the state of
malnutrition and health of infants. We define as poor those households
whose children 5 to 59 months of age display signs of severe28
malnutrition based on anthropometric measurements and, in particular,
on the height-forage-z-score. Although poverty is a highly
multidimensional concept, inadequate nutrition and poor health appear
to be among the most critical determinants of the capability of an
individual to function in society.
Most estimates of poverty are based on poverty lines derived from the
Food-Energy-Intake (FEI) or Cost-of-Basic-Needs (CBN) approaches-
both of which are anchored to nutritional requirements. Basing
estimates of poverty on malnutrition indicators as opposed to estimates
derived from money metric food consumption measures obtained from
the FEI or CBN methods has a number of advantages. First,
malnutrition measures derived from anthropometric indicators reflect
an outcome (or health output) variable. Instead conventional poverty
estimates reflect a nutritional (or health) input variable, i.e. the required
calories bye a given household. Even if a child is provided with an
adequate amount of calories his/her health can be affected by being fed
an unbalanced diet (based largely on cereals)- a problem related to the
quality rather that quantity of the diet- and being vulnerable to a variety
of infantile diseases and pathologies. A household is poor if the parents
cannot provide or have access to the necessary health care and
balanced diet, even through satisfying their caloric requirements.
Secondly, malnutrition indicators reflect the nutritional and health
status of an individual. In contrast, poverty estimates derived from
consumption data from income and expenditure and living standard
measurement surveys are available only at the household level. Given
how little is known about intra-household allocation the actual
consumption of individual household members derived from using
equivalence scales and household economies of scale are gross
approximations at best.
An interesting result of this paper is the relatively high correlation
obtained between the malnutrition indicators drawn from the
Demographic and Health Surveys of 19 SubSaharan countries, and
poverty estimates derived from the use of an adjustable absolute
poverty line (increasing as a function of mean income) proposed by Ali
and Thorbecke (2000). Other poverty and malnutriton indicators used
by the World Bank, UNDP and the FAO performed significantly worse
in predicting infant malnutrition than the Ali-Thorbecke poverty
estimates used in this paper.
A final implication of the analysis in this paper is that malnutrition
indicators (such as the height-for-age-z-scores) could be considered as
a good alternative for the more conventional poverty measures derived
from nutritionally- anchored survey information.29
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1. Introduction
The periodic crises in agricultural production and the wars in Sub-
Saharan Africa are the main public perceptions of the sub-continent. So
the projections for the future from the media tend to be of the Gloom
and Doom variety. Actually the agricultural systems of Sub-Saharan
Africa have made some impressive achievements and there is potential
to make more even in the more difficult regions where the poor are
concentrated.
The focus of the World Bank has been returning to the principal
developmental concern of the ‘70s after a twenty year detour into
Structural Adjustment. Two decades of convincing the developing
world that if they just got the government out of its intrusive role in the
economy and let prices function, that everyone would live happily ever
after, was probably enough of that.
Now many are back again to the questions of how to influence
technology introduction, migration, economic policies, and agricultural
development to more systematically attack poverty and malnutrition. In
this paper the focus is on the introduction of new technologies in
semiarid regions of West Africa. Due to the concentration of rural
poverty in these regions more rapid technological change would also
have a substantial effect on rural poverty.
Some argue that maximizing economic growth is often the best
strategy for reducing poverty (Gardner, 2000). Fortunately, there are
also efficiency reasons for accelerating the introduction of
technological change in semiarid regions. When neither water
availability nor soil fertility are constraining, semiarid regions have
less disease and more sunlight than higher rainfall regions. So societies
need to take advantage of this as well as attaining the social benefits of
alleviating poverty by raising the incomes of the inhabitants of these
regions.
To evaluate the role of agriculture in reducing poverty in the semiarid
regions, let’s consider three basic questions:
1. How have the agricultural research and extension systems been
functioning in the regions with adequate rainfall?
2. Are there differences in these systems between increasing
productivity and helping poor people, (the efficiency-equity
problem)?
3. What are the appropriate agricultural development strategies for
moving into the lower rainfall regions where there are high
concentrations of poor people?34
The focus will be on the Sahelian countries and Ethiopia but the
analysis is relevant for the twenty Sub-Saharan countries with
substantial dependence upon their semiarid regions.
2. Performance of Agriculture
There have been impressive successes with both cotton and maize.
Notice the increase of cotton yields in Burkina Faso from the mid ‘60s
to the mid ‘80s (Figure 1). This is impressive growth and it happened
all over Franco-phone Africa. There were a stream of new cultivars,
increasing inorganic fertilizer use, and higher farmer incomes. There
was also a para-statal cotton agency, facilitating input use, providing
credit, guaranteeing prices and marketing the cotton. In recent years
yield growth leveled off here as in the US. However, breeding
switched then to higher fiber quality objectives in both places. To
reflect this it would be necessary to redo the axis to reflect the higher
economic value of the improved fiber.
1
Similarly, there were substantial gains in maize productivity during the
‘80s (Figure 2). From 1980-1992 yield growth rates for Ghana, Mali,
and Burkina Faso were 4.8, 6.7, and 5.7% (Sanders et al, 1996, p. 59).
These are also impressive yield gains. The gains were not as dramatic
as in cotton and in many countries the higher input use decreased again
after the para-statal removed the guaranteed price supports.
Nevertheless, as with cotton there were new cultivars available which
could be combined with soil amendments (manure and some inorganic
fertilizers) to give higher yields. The new technologies were adopted
quickly and gave high rates of return to research. There were
substantial increases in maize productivity and production.
1 The other relevant question is who benefits from the higher valued fiber and even
from the increased cotton yields. Some of the benefits undoubtedly go to the
farmer because the cotton regions are the most prosperous zones in the Sahelian
countries. However, there are monopsonistic buyers for the cotton so substantial
potential to avoid paying the competitive prices. World Bank estimates are that
farmers receive a much lower proportion of world export prices for lint in the Sahel
than in other regions of Africa with more competition in cotton marketing (Gary
Purcell, personal communication 1999).35
Source: Sanders et al., 1996 p. 55.
Figure 2. Maize yields in Ghana, Mali, and Burkina Faso, 1995-
1992
Source: Sanders et al., 1996, p. 59.
Figure 1. Cotton area and yields in Burkina Faso, 1951-
1992.36
The cotton parastatals then did not know what to do with the maize
surpluses as they had guaranteed prices. So they dropped the programs.
But they demonstrated again that with inputs and price supports they
could rapidly increase productivity and production. So the technical
problems of increasing output in the Sahel are not that difficult at least
in the higher rainfall regions.
3. Extending the Gains to Poor People and Lower Rainfall
Regions
As Sen (1981) has pointed out in his analysis of famine, a collapse of
agricultural output is not always the principal cause of famine. Rather
peoples’ ability to acquire food can be critical. There are cases of
successful agricultural production where in nearby regions people go
hungry because they do not have the entitlement (income, plus assets
they could cash in, plus any insurance, or state income support) to
obtain the food.
For example, in the second half of the ‘90s Ethiopia attained
impressive success in increasing productivity of the cereals with
widespread diffusion of new cultivars, credit, inorganic fertilizers, and
extension. Nevertheless, at the end of the ‘90s the FAO/ World Food
Program was making urgent appeals to donors for emergency food aid
for 8 to 9 million of their 62 million people after good crop years in the
prime zones (Georgis et al, 2001). Some inter- regional food trade
takes place but it was insufficient especially when incomes collapsed in
specific regions with inadequate or excessive water. Even with the
price declines of food in the higher rainfall regions the poor in the
adversely affected regions could not pay for it. Eliminating poverty and
malnutrition involves more than new technology introduction into
agriculture.
Another alternative for low income regions or countries has been to
look outside agriculture. Sachs of Harvard has suggested that many of
the countries of Africa should concentrate on labor intensive
manufacturing. But if Sahelian countries increased their production of
T shirts, could they sell them in developed countries? Could they
compete with the lower labor costs of India or China? Perhaps in
another two decades there will be more regions in the world similar to
Hong Kong, that essentially are dependent upon agricultural imports.
With the high populations presently in agriculture in African countries,
their low incomes, and their dependence upon local food supplies, a37
principal policy concern of these governments is to keep food prices
down and avoid being overly dependent upon food imports.
2
In West Africa food prices are kept depressed by government policy to
increase imports when supply declines with poor weather. With good
weather or with technological change prices collapse due to the price
inelasticity of demand.
3 So not only do these depressed prices from
successful production reduce farm level profitability, but public policy
reduces the profits in the adverse years. Both then discourage input
purchases and capital investment for the intensification process.
In Sub-Saharan African agriculture, especially outside the adequate
rainfall zones, soil fertility has been depleted by continuing population
pressure on the limited cultivable area. This population pressure has
been eliminating the traditional means of restoring fertility, fallow
rotation. Hence, farmers need to replace the essential nutrients with
input purchases. Higher output prices in the short run
4 and less output
price variability are required for farmers to purchase more inputs and
invest more in their farms.
2 There is presently a world cereal war in which developed countries pay their
farmers income subsidies, often based upon production, encouraging world cereal
price collapse. The objectives are to capture larger world market shares and to
obtain political support from farmers. There are high costs to taxpayers in the US
and the European Union for these programs. In fiscal year 2000 there were 28
billion dollars paid to US farmers in subsidies and disaster aid (Chicago Tribune,
Oct. 12, 2000). EU subsidies have been estimated to cost their taxpayers twice
those in the US (Binswanger and Townsend, 2000, pp. 1078, 1079) Developing
countries should take advantage of these lower world cereal prices when they can.
The questions to their policy makers are how long this will continue and then how
they will pay for the higher priced cereals if they allow their agriculture to stagnate
now.
3For poor people there are often few substitutes for their basic commodities so with
higher prices they still try to maintain their consumption. As prices decrease with
good weather or rapid introduction of technology there is only so much
sorghum/millet or cassava that people can eat so prices collapse. Once people have
more or less their basic needs, they don’t have any interest in buying more. For the
basic food crops the strategy needs to be to combine technology introduction with
the identification of new markets.
4In the longer run the continuing introduction of new technology will lower
production costs and allow prices to decline. In the short run (next five years)
governments need to make commitments to their farmers so that farmers have
confidence in purchasing inputs and making investments. Developed countries
have been excellent in recent years in supporting their agriculture and maximizing
technological change there. They still do not know how to phase out the subsidies.
So far there have not been taxpayer revolts in either the US of the European
Community about the size of these subsidies predominantly captured by the larger
farmers38
So if agricultural prices need to be higher so that farmers can invest in
inputs to increase soil fertility, what about the other objective of
helping poor people to eat more? So far donors and governments have
concentrated on food aid and food imports to keep food prices down.
But there are two principal determinants of the demand function of
poor people for food: food prices and their incomes. To get agriculture
moving with input purchases and investments by farmers, the
concentration needs to be on increasing the incomes of poor people
rather than on manipulating food prices. For example, when weather is
bad in some regions it is usually not bad in all regions. If donors
purchase food from one region to distribute in other regions, that would
be more beneficial for stimulating country growth than food aid and
food imports. Some of the donors did this in response to the adverse
weather conditions in Burkina Faso in 1998. However, the apparent
policy of the US now is to expand the role of the NGOs by monetising
food aid or letting NGOs sell increasing quantities of food and then
utilize these funds in their development programs. Food aid may be
more acceptable to US taxpayers than monetary flows but it will
continue to disrupt domestic incentives in developing countries to
improve agriculture.
Moreover, even in those countries where prices have been kept
artificially low by government intervention in poor agricultural years
and by natural economic factors in good agricultural years many
people in the society have not been able to eat adequately to eliminate
chronic and acute malnutrition.
So what needs to be done? Let’s look in more detail at one specific
country Burkina Faso.
4. Agricultural vs. Poverty Regions and the Constraints to
Development
In one of the agricultural strategies that all of the Sahelian countries are
now developing, Burkina Faso divides the country into two zones, an
agricultural region and a poverty zone (Fig. 3).
The agricultural region is the Southwest and most of the South. The
cotton sector is concentrated in the Southwest. Here rainfall is adequate
to insure a good response to inorganic fertilizers in most years. Soils
are better than in much of the country. Infrastructure investment has
been made and there are input and output marketing systems, including
research centered around cotton but extending to the other crops in the
cotton production systems. In this region the principal39
policy/investment recommendations of the strategy document are to
improve the efficiency of the input and product markets.
Source: Sanders et al. 1996, p. 73
Most of the rest of the country is considered to be a poverty zone. Here
low and irregular rainfall, poor soils, and low asset positions of farmers
require a very different approach. Input markets are written off as
farmers do not have the funds to purchase inputs.
Complex soil fertility strategies to substitute for inorganic fertilizers
are recommended. Little mention is made of water harvesting in spite
of the importance of this technique or irrigation in other dryland
regions that have successfully developed. There is also little mention of
product markets.
What is supposed to happen in these poverty zones? Very small or
marginal gains in income are possible with the various measures
recommended, such as improved seed, greater use and/or improved
quality of manure, rock phosphate, inter-cropping of cereals and
legumes. Once these marginal income gains are attained, farmers sit
and wait for industrial development in the capital or in the coastal
countries. Lately that industrial growth has either been slow or
Figure 3. Climatic zones in Burkina Faso.40
associated with minimal employment growth; hence, a decade or two
of waiting is implied before out-migration enables a welfare increase of
this sitting rural population and more extensive land use in the region.
Should the Sahelian countries buy into this waiting game for most of
their population? Is most of the Sahelian crop area too marginal for
agriculture for us to worry about the functioning of the input and
output markets there? If we compare the Sahel with other dryland
regions in the world, the answer to both of the above is clearly no.
Dryland areas have the potential of a comparative advantage over
higher-rainfall regions if increased water availability can be combined
with higher soil fertility. With these two additional components,
dryland regions have less plant disease problems and more sunlight.
Both of these advantages are substantial ones. The trick is to combine
the water harvesting with the soil-fertility improvement. With these
two inputs, there is a substantial change. It then will be profitable to
introduce new cultivars and often organic fertilization to complement
the inorganic fertilization by holding the nutrients and water in the soil.
5. Niche Crops and the Traditional Cereals
With the emphasis on markets and demand-induced technology
development, many have put the niche crops at the center of crop
development activities for these lower rainfall regions. To what extent
will the agricultural development of countries, such as Burkina Faso,
be influenced by higher export earnings from string beans, fruits and
vegetables under irrigation? In East Africa, flower exports to Europe
have grown very rapidly. These niche crops are activities that a small
number of farmers will produce for export with high technology. A
requirement will be good marketing information and infrastructure.
These are very specific markets with high quality requirements that can
be saturated. These are also technologies with sufficient earnings to
pay for extension and research services. So specialists can be engaged
in both the extension and research sectors to service them.
Meanwhile, there are advantages to looking again at the traditional
dryland crops in the region in the same analytical fashion, markets
first. The traditional crops of the low-rainfall regions of the Sahel are
sorghum, millet, and cowpea. With their evolved tolerance to drought
and low soil fertility, they have become the staple food crops of most
of the Sahel and even the northern areas of the coastal countries. Have
they now become relics useful only to maintain genetic diversity and a
food reserve in bad years but not very interesting for a research focus
on increasing productivity?41
What happens in the developed countries? In Texas, Nebraska, and
Kansas as rainfall becomes too marginal and irregular for maize,
farmers plant sorghum. With a small price discount for quality (10%),
sorghum becomes an important component of feeds in the United
States. And in the developing countries? As the development process
of income growth occurs, the first major shift is the rapidly increasing
demand for a higher quality diet, including animal protein, fruits, and
vegetables. Brazil and Honduras illustrate this process of demand
growth for products, such as poultry, occurring at almost 10% rates for
one to two decades. No developing country has been able to respond to
these types of demand shifts for grains without substantially increasing
its imports. This process of rapid introduction of poultry products is
ongoing now in Botswana with its last decade of rapid economic
growth and is beginning in Senegal, Zambia, and Kenya.
What needs to be done to convert the traditional food grains to feed
grains? In Senegal, maize is being imported as the principal component
of the ration. Maize production can be increased slightly in Senegal but
the primary cereal is millet. Millet is a good feed. Millet production
and productivity can be substantially increased, as will be discussed
later. To sell millet to feed producers, minimum qualities and quantities
needs to be assured to the feed mixer. This is something that organized
farmers’ groups could do.
What about the people who depend upon millet as a food grain? One of
the principal constraints to the introduction of new technology with the
traditional food crops is the low profitability and the price collapse
from the inelastic demand for principal food staples when weather is
good or new technology is rapidly introduced. The advantage of a
demand shift is to encourage rapid technology introduction while
maintaining in the short run higher prices, higher profitability, and a
moderating or smoothing of the price-collapse effect from output
increase. The increased demand encourages the rapid introduction of
technological change. These two activities of demand expansion and
technology introduction need to be undertaken simultaneously. In the
longer run as new technology reduces farmers’ production costs output
prices can fall without affecting as much farmers’ profits and then both
farmers and consumers can benefit.
So we need a new view of the traditional cereals, sorghum and millet,
based upon this prospective demand increase for feed grains. There
will still be a lag before income growth is sufficient to induce these
rapid demand shifts to a higher-quality diet in most Sahelian countries,
perhaps another five to ten years. The developing countries that have
gone through this process have failed to respond to these demand shifts
by producing the feed grains domestically. Hence, the Sahelian42
countries need to be concerned with these demand shifts now and to
anticipate them. For smaller demand shifts it is useful to identify the
factors enabling the growth in urban rice consumption in the last two
decades in the Sahel. One important factor is the greater availability of
processing-preparation technologies for rice than for the traditional
cereals. this appeals to urban women since the opportunity costs of
their time increases in urban areas. These same technology processes
are being adapted to sorghum and millet as the recent processing and
sales of coucous of millet in Senegal and cookies from the new white
sorghums in Mali have demonstrated.
So on the demand side the potential for the traditional cereals and other
food crops has been substantially underestimated.
5 What about the
supply side? Are there technologies available to rapidly shift the supply
curve outward in these lower rainfall regions?
6. Water Harvesting and Inorganic Fertilizers
The principal constraint to increasing crop yields in semiarid regions is
clear from the definition of the region, lack of water.
6 In much of the
semiarid zone irrigation will not be both technically and economically
viable. In those soils with crusting or other runoff problems water
harvesting will need to precede soil fertility improvements. On the
sandy soils where rapid infiltration rather than runoff is the water
availability problem the water harvesting technique can be with
organic fertilization or even higher plant densities (Shapiro and
Sanders, 2001; Shapiro et.al, 1993).
The important point here is the combination of increased water
availability with moderate levels of inorganic fertilizers. This
combination has been repeatedly shown to approximately double crop
5As already mentioned the grain legumes are an especially interesting case from
the perspective of future markets. So we will consider cowpeas, pigeon peas, and
other grain legumes below.
6On sandy soils the argument has been made that the problem is soil fertility rather
than water availability. In these areas the principal water problem is infiltration.
Increasing soil fertility is associated with increased plant bio-mass on the surface
and in the ground. This has been shown to result in increased water use efficiency.
Clearly, water availability and soil fertility have to be simultaneously undertaken.
Then methods for doing this will depend upon the soil types with fundamental
differences between soils where runoff is the principal problem and those where
infiltration is too rapid, the soils with more clay and sandier soils respectively.43
yields while decreasing the riskiness of fertilization alone ( Table 1;
Sanders et al, 1996, p.78).
The other important point to make here is to distinguish between the
types of fertilizer and their objectives. Inorganic fertilizers are designed
to provide low-cost sources of the principal nutrients, nitrogen,
phosphorous and potassium. Nitrogen and phosphorous are the
principal soil nutrient deficits in most semiarid regions and potassium
will quickly become limiting as cereal yields are increased with the
other two nutrients. Organic fertilizers are useful for increasing water
and nutrient retention capacity, especially in the sandy soils. Without
their inclusion with the inorganic fertilizers on sandy soils, the
principal nutrients can be rapidly leached below where the plant roots
can tap them. Organic fertilizers also increase biological activity and
can provide micro nutrients. Unfortunately, they are usually not cost
efficient providers of the major nutrients (Sanders et al, 1996, p.64)
and are usually not available in sufficient quantities for this function.
The bottom line on soil fertility and agricultural chemicals in general is
the need to avoid looking for a magic solution. If everywhere that crop
yields have been substantially increased inorganic fertilizers have been
involved, is it really likely that Sub-Saharan Africa will find new
solutions to the soil-fertility problem without them?44
Table1. Yields and Percentages of Farmers Taking Cash Losses from Fertilization and Tied Ridges
in Sorghum Production in Farm Trial Villages, 1983 and 1984





















11 Manual 157 416 431 652 27 9
Nedogo 18 Donkey 173 425 355 773 50 0
Bangasse 12 Manual 293 456 616 944 8 17
Dissankuy 25 Ox 447 588 681 855 28 0
Diapangou 19 Manual 335 571 729 1006 26 0
Diapangou 19 Donkey 498 688 849 1133 21 0
Diapangou 19 Ox 466 704 839 1177 5 0
1983
Nedogo
3 Manual 430 484 547 851 56 0
Nedogo 11 Donkey 444 644 604 962 58 42
Bangasse 12 Manual 406 493 705 690 21 17
Diapangou 24 Manual 363 441 719 753 8 8
Diapangou 25 Donkey 481 552 837 871 12 16
Diapangou 25 Ox 526 578 857 991 20 12
Source: Sanders et al., 199645
The observation that farmers in semiarid regions do not purchase
inputs, therefore they will not purchase inputs in the future needs to be
examined. Is the failure to purchase inputs a problem of farmer
liquidity (access to capital) or of their being convinced that a given
technology is sufficiently profitable to make the investment? We have
observed the flows of remittances to farmers in semiarid regions, their
savings invested in the highly liquid livestock, and their ability to come
up with capital for weddings, funerals, and livestock purchase. Their
problem of low input purchases is not the supply of capital but the
demand for the new technologies. So we need to demonstrate to
farmers the potential of these new technologies and to find new sources
of demand expansion for their traditional crops.
One consequence of the structural adjustment programs was a decline
of most food crop seed production. Public seed companies were either
being eliminated or ordered to become more profitabile. The private
seed sector has not been filling the gap. Rather private seed companies
were concentrating on hybrids and on crop activities in the prime
agricultural areas. Food crops outside the prime agricultural areas were
ignored.
Community seed production schemes with NGO and/or national
research-scientist support have been used to fill this gap. These
schemes can function as long as there is a high level of well-trained,
technical input. As soon as the pressure of other activities occurs for
the scientific staff of the national research centers or extension
agencies, there tends to be a decline in the quality of seed production.
7
The problems of quality control among small farmer seed producers
are serious, especially the needs for roguing and isolation. Farmers
need substantial training to handle these technical problems of seed
production.
In the long run for the semiarid sector, some specific policies to
encourage the evolution of private sector seed production are
necessary. Breeders’ rights, in which the individual developers of new
material directly benefit from its diffusion to farmers, may be a start in
encouraging small private seed concerns specialized in specific
activities. Breeders are often innovators and entrepreneurs. They may
not have the capital themselves for starting a seed business but they
probably know people, who do.
The evolution of private sector seed producers could also allow the
public-sector company to return to their previous function of providing
quality seed to small farmers, open- pollinated varieties, and other seed
7 The NGOs could themselves hire highly trained agricultural scientists and a few
of the larger ones have done this.46
functions presently not profitable enough or too risky for the private
sector to undertake.In this scenario the public sector becomes the
orphan crop seed producer until the sector becomes profitable enough
for the private sector to enter. Here it becomes critical for the public
sector to create a bridge to the evolution of expanded activities by the
private sector by not subsidizing the costs of seed production.
Moreover, the public sector needs to encourage the private sector to
take over its activities once the public sector has demonstrated a
potential profitable demand for these activities.
Fertilizer distribution is another critical activity for the entire country.
But as with the seed sector, improving the functioning of this market in
semiarid regions will be very difficult until there is increased water
harvesting or irrigation in these regions. Once more water is available,
demand increases substantially for inorganic fertilizers. But water
availability is the prerequisite.
7. Product Markets
The concept of demand driven growth for determining priorities in
agricultural research institutions is now widely disseminated. This
should not be interpreted as a license to neglect semiarid regions as has
been in the case of Ethiopian seed production (Georgis et al, 2001).
Rather there is substantial potential for increasing yields of the food
crops in semiarid regions. We already discussed the potential role of
the traditional cereals as feed grains.
Presently there is substantial research effort in the Sahel to identify and
expand the marketing of traditional cereals by improved processing,
marketing new food products, or looking for new markets in bread or
beer. In the two West African networks for millet and sorghum, a
major proportion of their activities (as reflected in the subject matter of
their workshops) is put into this search for new markets and increased
quality control.
Grain legumes provide one of the most interesting illustrations of the
need to take a new look at dryland regions. The importance of cowpeas
as a cash crop both for hay and for grain has been increasing
substantially across the Sahel. As with the cereals, higher input levels
are needed to increase productivity, especially phosphorus, but also the
control of field and storage insects. The combined gains in sales and
productivity will enable improved nutrition. With its high protein
levels, food use of grain legumes is clearly important to many small
farmers.47
The most interesting recent case has been the search for new export
markets for pigeon peas in Kenya. ICRISAT had identified the
characteristics of pigeon pea required for making “dhal.” Then an
ICRISAT extension specialist went the next step of putting producers
and exporters in touch. The components of the integrated system then
were “access to well organized markets, distribution, and post harvest
systems; effective market information; and technologies that allow
them (farmers) to be price and quality competitive.” (Jones,
Freeman,Walls and Londner 1999, p. 3).
The combination of quality control
8 in all stages of the market and
searching out new markets were very innovative for an international
center and more characteristic of a private company. The importance of
quality control in producing specific cultivars and then maintaining
that quality control in the marketing channels is now being discussed
for many commodities. Clearly, there will need to be incentives to
farmers and marketing personnel to maintain the quality levels. The
direct ties and even advance contracts between exporters and farmers
are often a useful feature of developing these new markets and getting
the exporters involved in input supplies as a start in the quality control
process.
8. Conclusions
One indirect consequence of the concentration upon privatization and
getting prices right is the neglect of public services, which had
previously been directed at a broad spectrum of the society not just at
the most productive regions. These services were often provided very
inefficiently and sometimes even retarded the evolution of the private
sector as with the public seed production system in Niger consistently
underpricing seed and thereby preventing entry of private producers.
This neglect of the public sector has also extended to critical public
goods as research but even in the private sector it is necessary to move
beyond a concentration on only the prime regions. With some support
to public goods and clever design of incentives to the private sector
other areas of agricultural production have substantial potential.
8 For pigeon peas, the quality considerations include grain size, color, processing
characteristics and quality control on the delivery to market. The need for quality
seed production and for sufficient incentives for farmers are critical components of
the successful introduction process (Jones et.al., 1999, pp. 19, 20). Another
innovation was making the specialized exporters responsible for quality seed
production.48
Moreover, these areas are often where much of the low income sector
in agriculture live.
Given the substantial potential of dryland agriculture with a little water
harvesting and some inorganic fertilizer, the gloom-and-doom attitudes
of the Sahel need to be relegated to history. Some of what Israel,
Australia, much of Texas, Nebraska, and Kansas can do with more
sunlight and less plant disease can also be done in the Sahel. Water
retention and inorganic fertilizers are simple technologies. This is not
nuclear science.
The keys to developing the drylands are the same as in the higher-
rainfall regions and consist of two simple principles. Plants need
nitrogen and phosphorus (and other major and minor nutrients).
Farmers need to make money to adopt new technology. So get the
Input and Product markets working for the drylands and the rest of the
economy. The corollary here is to stop looking for magic or low-input
solutions. None of the tricks or gimmicks provide sufficient plant
nutrients. This includes manure, rock phosphate, intercropping of
cereals and legumes, new cultivars alone, microrisa, and inoculation.
So worry first about water and then inorganic fertilizer, where
necessary, complemented with organic fertilizers. Identify the specific
requirements to improve the functioning of the Input and Product
markets for the dryland regions.
Developing the drylands is a major attack on rural poverty in Sub-
Saharan African agriculture. But technology will not be able to resolve
the problems of all the farmers. In regions where inorganic fertilizer
does not become profitable with the removal of the subsidies and the
improved functioning of Input and Product markets, there is not much
that can be done in crop production Here we need to begin thinking of
out-migration with the crop area ultimately to go into other activities
such as forestry, agro-forestry, livestock production (Sanders et al.
1996, pp. 107-109).49
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Burkina Faso: principaux résultats.
Boubié T. Bassolé1 Introduction
Au Burkina Faso, l'Etat s'est désengagé de la commercialisation des
céréales depuis 1992. En plus de ce désengagement, il y a eu la
libéralisation du commerce des céréales, de leur prix et la création d’un
système d’information des marchés dans le but de rendre plus efficace
l’organisation et l’efficacité économique des marchés céréaliers. Dès
lors, il nous est apparu intéressant de chercher à répondre aux questions
suivantes. La politique de libéralisation a-t-elle favorisé un
accroissement de la concurrence de la structure du marché céréalier ?
Les acteurs privés de la commercialisation des céréales ont-ils réagi
favorablement à cet environnement avec des changements dans leur
comportement et leur stratégie ? Quels sont les effets de l’évolution de
la structure du marché et du comportement des acteurs céréaliers sur
l’efficacité économique des marchés et plus exactement sur l’efficacité
temporelle d’une part et l’efficacité spatiale de l’autre ?
L’objet de ce papier est de présenter les principaux résultats des effets
de la libéralisation sur le marché céréalier. Il est structuré de la façon
suivante. Dans la deuxième partie, nous exposons le cadre conceptuel
et analytique de l’étude. Ensuite, nous présentons successivement les
résultats relatifs aux effets de la libéralisation sur la structure du
marché et le comportement des commerçants et des producteurs
(troisième partie) et sur l’efficacité économique du marché (quatrième
partie). En guise de conclusion, nous faisons quelques remarques
terminales (cinquième partie).
2 Cadre conceptuel et analytique
Le cadre conceptuel auquel on se réfère pour apporter des éléments de
réponse à la problématique de la recherche est celui de l’économie néo-
institutionnelle et plus précisément de l’économie des coûts de
transaction pour les raisons suivantes. La plupart des auteurs
actuellement s'accordent sur le fait que pour analyser la performance
d'un système économique et principalement dans les PVD, il faut faire
appel à la nouvelle analyse économique institutionnelle ou économie
néo-institutionnelle (voir par exemple, de Janvry, Sadoulet et
Torbecke, 1994). En effet cette théorie semble avoir plus d'implications
dans l'organisation économique à cause des phénomènes hors marchés
qui se déroulent dans ces pays et pour le fait qu'il s'agit pour la plupart
des pays en transition d'un régime dirigiste vers un régime libéral. En
relation avec ce cadre conceptuel, l’approche analytique utilisée est une54
Figure 1 : Relations entre les composantes du cadre analytique
Environnement institutionnel Structure
- Libéralisation du commerce et
prix des céréales
- Existence d'un Etat de droit
- Typologie des acteurs
- Système d'information des
marchés
- Degré de concurrence
concertation des marchés
- Mesures incitatives pour
promouvoir de l'information
- Typologie des marchés
- Typologie acteurs
- Degré de concurrence
- Accès au marché
- Sources et distribution de
l‘information
- Règlements formels et
informels
Comportement
- Typologie de la clientèle
- Mode de transaction
- Période de vente
- Taux de rotation des céréales et comportement de
stockage
- Structure des coûts de commercialisation
- Réaction des acteurs au changement institutionnel
Performance
- Effectivité.
- Efficacité: Marges commerciales
Fluctuations saisonnières des prix
Intégration des marchés dans l'espace
synthèse des méthodes traditionnelles Structure-Comportement-
Performance et de l’approche néo-institutionnelle avec cependant une
place privilégiée de cette approche. Il s’agit alors de montrer comment
l’environnement institutionnel influence la structure des marchés
céréaliers, le comportement des acteurs (producteurs et commerçants)55
et finalement la performance de la commercialisation. La figure 1 est
une illustration de ces relations.
Deux types de données ont été utilisées pour estimer les effets de la
libéralisation. Ce sont des données primaires et des données
secondaires. Les données primaires ont concerné la structure du
marché céréalier, le comportement et la stratégie des commerçants et
des producteurs, et les coûts de commercialisation. Ces données ont
servi à apprécier l'évolution de la structure des marchés, la réaction des
commerçants et des producteurs dans cet environnement libéral et
l'estimation des marges commerciales. Quant aux données secondaires,
elles sont relatives aux séries des prix des céréales et elles ont été
utilisées pour estimer l'efficacité temporelle et spatiale du commerce
des céréales.
3 Environnement libéral, structure du marché céréalier
et comportement des acteurs
3.1 Environnement libéral et structure du marché céréalier
Les céréales sont actuellement commercialisées au Burkina Faso dans
un contexte caractérisé par un Etat de droit qui met les agents
économiques en condition de s’exprimer librement sur les marchés.
Théoriquement, cet environnement respecte et sécurise légalement les
droits de propriété des acteurs (producteurs et commerçants). Par
ailleurs, l’existence d’institutions formelles et informelles liées à la
commercialisation des céréales comme le Système d’information du
marché céréalier (SIM) contribue à stimuler et à dynamiser les
échanges commerciaux de céréales entre ces acteurs. Selon les
enseignements de l’économie néo-institutionnelle, ce contexte est
supposé favoriser l'existence d'une structure plus concurrentielle. Il
s'agit alors de tester cette hypothèse.
Les résultats obtenus à partir de l'analyse des données primaires ont fait
ressortir les éléments suivants. L'évolution de la structure du marché
céréalier, telle qu'elle apparaît selon les informations recueillies sur
certains éléments comme la typologie des marchés et des acteurs, le
libre accès, les sources et la distribution de l'information, les opinions
des commerçants et des producteurs, laisse penser à un développement
de la concurrence. En effet, l'entrée de nouveaux acteurs (commerçants
privés, institution de commercialisation des céréales) sur le marché
céréalier a eu pour conséquence une augmentation globale du nombre
d'intermédiaires. Ceci a accentué la concurrence. Le développement de
cette concurrence a entraîné, avec l'effet des récoltes, une meilleure56
rémunération des producteurs et principalement ceux des zones
excédentaires. Enfin l'existence d'un système d'information des
marchés a contribué à rendre le marché céréalier plus transparent car ce
système selon les informations recueillies auprès de certains
commerçants leur permet de choisir leurs marchés
d'approvisionnement en fonction des prix des céréales. Il convient de
noter cependant que la concurrence du marché céréalier est entravée
par certaines difficultés révélées par les commerçants.
Il s'agit du faible financement des activités de la commercialisation des
céréales par les banques, du coût élevé de la patente, de l'instauration
de taxes injustifiées, de mauvais état de l'infrastructure routière, de
l’irrégularité de la diffusion des prix des céréales et surtout de la
fiabilité de l’information relative à ces prix. En effet le constat est que
le SIM assure avec beaucoup de difficultés ces différentes tâches. Cette
déficience semble s'expliquer par des problèmes d'ordre institutionnel
et administratif que l'on peut résumer en deux points.
Tout d'abord il y a eu des problèmes conjoncturels qui sont relatifs à la
restructuration et à la liquidation de l’Office national de la
commercialisation des céréales (OFNACER) et précisément au départ
des agents de sa cellule d'Etude, de Planification et de Statistique avec
qui le système d'information a été élaboré et mis en place et celui des
magasiniers qui étaient chargés de la collecte des prix sur les
marchés13. Ces événements conjoncturels ont eu des répercussions
négatives sur le fonctionnement de l'institution.
Ensuite on peut mentionner des problèmes structurels qui concernent la
transmission à de l'information collectée sur les différents marchés au
siège du SIM à Ouagadougou pour sa saisie, son traitement et sa
diffusion. Pour la transmission, l’information sur les prix collectée
dans les grandes villes, est transférée par télécopie à Ouagadougou.
Mais dans les zones rurales le transfert de cette information est basé sur
le recours des transporteurs routiers. Cette forme de transfert peut être
source de perte ou de retard. Quant aux tâches de saisie et de
traitement, elles sont exécutées par un seul agent.
Ces difficultés institutionnelles illustrent le fait que souvent dans les
pays en transition, des réformes économiques sont mises en œuvre
avant que les changements institutionnels nécessaires soient effectifs.
En effet le SIM a été créé dans un contexte de réformes (liquidation de
13 Environ 300 agents de l’OFNACER ont été licenciés à la suite de sa liquidation.57
l'OFNACER, libéralisation du commerce et des prix des céréales) mais
des mesures adéquates (personnel qualifié, ressources matérielles) n'ont
pas accompagnées sa création pour permettre à cette institution de
réaliser efficacement ces objectifs. Cette inadéquation illustre l’inertie
de cette structure. Cette forme d'inertie institutionnelle a été mise en
évidence par certaines études sur la transition dans les pays de l'Est.
3.2 Environnement libéral et comportement des acteurs du
commerce des céréales
3.2.1 Environnement libéral et comportement des producteurs.
L'idée générale est que les producteurs dans les pays africains
concentrent leur vente immédiatement après les récoltes et ne profitent
pas de la hausse des prix des céréales pendant les mois de soudure. Par
exemple Dejou (1987, p. 128) indique pour le cas du Burkina Faso que
le comportement de la majorité des producteurs constituée par des
petits et moyens producteurs est de concentrer leur vente pendant la
période d'octobre à décembre au moment des récoltes. Les résultats des
enquêtes confirment-ils ce comportement ? L'environnement libéral a-
t-il influencé le comportement des acteurs (commerçants et
producteurs) du commerce des céréales ? Les résultats obtenus
montrent que l'environnement libéral a eu une influence sur le
comportement des producteurs notamment ceux des zones
excédentaires. Ces producteurs semblent passés d'un comportement
passif à un comportement actif dans la vente de leurs céréales. En effet,
non seulement ils planifient cette vente dans le temps pour bénéficier
de la hausse saisonnière des prix, mais ils préfèrent vendre aussi au
plus offrant. De même en bénéficiant de l'encadrement de certaines
institutions qui sont impliquées dans le commerce des céréales, ils
diversifient leurs partenaires commerciaux.
3.2.2 Environnement libéral et comportement de stockage des
commerçants
Le stockage des céréales et notamment celui de longue durée par les
commerçants est l’une des stratégies que ceux-ci peuvent développer
dans l'objectif de maximiser leur profit. Ainsi ils achèteront de grandes
quantités de céréales au moment des récoltes où les prix sont faibles et
vendre une grande partie de leurs stocks au moment où les prix sont
élevés en période de soudure.
Dans le passé et précisément durant la période révolutionnaire les
commerçants étaient qualifiés de véreux et de spéculateurs qui
exploitaient les producteurs et les consommateurs. Cet environnement58
hostile défavorisait le stockage car les commerçants dans la crainte
d'une saisie de leurs stocks par les autorités préféraient avoir une
rotation rapide de leurs céréales. Dans le contexte de l'Etat de droit et
de la libéralisation du commerce où les droits de propriété privée sont
garantis, on peut supposer que cet environnement incite les
commerçants à stocker leurs céréales pendant une période relativement
longue. C'est cette hypothèse que l'on cherche à tester grâce aux
résultats des enquêtes
Les résultats obtenus révèlent que l'environnement institutionnel n'a
pas véritablement changé le comportement de stockage des grossistes
et des semi-grossistes. En effet la durée moyenne de stockage de la
majorité des répondants n'excède pas trois mois. La conservation des
céréales au cours du temps par les commerçants pour bénéficier d’une
éventuelle hausse des prix pendant la période de soudure ne semble pas
être une stratégie de maximisation des profits de ces commerçants.
Ceux-ci préfèrent plutôt une rotation rapide de leurs grains pour les
raisons suivantes. La première raison invoquée est l’insuffisance du
capital financier (fonds de roulement) pour l'achat de grandes quantités
de céréales au moment des récoltes et les difficultés de conservation
des stocks. La troisième raison du comportement de la faible durée de
stockage de la majorité des grossistes et des semi-grossistes que ceux-
ci n’ont pas révélée se trouve dans la rotation technique d’une partie de
stock de sécurité de la société nationale de la gestion du stock de
sécurité alimentaire (SONAGESS). En effet pour renouveler son stock
de sécurité, la SONAGESS procède annuellement à un déstockage
d’une partie de ces céréales. Ce déstockage ou rotation technique a lieu
au moment de la soudure (juin, juillet et août) sur appel d’offre. Ce
déstockage entraîne également un accroissement de céréales pendant
cette période. Aussi tenant compte de tous ces facteurs et de leurs
effets sur le niveau des prix pendant la soudure, la majorité des
grossistes et des semi-grossistes préfère-t-elle éviter le stockage de
longue durée. Cette politique de l’offre de céréales par l’Etat qui ne
favorise pas le stockage de longue durée est également incompatible
(contradictoire) avec la mesure d’incitation de l’octroi du crédit aux
commerçants céréaliers que le gouvernement veut promouvoir.
3.2.3 Les coûts de commercialisation
La partie relative au comportement de stockage des commerçants a
révélé que la durée moyenne de stockage de la majorité des répondants
n'excède pas trois mois. Cette stratégie est plutôt basée sur une rotation
rapide de leurs grains et elle a pour conséquence d’augmenter la
fréquence d’achats des céréales dans les zones d’approvisionnement.59
On peut donc admettre que cette fréquence contribue à maintenir des
coûts de commercialisation plus élevés notamment les coûts de
transaction. Le tableau 1 met en évidence la répartition des coûts de
transaction et de transformation dans l’ensemble des coûts de
commercialisation liés aux échanges commerciaux des céréales selon
les différents commerçants
14.
Tableau 1: Répartition de coûts de commercialisation d’un sac de



















































Source : calculs effectués à partir des données d’enquête
Ce tableau synthétique fait ressortir que la part des coûts de transaction
est relativement prépondérante dans l’ensemble des coûts de
commercialisation quelle que soit la distance du commerce (commerce
intra-régional ou commerce inter-régional). En effet cette catégorie de
coûts représente en moyenne plus de 60% des coûts de
commercialisation. La forte proportion de ces coûts est principalement
due au coût de transport des céréales. Ceci confirme l’une des
difficultés de la commercialisation des céréales révélées par certains
commerçants à savoir «le coût élevé des transports dû au mauvais état
des routes ». Cependant il convient de noter que le niveau du coût du
transport peut également être imputé aux divers circuits de
commercialisation que les commerçants suivent dans leurs opérations.
En effet le commerçant grossiste ou semi-grossiste n’a pas un seul
marché d’approvisionnement mais il se déplace sur plusieurs marchés
14 Le coûts de transformation sont liés aux coûts engendrés par la valeur ajoutée au
produit. Pour les céréales au Burkina, il s’agit essentiellement des coûts de
stockage (coûts d’entreposage et coûts finaciers). Les coûts de transaction sont les
coûts engendrés au moment de la transaction lorsqu’un individu transfère le droit
de propriété qu’il détient sur un bien dans un cadre marchand. Il s’agit des coûts de
transport, de la manutention, des taxes de commercialisation des céréales, etc.60
pour satisfaire sa demande des céréales. Cette ronde des commerçants
à la recherche des céréales s’explique principalement par
l’incomplétude et l’imperfection de l’information qu’ils détiennent du
marché céréalier. Cette information incomplète et asymétrique
contribue par conséquent à augmenter les coûts de transport moyens
supportés par le commerçant pour le transfert des céréales. Ces
résultats créditent la vision néo-institutionnelle selon laquelle dans les
pays en développement où les transactions sont incertaines et risquées
à cause d’une information asymétrique et imparfaite, les coûts de
transaction sont plus élevés et les dysfonctionnements des marchés
plus fréquents.
4 Efficacité libérale et efficacité économique des marchés
4.1 Environnement libéral et efficacité temporelle des marchés
céréaliers
L’efficacité temporelle des marchés ou efficacité saisonnière des prix
est l’un des indicateurs de l’efficacité économique des marchés.
L’étude de l’efficacité temporelle des marchés a pour objectif
d’analyser les variations intra-annuelles des prix des céréales par
rapport au coût de stockage afin de déterminer si les marchés
apparaissent spéculatifs au moment de la soudure. En effet, dans un
pays comme le Burkina Faso, les récoltes ont lieu une fois dans l'année
au cours de trois mois (octobre à décembre) avec une période de
soudure qui s'étale de juillet à août. Ces caractéristiques saisonnières
entraînent alors des fluctuations des prix au cours de l'année.
Par rapport au comportement des acteurs, ces enquêtes ont révélé que
la grande majorité des commerçants ne stocke pas au-delà d'une durée
de trois mois et qu’une forte proportion des producteurs étale dans
l’année leur commercialisation des céréales. Ce comportement
novateur de la vente des céréales par les producteurs suppose qu’ils
contribuent avec les commerçants à assurer les opérations d’arbitrage
inter-temporel. Il est donc important de déterminer la relation entre les
variations saisonnières des prix des céréales et les résultats des
enquêtes sur l’évolution des marchés et sur le comportement des
commerçants et des producteurs.
4.1.1L’évolution des prix des céréales
Le tableau 2 donne un aperçu de l’évolution des prix du sorgho au
consommateur et les coefficients de variation de ces prix sur chaque
marché (voir également graphiques 1a à 8a). Ces prix sont des61
moyennes pour l’année calculées à partir des fréquences mensuelles
des données
Tableau 2: Prix moyens (FCFA/KG) au consommateur en terme
réel du sorgho et leur instabilité

















































































































































Note: Les prix sont des moyennes pour l’année.
cv = coefficient de variation = écart-type/moyenne
Dédou = Dédougou; Koudo = Koudougou; Ouahi =
Ouahigouya; Pouy = Pouytenga, Bobo=Bobo-Dioulasso
Source: Calculs effectués à partir des données mensuelles du SIM.62
Graphiques 1a à 8a: Evolution de sp r i xàl ac o n s o m m a t i o ne n














































































90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97
DEDOU DEDOUR
2a.Dédougou63
Si l'on considère maintenant les prix au producteur, le tableau 3 et les
graphiques (1b à 7b) montrent comment ces prix ont évolué au cours
de la période 1992-1996.
Tableau 3: Prix moyens (FCFA/KG) au producteur en terme réel
du sorgho et leur instabilité


















































































Note: Les prix sont les moyennes de l’année.
n.d. = données non disponibles.
cv = coefficient de variation = écart-type/moyenne.
Bogand= Bogandé; Djibas= Djibasso; N'Dor= N'Dorola;
Pouy= Pouytenga; Solenz= Solenzo.
Source: Calculs effectués à partir des données mensuelles du SIM.64
Graphiques 1b à 8b: Evolution des prix au producteur en termes
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L’analyse de l’évolution des prix des céréales dans le temps révèle une
forte augmentation des prix au producteur et consommateur après la
libéralisation du marché céréalier. L’un des facteurs explicatifs de cette
augmentation est le changement structurel de la demande des céréales
(accroissement de la demande globale des céréales) par rapport à une
offre en régression. L’accroissement de la demande globale est dû à la
demande d’importation des pays frontaliers et à celle des
consommateurs locaux. Mais dans la même période, l’offre des
céréales a stagné, voire diminuée.
4.1.2Les variations saisonnières des prix et les coûts de stockage
Pour un produit stockable et dont la production a lieu pendant une
période déterminée de l’année, les différences des prix entre la récolte
et la soudure devraient être égales au coût de stockage si les marchés
sont concurrentiels (Goetz et Weber, 1986, Azam et al. 1992).
L’estimation de la rentabilité nette du stockage (comparaison de la
différence des prix entre deux périodes au coût de stockage) permet de
conclure si les marchés sont spéculatifs (faible concurrence) ou si la
saisonnalité des prix est forte. En suivant Armah (1989, p. 268) on peut
estimer la rentabilité nette du stockage de la façon suivante. Dans un
premier temps, on détermine l’écart de l’indice saisonnier c’est-à-dire
la différence entre le niveau le plus élevé et celui et plus faible de
l’indice de saisonnalité. Cet écart est ensuite exprimé en variation
totale par rapport à l’indice le plus faible. Enfin, on calcule
l’augmentation mensuelle de l’indice de saisonnalité qui est le rapport
entre la variation totale et le délai moyen (i-e le nombre de mois entre
l’indice de saisonnalité le plus élevé et le plus faible). Le tableau 4
indique la rentabilité nette du stockage.66
Tableau 4: Ecart et augmentation mensuelle en moyenne des
indices saisonniers des prix au consommateur pour le
sorgho













































































































Source: Calculs effectués à partir des données mensuelles du SIM .
I lr e s s o r td ec et a b l e a uq u el ac o m p a r a i s o ne n t r el ’ a u g m e n t a t i o n
annuelle en moyenne de l’indice de saisonnalité et le coût du stockage
montre que cet indice est inférieur au coût de stockage. Autrement dit
l’accroissement saisonnier des prix ne couvre pas le coût du stockage.
L’arbitrage dans le temps n’est pas dû uniquement aux opérations
d’arbitrage des commerçants mais aussi à celles de certains acteurs et
institutions comme les producteurs et la SONAGESS. Ce résultat
n’apporte pas de crédit au sentiment selon lesquels les commerçants
sont des spéculateurs et des exploiteurs des consommateurs et des
producteurs. Ces fluctuations saisonnières ne permettent donc pas de
suspecter une rentabilité démesurée provenant de la constitution des
stocks de céréales pour la commercialisation et ce dans la plupart des
régions.67
5 Environnement libéral et efficacité spatiale du marché
céréalier
L’efficacité spatiale ou l’efficacité de l’intégration spatiale de la
commercialisation des céréales étudie le fonctionnement des marchés
dans l’espace. L’objectif de l’intégration spatiale des marchés est
d’évaluer le fonctionnement des échanges commerciaux des céréales
entre des paires de marchés – en l’occurrence entre marchés
excédentaires et marchés déficitaires - en déterminant si les
différentiels des prix entre ces paires de marchés reflètent les coûts de
transferts des échanges. L’efficacité spatiale des marchés est donc
fonction du degré d’interdépendance des prix et dépend de la liberté du
commerce, de la qualité de l’information sur les conditions des
marchés et par conséquent de l’étendue de la vitesse avec laquelle les
prix sont transmis d’un marché à un autre. Pour appliquer les tests de la
cointégration dans notre étude, on a distingué des sous-périodes
appropriées prenant en compte les réformes économiques relatives au
marché céréalier. Ces sous-périodes sont ceux de la pré-libéralisation
(1990-1992) et de la post-libéralisation (1993-1998). Les tests de la
cointégration des séries de prix des différents marchés sont appliqués à
chaque sous-période dans un premier temps. Dans un second temps, on
compare les résultats d’estimation de cointégration entre la période
pré-libéralisation et celle de la post-libéralisation. Aussi un
accroissement des relations de cointégration de la sous-période de la
post-libéralisation peut-il être considéré comme une preuve statistique
de l’amélioration du fonctionnement des marchés et donc de leur
efficacité spatiale grâce à la politique de la libéralisation.
Les tests de cointégration des séries des prix des huit marchés pour les
trois périodes et les valeurs critiques du rapport (ratio) de
vraisemblance associées aux tests de la valeur propre sont reportées
dans le suivant selon la procédure de Johansen (1988)
15.
15 Il convient de signaler au lecteur qu’avant d’appliquer la procédure de Johansen,
on a effectué un test de la stationnarité des prix (Dickey-Fuller).68
Tableau 5: Tests de cointégration de Johansen (sorgho)
Rapport de vraisemblance Valeurs critiques Hypothèse sur
le Nombre de
E.C

















































Notes: E.C= Equation de cointégration.
*(**) dénote l’hypothèse sur le nombre de relations de
cointégration à un niveau de significance de 5%(1%)
Les valeurs critiques sont données par Eviews 3
Les résultats de ce tableau montre un nombre de relations de
cointégration de la période post-libéralisation supérieur à celui de la
période pré-libéralisation. L'augmentation du nombre de relations de
cointégration suggère alors que les prix des céréales sont étroitement
plus reliés pendant la période de libéralisation. Ceci indique alors que
le degré de stabilité de long terme des relations des prix des céréales au
cours de cette période est devenu plus intense. Cette intensité peut
s'expliquer par l'applications de certaines mesures telles que la
diffusion de l'information sur les prix et la levée de certaines entraves
relatives aux échanges inter-régionaux des céréales.
6. Remarques terminales
La présente étude a présenté les résultats relatifs aux effets de la
libéralisation sur l’organisation de la commercialisation des céréales et
l’efficacité économique du marché céréalier au Burkina Faso. De façon
générale les mesures ont été effectives dans leur application et elles ont
eu pour effet une amélioration de l’efficacité de l’organisation et de la
performance de la commercialisation des céréales. Il reste cependant que
pour renforcer cette performance et la sécurité alimentaire, les décideurs
de la politique économique notamment de la politique céréalière sont
invités à jouer ou à accroître leur rôle dans les domaines suivants :
promotion de la concurrence, augmentation du stockage commercial et
création des opportunités du marché céréalier.69
La promotion de la concurrence
La promotion de la concurrence des marchés céréaliers nécessite une
plus grande transparence de l'information, une garantie de la liberté
pour les acteurs de transférer librement leurs droits de propriété et leur
sécurisation. Il est indispensable que le système d'information des
marchés céréaliers, véritable instrument de la transparence du marché
soit plus opérationnel dans son rôle d'éclairer les opérateurs
économiques dans leur prise de décision. A cette fin, il est
recommandé aux dirigeants du système d'information de diversifier les
supports pour permettre une large diffusion de l'information. A ce titre,
en plus de la radio nationale, les radios privés décentralisés et les
journaux en langue nationale peuvent servir de supports.
D'autre part, la seule collecte des prix ne suffisant pas pour favoriser
l'adaptation de l'offre en fonction de la demande, il est souhaitable qu'à
moyen terme le système d'information des marchés puisse envisager la
collecte et la diffusion des quantités de céréales et principalement dans
les marchés primaires des régions excédentaires et dans les marchés de
regroupement (Bobo-Dioulasso et Pouytenga) qui sont les marchés
d'achat de la majorité des commerçants. La disponibilité de cette
information peut contribuer non seulement à réduire les la ronde des
commerçants à la recherche des céréales et par conséquent leurs coûts
de transactions mais aussi les oligopoles des grands commerçants qui
disposent de leur propre service d'information grâce auquel ils
s'assurent des données du marché céréalier et donc un avantage face à
la concurrence.
L’augmentation du stockage commercial et la création d’opportunités
pour le marché céréalier
L'augmentation du stockage commercial et la création d'opportunités
pour le marché céréalier sont également recommandées. Pour cela, le
rôle actuel du stock national de sécurité doit être revu. En effet, le
déstockage ou la rotation technique du stock national de sécurité par la
SONAGESS qui a lieu pendant la période de soudure (juin, juillet et
août) empêche une hausse importante des prix des céréales mais a pour
corollaire une réduction des quantités stockées par les commerçants.
Ce déstockage qui s'apparente à une forme déguisée de l'Etat sur le
marché est préjudiciable au commerçant qui n'a aucun intérêt à stocker
une partie importante de céréales pour la soudure étant donné que
l'accroissement des prix pendant cette période ne couvre pas le coût de
stockage de longue durée. Il faut alors rechercher une harmonie entre
l'intervention de la SONAGESS et le commerce privé. Cette harmonie70
consiste à ce que le stock de la rotation technique de la SONAGESS
serve essentiellement à assurer la sécurité alimentaire des populations
d a n sl e sz o n e sr u r a l e sd é f i c i t a i r e se tàr i s q u e sa l i m e n t a i r e so ùl e
pouvoir d'achat est faible. Dans ces conditions, une partie de ce stock
peut être vendue à un prix social aux banques de céréales et à d'autres
structures comme le comité national des secours d'urgence
(CONASUR) et le programme de sécurité alimentaire et nutritionnelle
(PSAN). Etant donnée que la demande des céréales sur le marché de
cette catégorie de population est marginale, le marché céréalier ne sera
pas perturbé pendant la soudure. Cette action de la SONAGESS peut
alors inciter les commerçants à constituer un stockage commercial.
Dans ces conditions, l'octroi du crédit aux commerçants des céréales
pour les inciter à s'impliquer davantage dans le marché céréalier est
opportun. Aussi pour faciliter l'accès de ce crédit à la grande majorité
des commerçants, est-il souhaitable de recourir à un système de crédit
adapté. A ce titre, les institutions financières décentralisées qui
couvrent l'ensemble du territoire et dont les procédures de financement
sont relativement moins contraignantes peuvent jouer un rôle important
dans ce financement.71
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Burkina Faso.72If the River bends, the Crocodile will bend
too
Some Results of an Analysis of Farming Systems in the
North-Western Region of Burkina Faso
Arno Maatman
“Crisis narratives are the primary means whereby development
experts and the institutions for which they work claim the right to
stewardship over land and resources they do not own. By generating
and appealing crisis narratives, technical experts and managers
assert rights as ‘stakeholders’ in the land resources they say are
under crisis”(Roe, 1995: 1066).1. Introduction
This paper will give a short overview of an extensive study that was
executed in the north-western region of Burkina Faso
16 (see map 1).
The objective of this study was to analyse the perspectives of
sustainable intensification of farming systems, through low cost
technologies. The following questions were asked: to what extent can
the actual strategies of the farmers guarantee food security of their
households? what changes are possible to ensure a higher and
sustainable level of food security? what are possible governmental and
non-governmental interventions which could encourage and maintain
such changes? The study was limited to the sedentary farmers in the
north-western region. Mathematical programming models were used as
an instrument of analysis.
In this paper we will focus on the results
17. However, enough attention
will be given to the methodological approach, which in some way can
be considered a result in itself (sections 3 and 4). While discussing the
results we will first focus on the more or less ‘traditional’ decisions
with respect to the production, the storage and the marketing of
agricultural (read vegetable) products (section 5). Heterogeneous and
flexible farmer’s strategies are shown to be the result of risk
minimising and labour optimising objectives. Next, we will concentrate
on ‘new’ methods of water and soil conservation (even though they are
often based on traditional knowledge) and on the integration of
agriculture and livestock (sections 6). These strategies, based on low
cost technologies, are being adopted by many farmers in the region; in
particular in the more densely populated areas where the problem of
soil degradation is most severely felt. It is demonstrated that these
strategies improve, at least in the short run, agricultural productivity and
food security. The longer-term perspectives of the rural populations in
the north-western region are discussed in section 7. Despite some evident
problems, the ‘doom scenarios’ are to be rejected. Farming systems are
less vulnerable than often thought, and rural populations have a long
history of creative ‘adaptation’. Government policies and development
programs should – therefore – be carefully designed and implemented.
‘Enabling’ policies and projects with a flexible and mutual learning
approach seem to be – for the time being – the most efficient. Finally we
For a detailed description of this study see Maatman (2000).










will say a last word on the methodological approach (section 9). In the
next section we will first discuss the context of the study.
Map 1: Burkina Faso
2.Context of the study
Burkina Faso is one of the rare countries in West Africa where
agricultural production increased considerably after the drought years
in the early 70s and 80s; the cereal production has exceeded – even if
1 = Bam 11= Kadiogo 21= Poni
2 = Bazéga 12= Kénédougou22= Sanguié
3 = Bougouriba13= Kossi 23= Sanmatenga
4 = Boulgou 14= Kouritenga 24= Seno
5 = Boulkiemdé15= Mouhoun 25= Sissili
6 = Comoé 16= Nahouri 26= Soum
7 = Ganzourgou17=Namentenga27= Sourou
8 = Gnagna 18= Oubritenga 28= Tapoa
9 = Gourma 19= Oudalan 29=Yatenga
10= Houet 20= Passoré 30=
Zoundwéogo
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only marginally – the population growth between 1985 and 1995. It is
also one of the few countries where the ‘external’ debts increased very
moderately between the 80s and the 90s, giving the government a
favourable position in the negotiations with the ‘Bretton Woods’
institutions. Despite these performances, Burkina Faso is still one of
the poorest countries in the world. The north-western region covers
about 11% of the national territory (31.000 km
2). It comprises 4
provinces (Bam, Passoré, Sourou, Yatenga) and 1,4 million inhabitants
of various ethnic groups. Demographic density varies considerably
from one sub-region to another. The majority of the population mainly
lives from agriculture. The region comprises pastoralists, agro-
pastoralists and sedentary farmers; irrigated agriculture is practised in
the Sourou valley. It is noted that most villages in the north-western
region are located at quite some distance from the larger market-places
and the principal roads. Besides, the whole region has only one paved
road that goes from Ouagadougou to Ouahigouya, the capital of the
Yatenga province. The sedentary farmers in the region produce to a large
extend just to fulfil their own consumption needs; only a small part of
their production is sold. Local food markets are ‘thin’ and the supply
varies much from one period to another. Agricultural production is based
on the cultivation of millet and sorghum, often associated with cowpeas.
Maize is also grown, on some small plots around the dwellings. A study
on the dynamics of agrarian systems in two village-sites in the North-
Western region (Baszaïdo and Lankoé, see below) demonstrated, among
others, the tremendous extension of the agricultural area (in terms of
hectares per active member!) in the last decades (see also Dao et al.,
1996 a,b). These strategies, based on the ‘extensification’ of land-use
practices, seem to reach – at least in a large part of the north-western
region – their limits
18. As one young farmer in another study village in
the north-western region said:
“We know very well that we can not continue cultivating more and
more fields, as we have done for a long time. But what can we do, if we
only have some few fields, which are often located at quite some
distance from each other? And if we have to share these already small
areas with again more people in the future? This is difficult already,
but it is not all, far from that. The work on the field has become more
arduous than before, even in the words of our parents. Many of us are
afraid to start cultivating, knowing that it will be very difficult to feed
our families from the fields we have and our own labour. Some of us
It is noted that these limits were already reached several decades ago in the central
part of the Yatenga province and some parts of the Passoré province (e.g. Marchal,
1983).76
are waiting for projects to come, they have organised themselves in
‘groupements’ to attract money, others are looking for new
opportunities, outside the village and, if possible, outside agriculture”.
(Young farmer in Kalamtogo, 1995)
The consequences of ‘extensification’ and increased pressure on natural
resources are not always evident. Some farm-households seem unable to
avoid the vicious circle of decreasing yields and land degradation; they
become marginalized, and a growing number of their members is looking
for employment outside the agricultural sector or even outside the region
(seasonal or permanent migrations) in one of the larger towns of Burkina
Faso or in the guinean zones, with much higher agricultural potential.
Seasonal migration is not the only option any more. Permanent migration
of whole families, trying to settle in the guinean zones, has become
widespread in the region. However, other farm-households seem to
succeed in decreasing the effects of erosion, through the construction of
rock bunds and the application of soil and water conservation methods.
Often, they also try to increase the organic matter production, through an
increased integration of agriculture and livestock and improved methods
of residue recycling (i.e. mulching). Many of them have received some
kind of assistance (technical, financial) from development programs or
projects, in particular for the construction of rock bunds and (small)
dams
19.
The study was executed between 1992 and 1996. Primary data collection
was concentrated in three villages (Baszaïdo in the Yatenga province,
Kalamtogo in the Passoré province, and Lankoé in the Sourou province,
see map 2), and executed in collaboration with the regional team (north-
western zone) of the national farming systems research program of the
Institute for Environmental and Agricultural Research in Burkina Faso
(INERA). In fact, the whole study has been an integrated part of the
activities carried out by this team, executing at the same time a large
number of experiments together with the farmers in the above-mentioned
village-sites
20.
An important reason for the construction of dams has been to promote horticultural
activities in the dry season, immediately after the cereal harvest.
For more details on the work of this team see the different reports of INERA/RSP/
Zone Nord-Ouest (listed in Maatman, 2000, see in particular the synthesis report
INERA/RSP/Zone Nord-Ouest, 1997), a short summary and analysis is presented
in Maatman (2000, chapter 4). An overview of the surveys is given in Ouédraogo
and Maatman, 1995.77
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Map 2: The north-western region (and study villages)
3.The methodological approach
Our analysis of farmers’ strategies is a normative analysis. It tries to
explore which strategies do well under various conditions, and how
strategies can be improved. The normative analysis has been based on
a systems approach, which mainly consisted of a systematic discussion
of various concepts to be used, and of the following questions:
1)Who takes which decisions? Which decision questions are to be
taken into consideration?
2)Which socio-economic and physical conditions influence the
decisions? Which of these conditions are explicitly to be taken into
consideration? How do these conditions influence the decisions?
3)On the basis of which criteria are the decisions taken? Which of


















The concept of a farming system has been used to structure the research
and the interdisciplinary exchanges. The definition of the principal
elements of a farming system (actors, physical and human resources,
activity domains, ‘inputs’ and ‘outputs’) and the schematic
representation of their interrelationships facilitated the comparison of the
results obtained by the mathematical programming models and those
obtained from fieldwork (interviews, observations, experiments), i.e.
‘the reality’; it also helped to identify new orientations for a more
realistic model.
An intensive study was done of a large number of secondary sources, in
particular all village level studies carried out in the sahelo-sudanian and
sudanian zones of Burkina Faso
21. This study forms, together with the
interviews and the observations in the field (i.e. mainly in the village-
sites) the basis of this study and of all the models. Information was
collected on farmers’ strategies of agricultural production, of marketing,
storage and consumption of agricultural products and on the influence of
the factors ‘land’, ‘labour’, ‘capital’ and ‘rainfall’. Specific attention has
been given to strategies to minimise rainfall risks and in particular the
risks on food shortages that result from these. One can distinguish
between various strategies of risk minimisation:
1) the prevention of risks,
2) the dispersion of risks (by diversification of risky activities),
3) the control of risks through sequential decision making and
4) the ‘insurance’ against risks.
An example of a method of risk prevention is irrigation. The soil and
water conservation methods that are practised in the north-western
Among others the studies of ICRISAT (e.g. Matlon and Fafchamps (1988),
McIntire (1981, 1983), Kristjanson (1987)), studies based on the data of ICRISAT
(e.g. Fafchamps (1989, 1993), Reardon et al. (1988, 1992), Reardon and Peters
(1991)), ICRISAT and IFPRI (Reardon and Matlon (1989)), of the program
FSU/SAFGRAD (e.g. Lang, Roth and Preckel (1984), Nagy et al. (1986), Roth et
al. (1986), Roth (1986), Singh (1988)), of the University of Ouagadougou
(Thiombiano, Soulama, Wetta (1988)), of the University of Wisconsin (Sherman,
Shapiro and Gilbert (1987)), Delgado (1977, 1978), Broekhuyse (1982, 1983,
1988), M.J. Dugué (1987), P. Dugué (1989) and Ouédraogo, I. (1991) – together
with the INERA/RSP/Yatenga team –, Kohler (1971), Marchal (1983), Imbs
(1987) and Prudencio (1983, 1987); the result of farming systems research
published e.g. in Matlon et al. (1984), Ohm and Nagy (1985) and Lowenberg-
DeBoer (1994) have been consulted as well. For a complete overview of the
studies – including some studies focusing on social relationships – see Maatman
(2000).79
region can also be considered as risk prevention strategies. Methods of
dispersion of risks of agricultural production refer, for instance, to the
cultivation of different crops (or varieties) on different soil types
applying different agricultural methods. It is useful to note that the
development of livestock systems next to cropping systems is also – at
least partially – a strategy to diversify risks. In general, dispersion of
risk is only effective, if the effects of the different activities are not too
much ‘correlated’. Methods of risk control refer in this study to
sequential decisions on (re)sowing and weeding during the growing
season making use of information which becomes available (e.g. on
rainfall, germination of plants, appearance of herbs). Livestock often
functions as a method of ‘insurance’ against a poor harvest. If harvest
fails some of the animals can be sold to buy food. In this study
methods of dispersion and of control of risks have been explicitly taken
into account. Insurance of risks has only been dealt with by the
possible installation of a safety stock of cereals at the end of the year.
Finally, the process resulted in a stochastic programming model, for
‘Exploitation North-West’, that describes the strategies of a
hypothetical farm-household, but representative for a large number of
farm-households in the north-western region. We have supposed that
the ‘Exploitation North-West’ does not apply chemical fertilisers;
moreover it does not possess the equipment nor the trained animals to
practise animal traction.
4. The stochastic programming model
Introduction: some key elements of the model
The model for a representative farm-household (‘Exploitation North-
West’) allows us to analyse crop production strategies during one
growing season and consumption, storage and marketing strategies
during the year following the beginning of the harvest period. This year
is called target consumption year. Production decisions taken into
account refer to:
a) crop choice: the mono crops maize, red sorghum, white
sorghum, millet and groundnuts, and the mixed crops red
sorghum/cowpeas, white sorghum/cowpeas, and millet/cowpeas,
b) land category: dependent on the location on the ‘toposequence’
(low and high lands), on the distance from the compound (less
than 100 metres, between 100 and 1000 metres, more than 1000
metres), and on ownership (common or individual fields),
c) method of soil preparation (ploughing, cleaning of land),80
d) amount of organic manure applied (0, 800 kg, 2000 kg, 4000 kg,
8000 kg per hectare),
e) sowing dates, dependent on crop and land category (6 sowing
periods)
f) levels of intensity of weeding (intensive or light)
A pivotal feature in the model developed is the concept of a plot. A
plot is a piece of land with the following properties: one of the crops
under a) is grown; it belongs to one of the land categories b); one of the
soil preparation methods under c) is applied; one of the amounts of
organic manure under d) is applied; and sowing takes place at one of
the dates e). It is noticed that the level of weeding is not included in
this definition; this factor will be dealt with in another manner (see
below). In this way a great number of plots are distinguished.
‘Representative’ plots refer to combinations of crops, land categories,
and agricultural methods observed in practice. Besides, a number of
‘alternative’ combinations is considered, to study their feasibility,
usefulness and possible advantages; manual ploughing, for example, or
high doses of organic manure (2000 kg/ha) on sorghum or millet fields
(sole or intercropped). The area of each plot is a ‘decision variable’.
Their values correspond to the production decisions what, where, how
much, how and when should be cultivated.
Key elements of the linear programming models describe the influence
of the production factors land, labour and organic manure on the
production decisions. They are called the constraints of land (per
category), of labour and of organic manure. These constraints formula-
te the condition that required amounts of resources used can not exceed
available amounts. In order to formulate the labour constraints the
growing season was split up in time periods of two weeks or a month
(see figure 1). In the labour constraints the required labour includes not
only time of the work on the land, but also of walking from and to the
fields. Organic manure is only applied on the common fields. Fallow
practice is another key element of the models. It is dealt with by
postulating that supplementary to each ‘plot’ a piece of land is left
fallow. The size of this piece of land, as ratio of the size of the
corresponding ‘plot’, depends on category of land, crop and manure
level. Two scenarios of fallow practice have been analysed. The first
one is based on observation of actual practice; the second one
corresponds to longer fallow periods allowing (more) sustainable crop
production.81
Figure 1Schematic representation of the planning period.
Decisions on consumption, storage and marketing are taken during the
target consumption year, which is divided in several periods of time to
allow analysis of the strategies at different times of the year. Decision
variables on consumption correspond to consumption of the various
products in each period, decisions on storage to amounts kept in store,
decisions on marketing to quantities sold and purchased. The nutritive
balances express the cereal and the non-cereal consumption in terms of
nutrients (calories and proteins). In the stock equations for all
agricultural products, losses and seed reserves are included as well.
Financial balances also contain interest rates, and non-agricultural
incomes and expenses. A few constraints, called normative constraints,
are included to ensure that calculated patterns of consumption
correspond to observed patterns in the north-western region. For
instance, a restriction is imposed on the consumption of red sorghum,
which is mainly used for beer consumption. A certain level of
self-sufficiency is also required. The main objective of all strategies of
the ‘Exploitation North-West’ together is to try to prevent, or if that is
not possible, to minimise shortages of calories and proteins during the
target consumption year. If these shortages can be avoided, then a
stock is kept for the harvest period of the next year. If these stocks are
sufficient, then the revenues are maximised. If net revenues are indeed
obtained, a fraction is spent on a food security safety stock for the next
year. All these objectives are dealt with in one objective function. The
model is a typical multi-objective model.
Data from all secondary sources studied have been used to estimate
‘average’ values of parameters in the base model. For instance, yields
and labour times for all plots, i.e. for all crops, categories of land,
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weeding, have been estimated. For ‘alternative plots’ the values of
these parameters have been estimated by extrapolating results of
village level studies, and by making use of data of experimental
stations. Exogenous selling and purchasing prices refer to average
observed producer prices during the harvest period, and consumer
prices during the lean season. The estimated values of the parameters
are given and justified in Maatman (2000, appendix 4).
Sequential decision-making
In practice, farmers make their decisions sequentially, for a large part in
response to the observed rainfall. In this study we have concentrated on
some crucial decision-making moments, i.e. on the decisions of
(re)sowing according to the arrival of rains and early rainfall at the start
of the agricultural season, then on the decisions with respect to
(re)sowing and weeding according to the rainfall in the period after the
start of the rainy season. In principle, more stages could be
distinguished, but it would make the analysis very complex. Therefore,
the analysis was restricted to these two stages of the growing season.
The demarcation of these two stages was not obvious. If a clear-cut
distinction could be made between a first period of sowing and a late
period of weeding the discussion would be easy. However, during the
growing season late sowing and first weeding may coincide. Stage 1
has been chosen as the period in which most sowing decisions are
taken, in stage 2 the most important weeding decisions (see also figure
1).
•  Stage 1: the first stage of the installation of the growing season
covers the months May and June. Then most production decisions
deal with soil preparation, sowing, and early weeding. In practice,
these decisions are taken progressively during these two months, in
particular depending on dates of the first rains. In our model three
situations are distinguished: the growing season starts ‘late’,
‘normal’ or ‘early’. The production decisions are different for each
of these situations. So instead of one average strategy of production
as in the base model, and in the second-stage model, here three
different strategies are at stake: for ‘late’, ‘normal’, and ‘early’
starts of the growing season. If the growing season starts ‘late’, less
time is available for land preparation (i.e. ploughing) and sowing.
The number of days ‘favourable’ for sowing and ‘effective’ for
ploughing are the parameters that have been used to describe the
time that is available for sowing and ploughing depending on the
rainfall in the first stage of the agricultural season.83
•  Stage 2: comprises the months of July and August, called the
‘continuation’ of the agricultural season, and the target consumption
year (starting from the first harvest of the agricultural season to the
first harvest of the next season, see figure 1). The rains after the
‘installation’ of the agricultural season can be ‘bad’, ‘average’ or
‘good’. The decisions during the ‘continuation’ of the agricultural
season correspond to some decisions of late sowing (e.g. for maize
and groundnuts) and especially of intensity of weeding. Decisions
can be made of intensive or less intensive weeding, it can also be
decided to abandon certain plots, planted during the first stage.
‘Bad’, ‘average’ or ‘good’ rainfall influences the time available for
late sowing, and in particular the labour time for intensive and less
intensive weeding. Yield levels – and as a result also the time
required for the harvest – depend on ‘bad’, ‘average’ or ‘good’
rainfall in the second stage. Marketing, storage and consumption
decisions are made during the target consumption year. These
decisions depend on the harvest, and therefore also on rainfall.
Because there exists enough data of rainfall in the north-western
region, more rainfall scenarios, both for the start as for the
‘continuation’ of the agricultural season could be distinguished.
However, relatively few data are available on the influence of rainfall
on yields and labour times, as a function of crop, soil type and
agricultural methods. More importantly, the nine scenarios
distinguished for rainfall in the first and second stage of the
agricultural season reflect the division that is often made by farmers in
order to explain results of the agricultural season. We note as well that
it is not necessarily required to take into account extremely poor
rainfall scenarios. Methods of risk insurance anticipate such situations.
In the model, no decision can be taken before the first observations (i.e.
the realisation of the first rains) have been made. Consequently, the
three-stage stochastic model can be formulated as a set of so-called
two-stage recourse models, with each model corresponding to one
particular outcome of the first rains (i.e. ‘early’, ‘normal’ or ‘late’).
The values of the first stage decision variables are determined by way
of optimisation of the expectation of the value of the objective
function. Each two-stage recourse model can be approximately
formulated as a linear programming problem. Use is to be made of the
distribution of rainfall (‘bad’, ‘average’, ‘good’) in the second stage.
Here again, a simple approach is applied. It is assumed that there is an
equal probability of having ‘bad’, ‘average’ or ‘good’ rainfall in stage
2. The linear programming models can be solved quickly by standard84
LP software, even in small research centres in developing countries,
which facilitates their application.
5. The analysis of actual strategies
According to the first results of the analyses, it appears that the food
situation of the ‘Exploitation North-West’ is delicate indeed. Annual
consumption targets are attained only in 5 of the 9 rainfall scenarios. It
produces between 55% (very poor rainfall season) and 140% (very
good rainfall season) of its nutritional requirements; based on the
supposition that 20% of the energy requirements are covered by other
products (meat, leaves etc.). In 8 of the 9 scenarios, the ‘Exploitation
North-West’ buys more cereals for consumption (during the ‘lean’
season, just before the harvest) than it sells. The sale of cereals, but
also of groundnuts and cowpeas, is necessary to satisfy certain (non-
food) expenditures of the farm-household. The non-agricultural
revenues are in 4 of the 9 rainfall scenarios not sufficient to buy the
cereals that are – in principle – required for consumption. In most
cases, the farm-household adapts to this situation, simply by rationing
strategies. This concurs to what we have found in the consumption
surveys that we held in the village-sites. However, in very bad rainfall
years, the food-deficits of the ‘Exploitation North-West’ become
unbearable. Survival then depends for a large part on the capacity of
‘risk-assurance’ strategies. It is noted that the levels of agricultural
production and of consumption correspond well to the reality of the
farm-households in the region. The vulnerability of farming systems is
caused for a large part by the climatic conditions that are not very
favourable for agricultural production, the scarcity of fertile soils and a
lack of alternative economic opportunities. Some major results that
follow from the analyses – introducing some nuances to the alleged
precarious situation of the ‘Exploitation North-West’ – bear on the
following points:
1)The heterogeneity of agricultural strategies, i.e. the cultivation of
different crops, sometimes ‘pure’, sometimes intercropped, on
different soil types, and using a great diversity of growing methods
(different sowing periods, with different quantities of organic
manure, intensive and less intensive weeding). The great diversity
in agricultural activities, in response to a complex range of
objectives and constraints, is a key element of the farmers’
strategies in the north-western region. The results for instance show
the particular role of mixed crops. They are especially grown in an85
‘early’ or ‘normal’ growing season. In a ‘late’ season sole cropping
is preferred. Another example is the growing of maize. Maize is a
lean-season crop, since it is harvested during the first weeks of the
harvest period, just before the harvest of the (large) millet fields.
Since reserve stocks of the preceding year are often empty long
before this period, the harvest of maize helps in decreasing
consumption expenses and in minimising, or even preventing, food
shortages.
Differences also exist between the strategies of the ‘Exploitation
North-West’ on the common and those on the individual fields,
where the women of the farm-household make the decisions. Millet
and groundnuts are produced on these individual fields, cultivation
of sorghum and maize is not efficient because of the lack of
manure. Relatively more groundnuts are cultivated on the individual
fields than on the common fields. The analyses show that the labour
requirements for groundnuts fit relatively well to the availability of
labour for the individual fields.
2) The flexibility of the production strategies. They differ greatly
according to rainfall patterns. In the distinguished scenarios of the
‘installation’ of the growing season (‘late’, ‘normal’ and ‘early’)
and of the rainfall later in the season (‘bad’, ‘average’, ‘good’) this
flexibility can best be illustrated for two extreme situations:
•  a ‘late’ start of the growing season and bad rainfall later in the sea-
son: time for sowing is limited. Poor rainfall conditions limit the
growth of weeds, all weeding can be done intensively. Yields and
production are low.
•  an ‘early’ start of the growing season and good rainfall later in the
season: much more labour time for sowing is available. Now,
labour time for weeding is very restrictive. In fact, the
‘Exploitation North-West’ is obliged to abandon part of its fields
and another part is weeded less intensively. Yields and production
are relatively high.
The results of the model of the ‘Exploitation North-West’ show
again that farmers choose strategies of land preparation, sowing
and early weeding which anticipate poor rainfall conditions later in
the growing season. This result is quite understandable. Farmers
intend to orient towards flexible cropping systems, for instance to
the cultivation of crops like millet, which can endure low levels of
crop management. Due to its resistance against weeds, weeding of86
millet can be done less intensively without reducing the yields too
much. Risk minimisation strategies – and in particular the
strategies to control risks – favour the ‘extensification’ of
agricultural production systems. Besides, the ‘Exploitation North-
West’ is not executing – for the same reason – any ploughing on
the fields, except for the fields where maize and groundnuts are
grown; even when the rains in the first stage of the agricultural
season start very early, only some small cereal plots are ploughed.
It is therefore not surprising that the adoption of the models of
intensive agriculture, proposed by a large part of the development
structures in the north-western region, appears to be very limited.
3) The resilience of the farming system. This points to the substantial
capacity the ‘Exploitation North-West’ to adapt themselves to
difficult conditions, and in particular to increasingly severe
constraints of land availability. The adaptive capacity of farm-
households in the north-western region is certainly much higher
than certain authors and development agents want to recognise. The
sensitivity analyses, for instance, show that even with an important
decrease of the available land (-25%), the ‘Exploitation North-
West’ still seems to be able to provide their members with enough
food, at least for most of the years; of course, using – as usual – the
revenues obtained outside agriculture, and by adapting its strategies
to the decreasing availability of land. However, this apparent
resilience does not provide a guarantee for the long term. This is
even truer when we consider that actual levels of crop production
can only be realised at the expense of soil fertility. We recall that in
our study the handling of fallow practices was based on practices
observed in various village studies. In many people's opinion, the
actual fallow practices are, however, insufficient to allow
sustainable cultivation on long term. The fallow periods are too
short to restore soil fertility. In a sensitivity analysis we have
computed the consequences of more sustainable fallow practices
(i.e. based on a 20 to 30% decrease in land-use intensity for each
plot). The nutritional value of agricultural production decreases by
10%. Apparently, the ‘Exploitation North-West’ can not permit itself
such a reduction of agricultural production; and is more or less
‘forced’ – like the majority of farm-households in the region – to
overexploit the land.
4) The independence of the strategies of ‘Exploitation North-West’
against price variations of agricultural products on the market.
Sensitivity analysis shows that even considerable price variations87
for agricultural products, while maintaining the same ratio between
selling and purchasing prices, do not seem to have a big influence
on the agricultural production strategies and the commercialisation
of agricultural products. This result confirms that the farmers react
to the prices only marginally. Nevertheless, a drop in the price of
cereals seems to be interesting for the ‘Exploitation North-West’.
These results are based on the fact that the household is not able to
assure the consumption needs by its own crop production, neither
directly by auto-production, nor directly by selling a part of the crop
production. The ‘Exploitation North-West’ is a net buyer of cereals.
The households are dependent on the markets for purchasing cereals
rather than for selling their surplus.
In a normative analysis one does not only expect results that are
conform actual practices. The analysis has clearly shown that nutritive
demands can be better satisfied, if part of the cereal consumption is
replaced for instance by the consumption of groundnuts. So,
diversification of produce can improve levels of food security. There
are also other reasons why diversification of consumption is desirable,
for instance to prevent deficiencies of vitamins. However, it will not be
easy to change the modes of consumption of the rural populations in
the north-western region, that are based almost exclusively on cereals
(millet and sorghum).
6. The analysis of short and medium term perspectives:
farmers’ initiatives
The agricultural production system of the ‘Exploitation North-West’ is
characterised by strategies of diversification and (risk) control (see
above), resulting from risk (of bad harvests) minimisation objectives
and from optimising criteria with respect to the resources of production
(in particular of labour). The farmers seem to make maximal use of the
available resources. It follows from all our analyses that for the
‘Exploitation North-West’ with its scarce resources of land, labour, and
organic manure, and with no capital for investment in agriculture the
margins for improving the food situation by intensifying production are
very little. Other measures have to be taken to improve the situation.
Methods of anti-erosion, and soil and water conservation methods
Different measures are undertaken by the farmers in the north-western
region to slow down or to stop erosion, and to optimise the supply of
water and nutrients to the plants. Particular attention has been given to88
the rock-bunds, anti-erosion devices that have generated a lot of
excitement among the farmers in Burkina Faso, and in particular in the
provinces of Yatenga, Bam and Passoré (see for instance Dialla, 1992,
Sawadogo, 1996, Kaboré et al., 1994a,b). Rock bunds are lines of
stones that are placed along the contour lines, of variable length and
wings folded upstream. The stones do not stop the water, but slow
down the water streaming downwards, improving infiltration and the
accumulation of fertile deposits, while evacuating excess water. These
measures should permit on the middle and/or on the long term to
improve the productivity of the land and assure the conservation of
natural resources. Another interesting anti-erosion method is <zaï>.
<Zaï> is applicable at the farm-household level. It is an intensive
method of manure management and water conservation. It has already
been practised for a long time in the Yatenga province in the north of
Burkina Faso, to recover the poorest parts of the land. Nowadays this
method is used in all regions in Burkina Faso where degradation is
important. It consists of digging holes, putting in organic manure, and
then sowing. The holes are covered with soils from the lower areas; the
micro-environment created makes the plant better resistant to droughts
and the yields will grow substantially. <Zaï> permits recovery of
degraded soils.
Our analysis of the <zaï> method and the rock bunds demonstrated the
important potential of these methods (Maatman, 2000: chapter 11).
They decrease the rate of erosion on the fields and contribute to
improved conservation of water and soils. Moreover, the <zaï> method
increases the efficiency of the organic manure, of which the available
quantities are very limited. With the rock bunds (only in the 1
st and 2
nd
rings!) and applying the <zaï> method on a (small) part of the area, the
‘Exploitation North-West’ was able to increase the nutritional value of
the agricultural production on average with 5%, and with 10 to 12% in
years with a bad rainfall. The extension of rock bunds in the 3
rd ring
would certainly be beneficial. However, such an extension comes up
against problems of labour and transportation means (to collect the
stones). Besides, the effect of rock bunds is more important when it is
combined with intensive agricultural production on the fields that
profit from the increased conservation of water and land through
applications of organic manure, and eventually of chemical fertilisers;
however the availability of these inputs is limited. The extension of the
<zaï> practice is also difficult due to the limited availability of organic
manure and by labour constraints. Finally, the efficiency of the <zaï>
method is highest when the soils are very poor and the availability of
land limited.89
Strategies of integration of agriculture and livestock
At present, integration of crop cultivation and keeping of livestock is in
its infancy. One can observe an increase of farmers' interest in methods
of stalling, of collection of manure, of making compost, of storing crop
residuals etc. (see e.g. Sienou, 1996). The adoption of such methods
goes slowly differing from region to region, even from household to
household. The strengthening of the integration requires many efforts
by farmers and extension officers, but also much agricultural research.
A large number of constraints and problems related to integration have
not yet been solved: feeding of the animals is often difficult, e.g.
because of decreasing quality of the pasture lands; methods to improve
livestock management (vaccination, stalling) are often too expensive or
the farmers are not familiar with them; water for livestock may be
limited; improved livestock management may compete for labour etc.
The perspectives of the integration of agriculture and livestock, based
on a simple reinforcement of actual practices to exchange sub-products
of livestock (manure) and agriculture (residues), are meagre (see for
more details Maatman, 2000: chapter 12). This seems particularly true
for strategies that aim to increase the number of animals (to obtain
more manure). These strategies amplify the difficulties of feeding in
the dry season and do not constitute a solution for most of the farm-
households (except in some sub-zones where pasture lands are still
relatively abundant). Given the actual conditions in most of the sub-
zones of the region, it seems more efficient to try to improve the rate of
use of the residues for forage and – if possible – the collection of
forage crops (weeds) in the bush. It could also be tried to increase the
quantity of manure available, by intensifying the collection of
excrements of the animals during the nocturne parking. The
improvement of the quality of organic manure through composting
could also be an option, but needs considerable labour, water and –
a l s o–c r o pr e s i d u e s .
7. Long term perspectives: integrated and more intensive
production systems
In sum, we may conclude that the actual situation of the ‘Exploitation
North-West’ is precarious. The analyses even seem to suggest that the
‘Exploitation North-West’ is caught in survival strategies, and moving,
slowly but surely, away from the subsistence economy of the past. At
the same time, it is recognised that the ‘Exploitation North-West’90
possesses a remarkable capacity to adapt itself, as well as is possible, to
worsening conditions for agricultural production, and in particular to
demographic growth (i.e. reducing the availability of land). However,
this capacity – based on ‘traditional’ principles of adaptation – begins to
weaken. In the longer run other initiatives will be necessary to face
population growth and continuing degradation of natural resources. We
can make a distinction between two situations:
•  The pressure on agricultural areas is not increasing, due to
migration and the growth of employment opportunities outside the
agricultural sector. In this case, agriculture based on low ‘external’
input use and ‘rational’ use of local resources seems to be able to
maintain itself.
•  The pressure augments and soils progressively degrade.
The last situation is the most probable for most sub-zones in the north-
western region. Possibilities for intensification of agricultural
production will develop, if population growth is coupled with increased
market exchanges and some general economic development.
Intensification will be based on the use of ‘external’ inputs, and in
particular on chemical fertilisers. To minimise financial risks, it is
important to reduce transaction costs, and to fine-tune existing
technologies. The combination of chemical fertilisation with soil and
water conservation methods, and with organic fertilisation (mulching,
applications of organic manure) seems to be the most suitable strategy.
Animal traction also deserves special attention. The study concludes
that there are no easy solutions. In the short term it seems very
inefficient to undertake ambitious and hasty projects to promote
intensification processes in the north-western region. Such projects are
bound to fail, except maybe in some small regions (i.e. the villages
close to the major road connecting Ouahigouya and Ouagadougou, the
irrigated area in the Sourou valley). It will be – for the time being –
more useful to support local initiatives of land-management, both at the
village and the farm-level, and methods of low-external-input
agriculture (recycling of crop residues, collection of manure,
application of soil and water conservation methods, use of chemical
fertilisers in combination with applications of organic matter on small
‘intensive’ plots). Such an ‘adaptive’ approach is without doubt more
interesting for farmers in the region; at the same time it could stimulate
farmers to experiment with other (more intensive) methods, that aim to
raise the challenge of the days after tomorrow.91
In view of these ideas and observations, an ‘enabling’ approach (De
Janvry and Sadoulet, 1993) seems to be most indicated for (regional)
food security policies. Despite the so-called disengagement of the state
and the reduction of its expenditures, it remains essential to extend
public investments invest in physical infrastructure, in education and
health. Such an approach includes programs that aim to improve
market infrastructures and rural institutions. Progressively, we will
come to know if the north-western region is developing into a region
with intensification potential. However, if food security policies play
an important role, their effects must not be over-estimated. The
perspectives of the north-western region depend foremost on the
creativity and the perseverance of the rural populations themselves
22.
8. Final observation
The models that have been used in this study are instruments of
analysis. They aim to determine what farmers ‘should’ do, based on a
specific formulation of the farming system, including its physical and
socio-economic environments. In this study, the definition of decision
questions, physical and socio-economic conditions, decision-making
criteria and their interrelationships have received ample attention.
Together, these elements constitute the farming system. The systems
approach provided the framework for this study. The models were
developed in several phases. First, a very simple model was developed,
based on a restricted number of decision questions and on some simple
hypotheses with respect to the physical and socio-economic conditions
and the decision-making criteria. The discussion of the results of this
model, including those of certain sensitivity analyses, were used to
identify the most important elements that should be integrated in the
modelling process, leading to more realistic results. The step-wise
approach led to major improvements of the model
23. The inclusion of
the sequential decision-making process, and the distinction between
This should be a major lesson also for the many development projects in the
region. Despite the ‘participatory’ rhetoric, most projects are still very much
governed by ‘external’ agenda’s. They often fail to achieve the most important
goal: to strengthen the innovative capacities of the target-population. Without real
involvement (and – adequate – control!) of the rural populations, most projects will
continue providing (temporary) relieve (if at all), which ultimately only reinforces
the feelings of non-control.
The stepwise approach and the models – from simple to more complex – that have
been developed are presented (for the Central Plateau region in Burkina Faso) in
Maatman and Schweigman (1995) and Maatman et al. (1996).92
light and intensive weeding, was such a step. It proved to be a crucial
step, as solutions came much closer to what we observed in reality. In
particular it explained the close relationship between on the one hand
the minimisation of risks and on the other hand flexible cropping
systems and farmer’s extensive land-use practices. Finally, the
organisation of a continuous and systematic discussion on a given set
of problems, with the aim to formulate a mathematical programming
model, was a useful experience. It permitted to make an in-depth
analysis of the problems of farmers in the north-western region, and to
share knowledge and to exchange ideas and different points of view
with a large number of actors.93
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and Institutions for the Functioning of
Food Markets in Developing Countries
Peter Hazell and Shenggen Fan101
1. Introduction
Public investment in rural areas has stagnated in recent years in many
developing countries and has fallen as a share of total government
expenditure and of agricultural GDP (Fan and Rao, Forthcoming).
Government spending in rural areas has even declined in many poor
African countries. This stagnation has been driven in part by the need
to cut total public expenditure as part of structural adjustment
programs, but also by the low priority attached to agriculture since the
mid-1980s by many governments and donor agencies.
Are national policy makers and donor agencies correct in neglecting
rural investment? This paper presents recent evidence from work at
IFPRI showing that public investments in rural areas have been very
instrumental in generating agricultural productivity growth, and that
they continue to give very reasonable returns in terms of both
economic growth and poverty reduction, even in countries that have
already invested heavily in their rural areas. Guidance is also provided
on the kinds of investments by type and region that give the best
returns.
These results have special importance for most African countries given
their already low levels of rural infrastructure and human capital
development and stagnant agricultural sectors. Map 1 shows road
density in Uganda, one of better countries, overlaid with population
data. Although there is a pretty dense road network in the major
populated areas, especially near Lake Victoria, there are vast areas of
the country where many rural people do not have access to roads, even
low quality ones. Although we do not yet have accurate data on the
proportion of Africa’s farmers who are far removed from roads and
transport systems, it seems likely that the vast majority is
disadvantaged in this way.
Spencer (1994) compared the density of Africa’s road network in early
1990s with that in India in 1950s prior to the green revolution (Table
1). India had nearly six times the density on average. If one takes the
Indian density as broadly indicative of what is needed for rapid
agricultural growth, then it is clear that Africa will need massive
investments in rural infrastructure before it can launch a successful
agricultural revolution.102
Table 1: Rural Road Network in the Humid and Sub-Humid
Tropical (HST) Countries of Africa














Sierra Leone 80 391
Tanzania 66 181
Zaire 36 110
All HST 63 388
Source: Spencer, 1994
2. Estimating Returns to Public Investments in Rural
Areas
Recent work at IFPRI has led to econometric estimates of the marginal
impacts on agricultural production and poverty of public investments
in different types of rural infrastructure. Since there are different
versions of the model in terms of the way key variables are defined and
measured, and the level of regional disaggregation achieved, we
present only a stylized version of the model here. Additional details
about the various model specifications can be found in the papers
referenced below.
There are five key equations in the model:
1)AGP = f(FARMINP, TECH, IRRIG, INFRA, ATT)
2)NFE = F(AGP, IFRA)
3)WAGE = f( AGP, INFRA)
4)ATT = f(AGP, WP, I)
5) POV = f(AGP, NFE, WAGE, ATT)
Equation (1) is the agricultural production function, where production
(AGP) is either agricultural output or total factor (or labor)
productivity. Explanatory variables include a set of traditional farm
inputs (FARMINP) such as labor, land, fertilizer, machinery, and draftMarkets in Developing Countries
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animals; technology (TECH); irrigation (IRRIG); a set of rural
infrastructure variables (INFRA) such as roads, rural electrification,
education and telecommunications; and the agricultural terms of trade
(ATT), typically lagged by one period. Annual rainfall is also often
included and a time trend variable to capture any time-related changes
not captured elsewhere. All explanatory variables are expected to have
a positive impact on agricultural production.
Equation (2) is a nonfarm employment equation. The dependent
variable is either the number or percentage of rural laborers engaged in
rural nonfarm activities. Independent variables are growth in
agricultural production or productivity, and rural infrastructure
(including education). Equation (3) is a rural wage equation with
growth in agricultural production or productivity and rural
infrastructure as independent variables. Equation (4) is a terms-of-trade
equation that models how growth in agricultural production or
productivity would affect agricultural or food prices. World food prices
(WP) and national per capita income (I) are also included as
independent variables.
Equation (5) is the rural poverty equation. Rural poverty (POV),
measured as the percentage of the rural population falling below the
official poverty lines, is modeled as a function of agricultural
production (AGP), rural nonfarm employment (RNE), the rural wage
(WAGE), and the agricultural terms of trade (ATT). Increases in
agricultural output, rural nonfarm employment, or wages should help
the poor to increase their incomes, and hence reduce poverty, while
increases in the price of food can be expected to increase poverty in the
short run. However, in the long run, improvements in the terms of trade
should stimulate greater investment in agricultural production (as in
equation 1) and lead to higher levels of productivity that can benefit the
poor.
The technology and infrastructure variables are measured in physical
or monetary form depending on the kinds of data available. When
modeling at the national or state level , time series data on public
expenditures are used to estimate additional equations relating the
value of stocks of the technology and infrastructure variables to past
patterns of government expenditure. Additional equations with
distributed lag structures are then estimated as part of the model
structure. When using data at more disaggregated regional levels (e.g.
districts or counties), the model is estimated only with physical
measures of technology and infrastructure on the right hand side.104
Typical physical measures are the share of cropped area planted to high
yielding varieties (for TECH) or the crop share that is irrigated
(IRRIG), the density of rural roads in terms of km per km
2 of
geographic area, and the literacy rate of the rural population.
Due to endogeneity problems, several variables, especially the rural
wage, technology, irrigation, and terms of trade variables, are also
specified with their own equations as part of the system. Other
potential endogeneities are handled by using appropriate systems
estimation techniques.
Once the model has been estimated, the marginal impact of additional
investments in an infrastructure or technology on agricultural
productivity or poverty can be measured by totally differentiating the
full equations system with respect to each investment variable of
interest. Depending on the type of technology and infrastructure data
used, marginal impacts are measured per unit of physical stock or per
dollar added to the existing stock.
When dollar values are used, the growth returns are measured as the
discounted value of future costs and benefits, using the estimated
lagged structures to calculate the benefit and cost streams over time.
Poverty impacts are calculated for a chosen year using the poverty
elasticity of growth and the discounted costs of each investment, again
based on the estimated lag structures. All marginal impacts are
calculated for the last year of the time series sample used.
3. National Results
India
In a study of public investment in rural India conducted by Fan, Hazell
and Thorat (2000), state level data were pooled for 1970-93 to estimate
the impacts of different investments on agricultural total factor
productivity growth (TFP), rural wages, nonfarm employment, and
poverty reduction for all India (Table 2). The marginal impacts were
calculated for 1993.
Additional investment in agricultural R&D has the largest impact by
far on agricultural growth and the second largest impact on poverty
reduction. Additional investment in rural roads has the largest impact
on poverty and the second largest impact on growth. These two
investments dominate all others in terms of the size of their impacts,
and can be considered the best win-win strategies for achieving growth
and poverty alleviation. Education ranks a distant third for both growthMarkets in Developing Countries
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and poverty alleviation. Investments in soil and water conservation and
rural development have the fourth and fifth largest impacts on poverty
reduction, but only modest impacts on productivity growth. They are
primarily used as relief employment schemes, but there is clearly a
tradeoff between the use of government funds for short-term relief
verses growth and long-term poverty alleviation. Additional
investments in irrigation rank poorly for growth and poverty reduction.
This is partly because most of the good irrigation projects have already
been done, but also because public irrigation schemes are managed
very inefficiently. Investments in rural health have only modest
impacts on growth and poverty alleviation.
Table 2: Poverty and Productivity Effects of















Soil & water 0.96 22.6
Rural development 1.09 17.8
Health 0.84 25.5
Source: Fan, Hazell and Thorat, 2000, but with new and
unpublished calculations by Fan of the benefit/cost ratios.
China
Fan, Zhang and Zhang (2000) have estimated a similar model for
China using province level data for 1970-97 (last column of Table 3).
The marginal impacts were calculated for 1997.
As in India, additional investment in agricultural R&D gives the
highest growth at the national level and the second largest impact on
poverty reduction. But unlike India, education investments rather than
roads have the largest impact on poverty and the second largest impact
on agricultural growth. These two investments dominate all others and
can be considered win-win for growth and poverty alleviation. Rural
roads rank third for growth and poverty alleviation, followed by106
investments in power and communications. Irrigation investments
again rank poorly for both growth and poverty alleviation, and
probably for the same reasons as in India. Investments in poverty
loans, a targeted assistance program for the poor, have no measurable
impact on agricultural GDP growth, and the smallest impact on poverty
reduction of all the investments considered. Again there is a high
tradeoff between short-term relief and growth and long-term poverty
reduction.
Table 3: Marginal Returns to Infrastructure and Technology
Investments in Rural China
Coastal Central Western National
Returns to Agricultural GDP in Yuan per Yuan Invested)
R&D 8.60 10.02 12.69 9.59
Irrigation 2.39 1.75 1.56 1.88
Roads 1.67 3.84 1.92 2.12
Education 3.53 3.66 3.28 3.71
Electricity 0.55 0.63 0.40 0.54
Rural
Telephone 1.58 2.64 1.99 1.91
Number of People Lifted Out of Poverty per 10,000 Yuan Invested
R&D 1.99 4.40 33.12 6.79
Irrigation 0.55 0.77 4.06 1.33
Roads 0.83 3.61 10.73 3.22
Education 2.73 5.38 28.66 8.80
Electricity 0.76 1.65 6.17 2.27
Rural
Telephone 0.60 1.90 8.51 2.21
Poverty loan 0.88 0.75 1.49 1.13
Sources: Fan, Zhang and Zhang, 2002
Discussion
Agricultural R&D, roads and education are the three best investments
in both India and China for achieving agricultural growth and povertyMarkets in Developing Countries
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reduction. Agricultural R&D has the biggest growth impact in both
countries, and the second largest impact on poverty reduction.
Many investments in rural areas still offer good productivity returns
despite the large amounts of investments that have already been made
in these two countries. For India, the benefit/cost ratios in Table 2
exceed 1 for most investments, and are very high for R&D and roads.
These investments can be justified even at high discount rates for
public funds. The China results in Table 3 also show that most types of
investments have favorable benefit/cost ratios (value of agricultural
GDP generated per Yuan of investment), and are especially attractive
for R&D, education and roads.
3. Regional Results
An important issue for many developing countries is the allocation of
public investments across different types of regions. Past public
investments have typically been biased towards irrigated and high-
potential rainfed areas. Conventional wisdom suggests that the
productivity returns to investment are highest in these areas, and that
growth in these areas also has substantial trickle down benefits for the
poor, including those residing in less-favored areas. For example, the
poor in less-favored areas will benefit from the cheaper food produced
in high potential areas, from increased market opportunities for growth,
and from new opportunities for workers to migrate to more productive
jobs in the high-potential areas and in towns. Fewer people will try to
live in less-favored areas, and this will help reduce environmental
degradation and increase per capita earnings. Migrants may also send
remittances back to less-favored areas, further increasing per capita
incomes there, especially for the poor.
Many of the expected benefits arising from rapid agricultural growth in
high-potential areas have been confirmed through empirical research.
Nevertheless, the rationale for neglecting less-favored areas is being
increasingly challenged by: a) the failure of past patterns of agricultural
growth to resolve growing poverty, food insecurity and environmental
problems in many less-favored areas; b) increasing evidence of
stagnating levels of productivity growth and worsening environmental
problems in many high-potential areas; and c) emerging evidence that
the right kinds of investments can increase agricultural productivity to
much higher levels than previously thought in many less-favored areas.
It now seems plausible that additional public investment in many less-
favored areas may have the potential to generate competitive if not108
greater agricultural growth than comparable investments in many high-
potential areas, and that these investments could have a greater impact
on poverty. If so, then additional investments in less-favored areas may
actually give higher aggregate social returns to a nation than additional
investments in high-potential areas. In fact, they might even offer win-
win-win possibilities. We have tested this hypothesis for China and
India.
China
The results for China in Table 2 are disaggregated by three regions: the
coastal, central, and western regions. The coastal region is the most
fertile with good rainfall and can be classified as a high-potential
region. The western region is the least developed and has poor natural
resources and social infrastructure; it is a low-potential area. The
central region is intermediate between the other two, and from an
agricultural perspective can be considered a mid-potential area. More
than 60 percent of the rural poor lived in the western region in 1996
and most of the rest lived in the central region.
Apart from irrigation, all investments have their biggest impact on
poverty in the low-potential western region and their second biggest
impact in the mid-potential central region. The high-potential coastal
region ranks second or third for all investments. Most investments also
have their highest production returns in either the central or western
region, showing that investments in these regions are now win-win
strategies. However, the production returns are mostly larger in the
central rather than the western region, suggesting that some trade off
exists between growth and equity goals in allocating investments
between mid-potential and low-potential areas.
Irrigation investments yield their highest return in the coastal region,
where they also have favorable poverty impacts. In contrast,
agricultural R&D has its biggest production and poverty impacts in the
western region.
India
Fan and Hazell (2000) undertook an analysis for India using district
level data, where districts were classified into three categories:
irrigated, high-potential rainfed and low-potential rainfed. Districts
were defined as irrigated if more than 25 percent of the cropped area
was irrigated, otherwise they were classified as rainfed. Rainfed
districts were further subdivided into high- and low-potential areas
according to their agroecological characteristics. Using district-levelMarkets in Developing Countries
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data for 1970-95, an econometric model was estimated to measure the
impact of different types of public investments on agricultural
production and rural poverty. The model was then used to calculate the
impact on growth and poverty of another unit of each type of
investment by land type. The results are shown in Table 4.
Table 4: Marginal Returns to Infrastructure and Technology








Production returns (1990 prices)
HYV Rs/Ha 63 243 688
Roads Rs/Km 100,598 6,451 136,173
Canal Irrigation Rs/Ha 938 3,310 1,434
Private Irrigation Rs/Ha 1,000 (2,213) 4,559
Electrification Rs/Ha (546) 96 1,274
Education Rs/worker (360) 571 102
Poverty reduction
HYV Persons/Ha 0.00 0.02 0.05
Roads Persons/Km 1.57 3.50 9.51
Canal irrigation Persons/Ha 0.01 0.23 0.09
Private
irrigation
Persons/Ha 0.01 (0.15) 0.30




Note: The numbers in parentheses are negative. In most cases these negative
coefficients were not statistically significant.
Sources: Fan and Hazell (2000).
For every investment, the highest marginal impact on agricultural
production and poverty alleviation occurs in one of the two rainfed
lands, while irrigated areas rank second or last. Moreover, many types110
of investments in low-potential rainfed lands give some of the highest
production returns, and all except markets and education have some of
the most favorable impacts on poverty.
To delve further into these spatial relationships, Fan, Hazell and Haque
(2000) undertook a similar analysis at an even more spatially
disaggregated level. They classified rural districts into predominantly
irrigated or rainfed agriculture, and then subdivided the rainfed areas
into 13 agroecological zones, numbered in order of their land
productivity (1 being the highest). Data for 1970-94 were then used to
estimate the impacts of different types of investments on agricultural
growth and poverty reduction in each land type (Fan, Hazell and Haque
2000). For every investment, the highest marginal impact on
agricultural production and poverty alleviation occurs in one of the
rainfed lands, while irrigated areas often rank quite low (Tables 5 and
6).
Table 5: Marginal Returns to Investment in Infrastructure and













858 4.64 26.80 2.76 0.86 0.22
Rainfed zones
b:
1 1690 0.00 38.38 4.90 1.18 0.10
2 1391 26.14 8.29 6.27 10.02 1.54
3 986 7.50 102.83 3.17 5.15 0.09
4 902 0.00 29.94 3.63 0.80 2.50
5 960 0.86 37.88 2.19 1.28 0.86
6 918 12.87 135.85 3.51 1.09 1.07
7 965 29.80 100.47 6.96 4.44 0.94
8 924 0.41 137.28 7.81 4.28 2.41
9 508 5.30 82.53 1.95 2.92 10.55
10 649 9.21 9.14 0.14 6.90 6.76
11 443 0.02 2.57 2.53 0.16 11.93
12 719 10.67 50.88 2.71 5.78 1.10
13 335 0.00 113.29 0.00 31.42 12.37
a. Rs output per Rs investment
b. Zones ranked by land productivity (1 = highest)
Source: Fan, Hazell and Haque (2000)
Moreover, several types of investments also give favorable returns in
the poorer rainfed lands and have some of the most favorable impactsMarkets in Developing Countries
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on poverty. Rural roads and education scored particularly well on both
growth and poverty outcomes, as did irrigation in areas where
untapped water resources are available. The returns to agricultural
research in the poorest areas were more mixed, possibly because the
study was only able to capture the returns to crop improvement
research and not the returns to natural resource management research.
Table 6: Reduction in number of poor for an additional one
million rupees (1994 prices) invested in technology and








0.76 8.02 0.46 1.56 0.48
Rainfed zones
b:
1 0.00 25.69 1.00 12.47 1.09
2 32.56 55.07 0.55 26.37 3.83
3 0.97 35.84 0.05 11.20 2.16
4 0.00 35.98 0.00 7.15 7.01
5 0.72 39.75 1.85 4.10 1.24
6 13.43 165.35 0.44 5.65 3.01
7 5.44 18.34 8.82 8.97 3.36
8 0.17 0.00 0.98 3.33 3.02
9 1.21 25.29 1.85 2.37 3.73
10 3.39 1.02 0.00 11.82 5.66
11 0.00 2.60 0.48 0.03 2.54
12 0.00 1.75 1.88 26.21 8.93
13 0.00 n 6.06 12.43 1.68 0.66
a Persons per million rupees in 1994 prices.
b Rainfed zones are ranked by land productivity (1 = highest, 13 = lowest).
Source: Fan, Hazell and Haque (2000).
Discussion
These results from India and China provide strong support for the
hypothesis that investments in less-favored areas are becoming win-
win opportunities, and that more investment should now be channeled
to less-favored areas in both countries. However, the results should not
be interpreted to mean that public investment should now be reduced in
irrigated and high-potential lands. These areas are the major sources of
food for rapidly growing urban populations and they still offer
favorable returns to many investments. But the results do suggest that
there are attractive opportunities for reducing poverty through112
additional investments in less-favored areas, and that rather than
sacrificing growth, many of these investments actually offer win-win
opportunities for achieving more production growth and greater
poverty reduction.
Similar studies have yet to be done for other regions, and it would be
dangerous to extrapolate these results beyond Asia, since many poorer
countries, especially in Africa, have not yet invested sufficiently in
their high-potential areas to have reached the point of diminishing
production returns. Similar studies are needed of different types of
developing countries. We now have such work underway at IFPRI.
4. Supplying Rural Infrastructure and Rural Services
The previous section has highlighted the importance of investments in
rural infrastructure, technology and other key public services for
achieving growth and reducing poverty in rural areas. Many of these
investments also offer high returns, even in countries like India and
China that have already invested heavily in their rural areas.
Unfortunately, public investment in rural areas has fallen in many
developing countries in the past decade or so due to the fiscal pressures
imposed on governments through structural adjustment programs and a
precipitous decline in donor support for such fundamentals (Fan and
Rao, forthcoming). There has also been an over zealous downsizing of
the public institutions that provide essential public goods and services
like R&D, infrastructure, education and health, and this will also need
to be reversed. These institutions still have key roles to play and need
to be revamped and strengthened to fulfill their functions in cost
effective and demand responsive ways. The challenge for many
developing countries is to find effective ways to pay for additional
public investments, and to develop suitable institutional arrangements
for their delivery.
Better targeting of public investments in rural areas is one way to
improve the effectiveness of available public resources. This paper has
shown that the productivity and poverty impacts of different types of
investments vary widely, and policy makers seeking to maximize
growth and /or poverty alleviation goals should choose investment
portfolios that maximize these goals. Investments in agricultural R&D,
roads and education score well on both counts, as do greater
investments in many less-favored areas. Similar studies to the ChinaMarkets in Developing Countries
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and India work are needed for other countries to provide similar
guidance for their investment portfolios.
Reducing the unit cost of key infrastructure and public services is an
important way to increase their affordability, especially for poor
countries. Low cost alternatives, such as satellite communications, and
wind and solar power, do exist in some cases. Even the costs of feeder
roads can be contained by encouraging greater use of animals and
bicycles for local transportation, while building roads to match. Past
difficulties with the maintenance and upkeep of rural infrastructure
need to be addressed through greater local ownership of investments
and devolution of maintenance responsibility to communities and local
government. Local incentives can be enhanced by tying investments
from central government to matching funds from local district level
sources.
Strengthening public institutions that provide public goods and services
can also lead to significant cost reductions while improving the quality
of services provided. New innovations may be needed. For example,
increased donor support of key public sector investments could come
from new financing arrangements that empower the users of public
services (e.g. vouchers, user fees and other co-financing mechanisms)
and with appropriate institutional reforms to improve mandates and
performance. There is also need to form new partnerships between the
public, private and NGO sectors for the provision of public services.
Even though government must pay for many of these goods and
services, it does not mean that the public sector has to deliver them.
Recent years have seen considerable success in using NGOs and CBOs
to deliver targeted assistance to the poor, and private firms can be
contracted to build and maintain schools, health centers, roads and the
like. Contracting out arrangements with other parties can be much
more cost effective, and may offer better possibilities for involving
local people and communities. The types of partnerships desired will
vary by sector and function, with many more opportunities to diversify
supply arrangements for education and health services, for example,
than provision of rural roads and market regulation (Siamwalla, 2000).
Effective public institutions also require an adequate supply of trained
people, including agricultural policy advisors, agricultural researchers
and extension workers, business managers, and financial and computer
experts. Past investments in training did help increase the supply of
some types of key personnel, despite the fact that many did not return
from overseas training. But HIV/AIDS, ageing, and low salaries and114
morale within public institutions have contributed to chronic staff
shortages in many countries.
5. Conclusions
Infrastructure and rural services are central to agricultural
development. Improved infrastructure and rural services not only
expand opportunities for growth, but also help ensure that such growth
is more diffused and equitable. Many developing countries, especially
in Africa, still have woefully inadequate levels of rural infrastructure
and human capital, and this is a major constraint to their development.
Despite this importance, many governments and donors have slashed
their levels of investment in rural areas in recent years. This paper has
shown that this trend is misguided; many public investments in rural
areas still give very favorable rates of return even in countries like
India and China that have already invested heavily in their rural areas.
Moreover, they also make important contributions to reducing rural
poverty. The results presented in this paper show that investments in
agricultural research, rural roads and education are the best win-win
investments in India and China, contributing the most to both
agricultural growth and rural poverty alleviation. It has also been
shown that targeting more investments towards less-favored areas
c o u l da l s ob eaw i n - w i ns t r a t e g yi ns o m et w oc o u n t r i e s .
There is scope for doing better with existing levels of public
investment by targeting more precisely the available funds towards
investments that are win-win for growth and poverty alleviation. The
results presented in this paper provide useful guidelines for such
targeting. But developing countries also need to improve the efficiency
with which most of their public goods and services are supplied. This
will require institutional reforms, new forms of financing
arrangements, and partnerships with the private and NGO sectors.
Governments and donors also need to step up their levels of investment
in rural infrastructure, technology and human capital, especially in
Africa. These investments are essential for the successful agricultural
transformation of these countries.Markets in Developing Countries
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During the last decade extensive economic reforms were undertaken in
the agricultural sector in Benin and in many other countries in Sub-
Saharan Africa. The reform efforts have generated a positive response,
however the results have generally not met expectations and much
remains to be done (Kherallah et al., 2000). Thorbecke (2000)
distinguishes two types of liberalization policies. Policies that focus on
getting the prices right (devaluation, abolishment of tariffs, elimination
of state commodity boards) and policies that have a wider scope: trade
liberalization policies together with a constellation of structural
measures designed to improve the functioning of markets. The latter
policies could be described as getting the prices and institutions right:
“a comprehensive and joint package of policy measures addressing
institutions and other initial conditions to relax the constraining effects
of binding elements is a sine qua non to the successful performance
(…..) of cash crops as well as of staple food markets. Pushing the price
button in a setting where one or more complementary measures or
conditions are absent is fruitless” (ibid, p. 40).
A number of recent articles (e.g. Fafchamps and Minten, 2001a, Knack
and Keefer, 2001) stress the importance of social capital for the reduction
of transaction costs. This argument is relevant for food marketing
channels in developing countries. In many of these countries the food
markets are operating in a weak institutional environment where
institutions are deficient or cannot be enforced by the “soft state”. The
small-scale of most of the transactions further constrains the
effectiveness of existing formal institutions (e.g. McMillan and
Woodruff, 1999, Fafchamps and Minten, 2001b). In these circumstances
(social) relationships are very important for traders and it is expected that
social capital contributes to the creation of enforceable institutions. More
in general, it can be noted that the role of trade relationships has been a
major issue in the literature on industrial organization: for example,
many authors stressed the importance of business networks for efficient
transactions (Hakansson and Snehota, 1995, Ghauri et al., forthcoming).
The purpose of this paper is to show how food-marketing channels in
Benin are organised and how reductions in marketing costs can be
realized. In particular in economies in transition this is relevant, as new
organizational structures have to be developed. The marketing
channels approach and the theory of institutional economics provide a
useful framework for the analysis. The paper wants to make a nuance in
the debate on the importance of social capital for the functioning of food-124
markets in developing countries. In a recent study Fafchamps and Minten
(1999 and 2001) show that traders with more relationships (social
capital) realize higher output. They conclude that the accumulation of
social capital should be fostered (ibid, 1999, p.31). In the debate on food
trade policy in Benin these results have been a support for a project that
facilitated local trader organizations (Alapini, 1999). The results of this
project were evaluated positively by Gabre-Madhin, et al. (2001):
“Another positive factor is the prevalence of trader associations in Benin
and the strong public support that they are accorded”. However,
experience with this policy shows that the major objective of these local
organizations is the protection of the interests of incumbent wholesalers.
The unconditional support for local organizations will hamper the
dynamic efficiency in the market and will create a bottleneck for further
organizational change.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 will present some major
reasons for persistent market imperfections in many food markets in
developing countries. Section 3 focuses on marketing channels and
institutions. Section 4 discusses the organization of food marketing
channels in Benin. Section 5 argues that institutions play a dominant role
in the organization of the private food market and discusses some
opportunities for reduced costs. Finally, Section 6 shows how local trader
organizations may constrain organizational innovations.
2. Food allocation by the private market: an overview of a
debate
The quest for improvement of the functioning of food markets is a major
policy issue in many developing countries. Properly functioning markets
will serve both the producers at the one end of the marketing chain and
the consumers at the other end. Food market performance is the result of
a complex set of institutions (formal and informal rules) which co-
ordinate exchange and initiatives undertaken by individuals (traders,
farmers) governmental and non-governmental organizations (cereal
banks, co-operatives). Views on the performance of food markets in
developing countries have shifted in the course of time. During the
1960s the debate stressed the existence of “market failures”: due to a
lack of competition traders were alleged to abuse their market power; a
lack of capital and credit were supposed to constitute an entry barrier for
small traders and due to a lack of information, market integration was
expected to be deficient.125
Interventionist policies were developed to correct for these failures.
However, the experiences in the 1970s have shown that many of the so-
called “market failures” were only replaced by “government failures”.
Ellis (1992) summarises the government failures as follows:
•  Information failures:
It appeared almost always wrong to assume that state officials have
any clearer idea of the supply and demand conditions in the market
than private sector operators. This resulted in serious misallocation
and the coexistence of a network of formal and informal parallel
markets.
•  Complex side effects:
Interventions have secondary effects in an economy, e.g. maximum
consumer prices may lower farm-gate prices or increase government
budget-deficits.
•  Implementation and motivation failures:
Most of the developing countries are “soft states” with “soft
bureaucracies”, making the implementation of market policies all
over the country’s territory a difficult task. Moreover, low salaries
affect the motivation of the civil servants in charge.
•  Rent-seeking:
Under the above-mentioned conditions state action may easily lead
to bribery and malpractice.
As a result of the experiences in the 1970s, structural adjustment
policies in the 1980s and 1990s advocated market liberalization. These
have put to an end the interventionist policies of many governments.
The new market policies claim to foster the functioning of the market.
However, in spite of the liberalization, several market imperfections
(market failures) persist and the costs involved in market transactions
are high. Some of the major imperfections can be summarised as
follows:
- Seasonal and spatial arbitrage with imperfect information
There is no synchrony between food production and food consumption.
In the semi-arid areas rain fed production systems have only one harvest
a year, while consumption is continuous. Moreover, harvests are126
regularly threatened by climatic hazards: yields are volatile. This
seasonal aspect may cause substantial price fluctuations, as storage costs
(due to storage losses and capital needs to finance the cereals) are
important and information on local supply and demand conditions is
imperfect.
On a perfect market, prices convey information from households to firms
concerning what consumers want, and from firms to households about
the production costs (Stiglitz, 1994:8 and 1986). In most of the
developing countries this information is difficult to obtain as the
telecommunication infrastructure is imperfect and local market rules are
non-transparent. In many cases information depends on personal
networks of individual traders. In order to safeguard their existing trade
relations, traders are reluctant to share their information with
competitors. Some information simply does not exist due to risks in the
production process. Other sources of information may exist but are not
always accessible for all traders and farmers. Moreover, in many
countries official regulations are not transparent and their
implementation arbitrary. These conditions restrict competition, as a lack
of information constitutes an entry barrier. The existence of oligopolistic
markets often seems to be based on the possibility for certain wholesalers
to detain specific information. In practice we observe that many traders
stick to their individual marketing networks, which are nested in
particular geographical regions.
- Thin markets
Many producers are peasants who are to a large degree self-sufficient
with regard to food (Matthews, 1986). Often they buy/sell incidentally
their deficit/surplus in the market. The grain stock is perceived as a
liquid source that may be used for urgently needed household
necessities. The problem for the market is that many of these transac-
tions concern small and highly variable quantities, scattered all over
the country's territory. This fragmented structure inflates transaction
costs: the assembly and distribution of cereals becomes a labour-
intensive and costly activity. Another effect induced by thin markets is
that small marketable surpluses also restrict competition among traders
(in particular wholesalers may profit from a local monopsony), as only
a limited number of traders are sufficient to drain the surplus.127
- Missing or Incomplete markets
In most developing countries, the set of commodity and service markets
is highly incomplete (de Janvry et. al., 1991). Imperfections in three
related markets, providing essential services for cereal trade, hamper the
functioning of the food market and increase the transaction costs:
•  Transport services are only available to a limited extent. In most
countries a small group of large-scale wholesalers have their own
transport facilities, but the majority of small-scale traders depend on
public transport facilities, which are mainly oriented toward the
urban centres. During rainy seasons large rural areas may even
become inaccessible. Consequently, the transport of commodities is
less flexible than required for optimal trade flows.
•  Credit facilities constrain the commercial activities of traders and
farmers, in particular the storage function. Often the formal
financial sector does not provide credit for trade activities and even
if credit facilities do exist, most traders and farmers lack the
necessary collateral (see Zeller et al., 1997). The upshot is that most
traders operate with very small funds and most farmers have little
withholding capacity (they need money to settle debts and
household expenses).
•  Finally, an insurance (harvest failures) and futures (hedging)
market, accessible for individual traders and farmers, does not exist.
Hedging against price fluctuations is impossible. The institutional
structure necessary to guarantee the enforcement of contracts on the
futures and insurance market is weak, and this results in the non-
existence of this market.
- Hostile and Unstable Policy Environment
In the 70’s market imperfections were generally taken responsible for all
kind of marketing problems. Several populist regimes concluded that
traders abused their alleged market power. All kinds of controls were
installed to restrict the behaviour of traders. Despite the plea for
liberalization since the 80’s, many controls exist to date. Many traders
prefer to save on the costs of formal taxes and pay some money to bribe
controlling agents, who are not so much interested in checking whether
the formal taxes are paid but more interested in topping up their salaries.
Corruption, differences between local and national policies, changing tax128
laws, general mistrust of traders are all elements that provoke a hostile
environment for traders (see also Smith and Luttrel, 1994). Taking into
account the amount of money involved in a truck loaded with food, the
effects of this hostile environment should not be underestimated. It
increases the risks for traders and may constitute a real entry barrier for
potential newcomers on a local market. The upshot is an unstable,
opaque institutional environment, which hampers the market and the
furthering of institutions that reduce transaction costs.
3. Marketing Channels and Institutions
The above-mentioned problems influence the functioning of the food
marketing channels.
Marketing channels consist of a number of intermediaries all involved
in making the product available for the final consumer (see Coughlan
et al., 2001). In Benin most transactions take place in conventional
marketing channels. These channels rely heavily on spot markets
where commodities are traded between actors who are not involved in
recurrent trade relationships. Figure 1 shows how complicated
transactions in a simple conventional food marketing channel are if all
partners are involved in all the functions. The following functions are
distinguished:
1. Assembly of surpluses:
Thin markets and seasonality make this function rather complex
and exemplify the importance of access to proper information in
Benin. The market information system is not operational or trusted
and information is exchanged mainly within personal networks.
2. Transport of surpluses:
As the large majority of food traders do not have their own means
of transport they hire this service on the market for public
transport. As rural markets are thin, availability of these services is
not always guaranteed.
3. Storage of surpluses:
A lack of modern infrastructure, instable climatic conditions and
missing futures markets, imply that uncertainty and high costs
characterise the execution of this task.
4. Distribution of surpluses:
Thin markets and seasonality make this function rather complex and
exemplify the importance of access to proper information.
5. Negotiation of transactions:129
The lack of standard procedures (units of measurement and quality
standards) is a nuisance for transparency in the market.
6. Transfer of ownership, risk and payment:
As long as transactions take place in conventional channels this is not
a problem as these are characterised by cash payments and direct
delivery. However, transactions in vertically integrated marketing
channels may reduce costs, but need more institutional support. To
date “the play of the game” is based on trust and this limits the
opportunities for vertical integration.
7. Promotion of products (channels):
This function is limited to cleaning of the product and controlling for
freshness. One of the advantages of vertical channels is that
promotion of the product through standard packing procedures and
standard qualities can be more easily developed.
8. Financing of transactions:
As indicated above the formal credit market is incomplete or missing.
Moreover, to date the banks play only a limited role in the transfer of
money. This hampers transactions that take place in vertical
marketing channels.
9. Enforcement of transactions:
See function 6130
Figure 1: Functions in a conventional marketing channel
Institutions may accommodate some of the abovementioned problems
and facilitate the execution of the functions presented in figure 1.
Institutions are humanly devised constraints that structure political,
economic and social interaction (North, 1991). They consist of both
informal constraints (sanctions, taboos, customs, traditions and codes of
conduct) and formal rules (constitutions, laws, property rights).
Institutions form the incentive structure of a society and can be
interpreted as a set of rules. Economic institutions are the underlying
determinants of economic performance and shape the organization of
market transactions. Williamson (2000) distinguishes 4 types of
institutions:131
level 1: informal institutions resulting from the social context
level 2: formal institutions defining the rules of the game in the
market
level 3: institutions defining the play of the game in the market
level 4: institutions defining resource allocation inside the firm
Level 1 consists of institutions embedded in the social context like
customs and religion
Economists take these rules often as exogenous factors in their
analysis. These rules change only slowly. However, they are important
and influence the nature of economic transactions. Level 2, concerns
institutions that define the rules of the game. In particular the
economics of property rights addresses these type of issues. It concerns
the formal rules of the game, imposed on the market and often
enforced by the government or market authorities. Economists are
highly involved in this field as these rules should facilitate economic
transactions and have to be respected by all actors in the market.
Therefore, level 2 also influences the rules that are elaborated on lower
levels in the hierarchy of economic institutions. The institutions on
level 3 define the play of the game. These are the specific rules defined
by the actors involved in a transaction, in bilateral formal or informal
(oral) contracts. The institutions on this level define the governance
structures for transactions through markets while taking into account
the rules defined at higher levels. These rules facilitate market
exchange between the actors involved in a transaction. Finally, the
institutions on level 4 co-ordinate internal allocation, or transactions
inside the firm.
The second order is the institutional environment, enforced by the state
or a formal market authority. These rules should lead to efficient
transactions from a societal point of view. The important task for the
government is to define the rules that have to be respected by the actors
in the market and, subsequently, to enforce these rules in order to
guarantee that the market is a level playing field. As we are mainly
interested in the organization of market transactions between actors in
a marketing channel, the third level is the most important group of
institutions that shape the transactions in marketing channels. Here we
find the concrete contracts that define the conditions on which the
transaction is based and the responsibilities of the partners involved.
These contracts differ in time and space and between types of
intermediaries. The contracts specify the functions that have to be
executed by the partners involved. In conventional marketing channels
this is relatively straightforward, however more complex contracts will132
be developed when it concerns vertical marketing relationships. For
example, a futures contract between a maize miller and a farmer is
more complex than a contract based on immediate delivery and cash
payment. Existing marketing channels should be able to co-ordinate
both types of transactions in an efficient way and should be flexible in
the sense that they adapt easily to new opportunities in the market.
Social capital will influence the institutions on all four levels. The
development of civil society and, subsequently, the creation of new
social capital will influence the rules that are set by the social context
(e.g. the market should serve local food security). Some of these rules
may be formalized on level 2 (e.g. in order to guarantee local food
security local market authorities may restrict the ‘export’ of the local
marketable surplus to maize deficit areas), while new institutions may
be created to govern exchange relationships between actors in the
market (e.g. changes in the social context may facilitate horizontal co-
operation or vertical integration).
Institutions do not only define the rules, but implicitly also determine
the costs of transactions through the allocation of property rights and
influence the organization of marketing channels. It is here that the
economics of transaction costs becomes interesting (Williamson,
2000). Three types of costs are often distinguished. The costs of
obtaining information before concluding a contract (contact), the costs
involved in negotiating a contract (contract) and the costs involved in
enforcing a contract (control). The efficient outcome is to minimise the
sum of production and transaction costs for the product or service
concerned. Williamson claims that this process operates in the
commercial world: that transactions do get organised in efficient ways.
However, this is a much debated issue as a lot of research shows that
markets operate in more or less inefficient ways. The work of North
(1994) is interesting here as he shows that institutions do not
necessarily evolve in the direction that facilitates the optimum
organization: “Creating the institutions that will alter the benefit/cost
ratios in favour of co-operation in impersonal exchange is a complex
process, because it not only entails the creation of economic
institutions, but requires that they be under girded by appropriate
political institutions” (ibid, p. 365).
In the literature marketing costs and transaction costs are regularly mixed
up. In order to prevent confusion about the concepts used it is important
to make a subtle distinction between marketing costs, transaction costs
and transformation costs: “Transformation costs are the costs of land,133
labour, capital, and entrepreneurial skills required to physically transform
inputs into outputs. Transaction costs are the costs of the land, labour,
capital, and entrepreneurial skill required to transfer property rights from
one person to another” (North, 1994, p. 612). The functions distinguished
in Figure 2 all entail marketing costs, which encompass all costs
supported in the marketing channel between production of the
commodity and the final customer. Following the definition for
transformation costs, transport, storage, processing are treated as
transformation costs, since they change a physical attribute of the good
(location, time, form). The other functions involve transaction costs:
assembly, distribution, negotiation of contracts, transfer of ownership
and payment, promotion of products, distribution of risks, financing and
enforcement of transactions. The latter functions are all related to the
transfer of property rights.
4. Interregional Food Marketing Channels in Benin
Despite the problems discussed in Section 2, private food marketing
channels are effective in most African countries. In order to understand
the functioning of the food market we will give a closer look at some
major marketing channels in Benin, connecting 2 major surplus regions:
Nikki and Kétou, with the major urban centre: Cotonou (Figure 2).
The structure of the marketing channel through which the product
passes from producer to consumer varies; the channel can be longer or
shorter, depending on the distance and the behaviour of actors (traders,
farmers, consumers) in the market. Informational problems cohere with
distance; therefore we focus on inter-regional arbitrage and the costs
involved. The existence of a number of alternative channels is
interpreted as a positive sign because it enables farmers and consumers
to choose between the appropriate marketing services needed. The
choices to be made demonstrate the importance of information: where
to buy or sell? Where to obtain the required quality class(es)? What is
the ruling market price? Are there other, more profitable markets?
Which marketing services are provided at what costs?134
Figure 2: Alternative inter-regional marketing channels for
maize
A result of the above-mentioned characteristics is that transaction costs
are high and that market integration is imperfect (Kuiper et al., 1999).
We present the results of a study carried out in Benin in 2001 in order to
shed some light on the costs that market exchange provokes.
Conventional marketing channels rely on spot markets. Transaction
costs are specified for two marketing channels between two rural and
the major urban market place: channels over a relatively short distance
(Kétou-Cotonou) and a long distance (Nikki-Cotonou) are
distinguished. Most farmers sell the marketable surplus to assemblers
or wholesalers on the village market. They transfer the food to
wholesalers in the regional market. Urban wholesalers collect the
surplus on the regional market to supply the retailers or processing
firms in Cotonou. Two types of channels are distinguished on the
market segment that links the regional and the urban market: small-
scale urban wholesalers and large-scale urban wholesalers. Small-scale135
wholesalers are able to integrate the distribution function, while large-
scale wholesalers have to sell through the intermediary of brokers in
order to realize sufficient turnover. The table shows that small-scale
wholesalers can compete with large-scale wholesalers if the distance
between the local and the urban market is not too large. These channels
cover the major maize flows between the markets under study and
represent the principal types of market intermediaries. The retailers sell
in the retail-segment directly to consumers. Retailers deliver an extra
service (selling in small units at specific locations) and this justifies a
higher selling price.
The marketing costs involved in spatial arbitrage are considerable if
compared with the average selling prices. For example, the average
wholesale price in Cotonou in 2001 was about 100 Fcfa per kg. We
note that, in order to simplify the analysis, storage costs are excluded
from the analysis. As most traders are not involved in storage and
prefer a high turnover of their stocks, this simplification is justified
(see Lutz, 1994).136
Table 1: Breakdown of marketing costs for 2 marketing
channels: Kétou-Cotonou (short distance, 106 km)
and Nikki-Cotonou (long distance, 529 km)
*
KÉTOU-COTONOU NIKKI-COTONOU
Channel 1 Channel 2 Channel 1 Channel 2
















































































Total 34.2 100 33.9 100 37.8 100 42.0 100
* Channel 2 = small-scale wholesaler buying and selling +/- 1,000 kg on the
regional market per market day. Both wholesalers provision retailers. Taxes are
equal for each type of intermediary. Large-scale wholesaler (channel 1) may
negotiate a discount of 10% on freight costs. Large-scale wholesalers buy with the
help of an assembler and sell with the mediation of a broker. Small-scale
wholesalers sell directly to retailers. Traders’ gross margins (according to their
own estimation) vary as a rule from 0 to 10 Fcfa per kg. We imputed a gross
margin of 5 Fcfa per kilogram as a normal mark-up (4 Fcfa for the large-scale
wholesaler).
Source: Lutz 2001
The costs borne by traders consist above all of variable costs; taxes,
freight and commission fees. Only transport costs of the trader himself
are independent of the quantity traded per trip; a quasi fixed cost. The
fixed costs are more difficult to calculate; as trade concerns mainly
small-scale buying and immediate reselling, most traders do not invest
in fixed capital like a truck, a store or equipment. Transaction costs137
such as obtaining information, enforcing and concluding (bargaining) a
contract are difficult to isolate. As trade is transferred through
conventional marketing channels, these costs consist mainly of costs to
develop a network: search for new clients, search for peers who want
to co-operate on the basis of mutual interest, search for contacts with
officials in order to reduce taxes. These costs can be considered as
sunk costs. Especially large-scale traders can invest in these activities,
as the costs of failure can be spread out over a relatively large turnover.
Small-scale traders will be more inert, as a failure implies that the
dead-weight loss has to be captured on a small turnover. Consequently,
their networks are smaller and more often depend on relatives and
friends.
The sunk costs are limited and included in the gross margin of a trader;
a remuneration for invested capital, management and risk. These
components are difficult to separate and traders are reluctant to give
detailed information on these issues. In order to get an idea of the
average gross margin we asked traders to estimate the “normal” mark-
up. This estimate was used as a proxy for a “normal” gross margin and
enabled the calculation of the total marketing costs. The gross margins
given by the traders vary and depend on local market conditions and
the commercial services provided. However, the average figure given
in the table can be interpreted as an average remuneration, necessary to
attract the interest of the trader in the activity.
5. Opportunities for reduced costs and new market
institutions
An efficient channel reduces transaction costs to a minimum by
involving only these actors who have a comparable advantage to execute
specific functions (producer, wholesaler, retailer, consumer, transporter,
broker). Conventional channels follow a strict procedure: all channel
partners are involved in all the tasks. However, some traders are quite
active in developing alternative marketing channels. Basically they can
follow 4 strategies to reduce transaction costs:
1. Avoiding payment of formal market taxes;
Tax payments are reduced if the product does not pass through
formal market places. We observe that formal taxes constitute a
significant part of the trader's commercial gross profit: for urban
wholesalers in a conventional marketing channel this tax element is
approximately 60% to 80%. This shows that passing through the138
informal market is encouraged by the tax levels and explains why
the majority of flows are not taxed according to law. It also
explains why local governments, in co-operation with local traders,
regularly discourage integrated vertical channel arrangements, as
these channel formats reduce their revenues or hamper tax
collection (see the next Section).
2. Increase of turnover per trip in order to reduce transport costs;
The structure of transaction costs given in Table 2 shows that for
long distance trade an increase in turnover per trip may reduce
marketing costs. This explains why traders try to increase volume.
However, taking into account seasonality of production, imperfect
information and transactions based on conventional marketing
channels, the required minimum quantities can only be found
during the harvest season. Consequently, the small-scale
wholesaler is the most regular intermediary in the market.
3. Eliminating brokers and/or retailers in the chain;
The establishment of selling networks facilitates the flow of
information and may reduce the number of intermediaries in the
channel and, subsequently, may lead to cost reduction. For
example, wholesalers may work out a strategy based on the
availability of production factors (capital and labour), know-how
and relationships. This explains why some urban wholesalers
specialise in selling networks and prefer to buy from rural
wholesalers.
4. Eliminating assemblers and/or local wholesalers in the chain.
The establishment of buying networks will provide traders the
necessary information on local supply conditions. Again,
wholesalers may work out a strategy based on the availability of
production factors (capital and labour), know-how and
relationships, to reduce the number of intermediaries. This explains
why most rural wholesalers in Nikki and Kétou specialise in
buying networks and prefer to sell on the regional market to traders
from Cotonou.
The examples show that some traders develop strategies to eliminate
intermediaries. This implies that functions have to be assumed by other
members in the channel: some type of vertical integration has to be
achieved and new institutions (level 3) have to be developed. For
example, cost reductions are possible if transport costs to the
‘intermediary’ market can be saved through direct delivery to the urban139
market and if net margins of obsolete intermediaries are eliminated.
However, there is a trade-off between flexibility and integration.
Moreover, if the institutional infrastructure is weak, integration may
become risky, which makes traders reluctant to expose themselves to
opportunism (see also Fafchamps and Minten, 2001b). This explains
why most transactions take place in conventional marketing channels.
It also supports the argument that social capital may facilitate the
creation of business networks.
Finally we observe that primary assembly is determining an important
part of the total marketing costs. The lack of information on supply, the
small quantities per transaction and the accessibility of the farms
(condition of rural roads) explain these costs. This may be interpreted
as an argument for stronger involvement of farmers in primary
assembly. They have the information on supply and they can regroup
the marketable surpluses in larger quantities. Therefore it is remarkable
that farmer organizations are not active in vertical marketing channel
arrangements in Benin. In the past, this resulted from government top-
down policies that encouraged farmers to sell their surpluses on the
local formal market. This policy was expected to increase competition
among traders on spot-markets and to protect isolated farmers. Another
argument for this policy was that it facilitated the levying of local
taxes. Consequently no support was given by the extension service to
farmers that wanted to develop commercial strategies.
The cost structure shows that an important opportunity for better farm
prices may be rooted in the commercial functions assumed by farmers
or farmer organizations. Taking into account the high assembly costs,
farmer organizations may have a comparative advantage for the
execution of this task: they may perform the task of the local assembler
and the local wholesaler. Moreover, farmer organizations may facilitate
the storage process and improve access to credit. These organizations
may also facilitate the learning process of commercial skills. With
further developments in the telecommunication system farmer
organizations may even replace urban wholesalers and sell directly
through brokers in the urban market. This is not to say that farmers are
easy to organise and that the transaction costs involved in these
organizations can be neglected. However, the non-involvement of
farmers in food distribution looks like a missed opportunity for
increased farmer’ revenues. The question arises why farmer
organizations are not more active in vertically integrated marketing
channels in the liberalized food market in Benin.140
6. The role of local social capital: a barrier or a stimulant
for organizational change?
The actual enforcement of rules in networks is often based on trust.
Formal legal procedures are too expensive to provide protection for the
interests of the partners involved (Fafchamps and Minten, 2001b,
McMillan and Woodruff, 1999). Trust may be a solution for this
problem but the inconvenience is that it takes a lot of time to establish
it in a weak institutional environment. A lack of trust constitutes a
barrier for vertical integration in the food-marketing channel. Social
capital is expected to facilitate trust building and business
relationships. In many food markets trader organizations are
developing institutions to facilitate market functioning: “The
associations are sophisticated “Coase-like” responses to this market
environment: they focus on reducing their members’ transaction
costs”(Luttrell and Smith, 1994). However their dimensions are often
restricted to the local formal market place and they are strictly guided
by their self-interest. Therefore control for collusion and artificial entry
barriers is important.
Social capital is not a straightforward concept (see Knack and Keefer,
2001). Narayan and Pritchett (1999) defined it as follows: the quantity
and quality of associational life and the related social norms. The
problem is how to measure the concept of social capital. Putnam
(1993) used membership in formal groups as a proxy for this capital. In
order to be able to measure the value of social capital on the firm level,
Fafchamps and Minten (2001a) use ‘the number of traders known’ as a
proxy for social capital. They interpret the number of contacts as a
variable that improves market information and trust. The first question
that arises is ‘what is meant with knowing other traders?’. How did
traders interpret this question: how many traders do I know personally,
or, with how many traders do I deal on a regular basis, or, how many
faces do I know? Moreover, the number of traders known is not
necessarily a proxy for quality of information: a wholesaler buying
through assemblers and selling through brokers may have a limited
number of recurrent business contacts that provide trust and proper
market information.
A more serious problem is that traders in marketing channels are
involved in different functions on different segments in the market and
that not all traders are able to perform the same functions (see Figure
1). For example, limited access to capital is a barrier to entry in the141
wholesale segment. Due to the fact that the capital market is not perfect
small-scale traders simply do not have the capital to enter the
wholesale market. Consequently, they have to restrict their activities to
some specific commercial functions: retail trade and local assembly.
Due to the local nature of these transactions it can be expected that a
limited number of contacts with wholesalers will suffice to be
successful. This implies that the correlation between output and scale,
observed by Fafchamps and Minten, can be spurious. They did not
distinguish assemblers, retailers and wholesalers (50% of the
interviewed traders in Benin are retailers, see Gabre-Madhin 2001, p.
9). Large-scale traders may be more productive simply because they
carry out other functions than small-scale traders. The activities of the
latter group are restricted to petty trade, which is characterized by
fierce competition and, therefore, not interesting for large-scale traders.
The same argument was put forward by Barrett, observing that most
traders do not have access to the equipment and credit required to
penetrate the more profitable segments of the food market in
Madagascar (cited by Fafchamps and Minten, 1999, p. 4).
The question arises whether large-scale traders have higher profits due
to the larger number of contacts or due to the fact that they perform
more profitable functions in the channel? Subsequently, it becomes
interesting to know why wholesalers are able to realize higher margins,
or, how they reduce competition on their market segments. The
experience in Benin shows that social capital may provide the answer.
Since 1996, the national board for food security in Benin (ONASA),
carries out a project to organize food traders. These initiatives were
supported by several research results. For example, Tassou (1995)
concludes that the trader organizations do not hamper the functioning
of the market and do not lead to excessive profits. Gabre-Madhin et al.
(2001, p. 113) support the policy to promote market institutions such as
trader associations and intermediation services. Three regional
organizations were established, and these organizations were expected
to represent the wholesalers on the local markets. The objectives of
these organizations were rather ambiguous: e.g. contributing to food
security, encouraging traders to registrar their firm, and protecting the
interests of the members. Due to the fact that the national objectives
were not always in line with the local priorities, these regional
organizations have not met expectations. However, on the local level in
Nikki and Kétou some strong organizations were created. To facilitate
transactions warehouses were built on the market place by ONASA142
and the management of these buildings was delegated to the local
trader organizations.
The positive effects were that local traders organized some sessions to
train their members in storage techniques, bookkeeping, etc. Moreover,
the local organization plays a role in conflict resolution and the
development of local standards for measurement. However, all the
activities have been subject to the primary goal of protecting the
interests of the local incumbent wholesalers. Two groups of
stakeholders complain about the situation: farmers and non-resident
wholesalers. Farmers taking commercial initiatives are harassed and
non-resident wholesalers, willing to buy directly from farmers, are
fined by the local trade organization. This shows that the trader
organizations simply prohibit the development of integrated marketing
channels: the major source for further reductions in marketing costs.
Moreover, we observed that the local authorities approve this
behaviour, as it is part of the policy to facilitate local trader
organizations (see also Tassou, 1995, p. 48 and Fanou et al., 1991).
The result is puzzling: some types of social capital can reduce
marketing costs, while other types of social capital can inflate the
costs. The concept of “Social Capital” is ambiguous. Some forms
facilitate transactions, while others hamper efficient trade relationships.
In order to assess the effects of different forms of social capital it is
important to have a good understanding of the organization of the
marketing channels, the structure of the market and the behaviour of
incumbent traders. In line with this argument, Knack and Keefer (2001,
p. 1284) noted that “promoting horizontal associations may be
counterproductive”.
7. Conclusion
The Benin case showed the importance of getting the institutions right.
Withdrawal of the government will not solve the information problem
and will not protect actors in the market against artificial entry barriers.
Liberalization policies that neglect the importance of a national market
authority that imposes the rules of the game (institutions on level 2)
may reduce the dynamic efficiency in the market. In Benin local trader
organizations are preserving the present situation and, therefore,
constitute a barrier for the development of integrated marketing
channels. We have good reasons to expect that farmer organizations
may play a crucial role in the further reduction of marketing costs.143
However, the present support for local trader organizations is a serious
barrier for these type of initiatives in the two rural markets under study.
At least three policy initiatives are necessary to complement the
liberalization process:
- A support to trader organizations can be given only on the condition
that harmful cartel-arrangements are prohibited. Despite the
expected positive effects of social capital there is a need to control
artificial entry-barriers. In particular in a liberalized market there is a
need for transparent rules of the game enforced on a national scale by
a trustworthy market authority. In this respect it was remarkable to
observe that all policy documents we could consult in Benin
interpreted liberalization as ‘withdrawal of the state’. No explicit
reference was made to the crucial role of competition.
- Traders and farmers should be encouraged to improve the
institutions that shape the play of the game. The development of
vertical (hybrid) marketing channels that beat existing marketing
channels should be facilitated.
- An operational market information system should be installed. To
date the market information system is not operational on a national
scale. Incumbent traders indicate that their willingness to pay for
this service is limited. They rely on personal networks that provide
more accurate information. However, market information in less
transparent markets can be considered as a merit good. It will make
market segments more contestable and it will make farmers more
eager to develop commercial activities if the information is adapted
to their needs.144
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Washington.The effect of institutional improvements
on cereal trade in Burkina Faso:




A well functioning cereal market is a prerequisite for attaining food
security, which is of great concern in Burkina Faso as in many other
African countries. In this paper, the effect of some institutional
improvements on the distribution of cereals over space and time and on
cereal prices in Burkina Faso is analysed. In the literature on the
functioning of food markets in West Africa, problems with these
institutions are often perceived as a major constraint for food
marketing and rural development in general.
The functioning of the cereal market in Burkina Faso has improved a
lot in the last decade. This is among other things due to the adoption of
the Structural Adjustment Programme in the early 1990s and the
devaluation of the Franc CFA in 1994. Despite the liberalisation of the
cereal market and numerous other changes many difficulties persist.
Some of them are due to malfunctioning institutions or some peculiar
characteristics of the cereal market in Burkina Faso. For example,
cereal markets in the sparsely populated areas are thin, which means
that many transactions deal only with small quantities. As a result
competition is restricted and marketing costs are high. Secondly, food
production is not synchronised to food consumption. There is only one
harvest per year, while consumption is continuous. In the same vein,
the place of cereal production usually does not correspond to the place
of cereal consumption. A prerequisite for producers and traders to
make efficient transport and storage decisions is that adequate
information is available on prices, supply, demand, market rules,
transport facilities, credit facilities, etc. This information is often
difficult to obtain. Many traders rely on personal networks in order to
obtain this information. Thirdly, some markets, like the markets for
transport, credit, and insurance, are missing or incomplete. Such
imperfections hamper the functioning of the food market and increase
transaction costs.
In this paper, the effect of improvements in some of these institutions
are analysed. I concentrate on the effect of improvements in
infrastructure (roads and communication infrastructure), market
information services, and credit facilities on cereal prices and cereal
trade in Burkina Faso. Some other institutional improvements are
analysed in Ruijs (2002). These effects will be analysed using a
stochastic, equilibrium model in which the behaviour of the cereal
producers, traders, and consumers is simulated simultaneously. Before
discussing the main principles of this model in Section 3, I first briefly
discuss the organisation of the cereal market in Burkina Faso. Using150
this information, some scenarios can be formulated which indicate how
institutional changes are expected to affect cereal trade and cereal
prices. Furthermore, this information is necessary to understand some
of the choices made in the model and to interpret the results of the
model. In Section 4, the model is used to quantify the effects of the
scenarios of institutional changes. Finally, in Section 5 some
conclusions are drawn regarding the results and the model.
Cereal Trade and Marketing Costs
In this section, three scenarios are formulated which indicate how
improved market institutions are expected to affect cereal trade in
Burkina Faso. For this, first I briefly discuss which factors cause some
of the problems on the cereal market and how. In Burkina Faso, the
exchange of cereals from producers to consumers can take many
different forms, depending among other things on the number of
intermediaries involved. The intermediaries on the cereal market in
Burkina Faso are assemblers, wholesalers, brokers, and retailers. They
may purchase, collect, transport, store, and sell cereals. Furthermore,
they negotiate on agreements concerning quality, delivery, price,
distribution of risk, financial matters, and enforcement. The costs they
make for these tasks can be classified in transport costs, storage costs,
and transaction costs. The last cost type includes the expenses for the
negotiation tasks and for gathering the necessary information. From a
number of surveys performed in the past in Burkina Faso, it is derived
that they are 5% to 14% of the price paid by the consumers. Moreover,
transport costs are 5% to 20% and storage costs 6% to 9% of the
consumer price (see Déjou, 1987; Sherman et al., 1987; Bassolet, 2000;
Sirpé 2000 and price data obtained from SIM/SONAGESS).
The marketing costs are influenced by the state of the market
institutions. These institutions are important, because they have to
facilitate trade. Many problems on the cereal market in Burkina Faso
are related to outdated market information, underdeveloped
communication and road infrastructure, inaccessible courts, non-
transparent market rules and regulations, a low degree of organisation,
inaccessible capital markets, and low education levels. Due to
malfunctioning market institutions, especially uncertainty and the
investments which have to be made in order to set up and maintain
trade relationships (posting assemblers in remote regions, development
of trade skills and knowledge, collecting information, and building up
relationships with clients), may lead to high transaction costs. For
example, because information on trade opportunities is difficult to
obtain, it is important for a wholesaler to set up an expensive network
of assemblers who know local market conditions; due to expensive orinfrastructure, market information, and credit
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absent transport services and communication infrastructure,
wholesalers often send non-qualified but trustworthy relatives to
remote areas, instead of qualified strangers whose behaviour can hardly
be monitored; due to the inaccessibility of courts, agreements are
difficult to enforce; non-transparent market rules and missing quality
and quantity standards complicate entry of new traders in a region.
Many of the uncertainties and of the associated costs are related to a
lack of information on trade opportunities in the future and in other
regions. Especially price uncertainty is reported to be an important
impediment on the cereal market in Burkina Faso.
The way transactions are organised on the cereal market in Burkina
Faso are to a large extent motivated by transaction cost considerations.
To reduce uncertainty on the behaviour of employees (and hence
reduce transaction costs), relationships between wholesalers and their
employees are often based on family or clan ties. In these relationships,
trust can more easily be maintained, information can more easily be
obtained, and agreements can more easily be enforced. Furthermore,
reasons explaining the close ties between cereal traders and their
clients are to improve market access, to reduce supply uncertainty, or
to reduce transport and storage costs. Due to these motivations
wholesalers invest in long-term relationships with traders on distant
market places or close agreements with important farmers.
What are expected to be the effects of improved market institutions on
cereal trade in Burkina Faso? I consider three scenarios of institutional
improvement. First, consider the scenario in which infrastructure is
improved. Due to bad road conditions transport costs are high. Better
road maintenance and more asphalted roads will have a large influence
on truck maintenance costs, fuel costs, and transport time. A positive
effect of better roads is not only that transport will become cheaper, but
also that the mobility of people and goods will increase. This indirect
effect may have a stimulating effect on the economy. For wholesalers
monitoring is expensive due to the bad transportation and
communication infrastructure. To reduce behavioural uncertainty and
transaction costs, they rely on trustworthy relatives. However, relatives
are not necessarily the most qualified traders. If infrastructure would
improve, wholesalers are expected to employ more often qualified non-
relatives. In that case, traders without a trade network can more
cheaply move to an assembly market to purchase directly from
producers instead of relying on assemblers or local traders. Not only
transport costs but also transaction costs will decrease for them.
Purchases will probably more often be spot market transactions and
less often purchases from familiar producers or traders. Note that such152
an evolution can only take place slowly, because of social norms and
rules which force wholesalers to hire relatives.
Secondly, consider the role of market price information. To decide on
where and when to buy or sell, price information is indispensable.
Currently, however, price data transmitted by SIM are often inaccurate
and outdated (Bassolet, 2000). For the wholesalers, accurate price
information will decrease arbitrage uncertainty and the dependence on
their agents for obtaining reliable information. They can decide with
less risk, to transport to regions with more favourable prices.
Moreover, with more accurate price information, traders can better
predict future prices. Consequently, the risk of suffering losses from
storage decreases. Hence, transport and storage costs will fall. Also
transaction costs will be lower. Especially the time and personnel
needed to obtain the required information will reduce. The need to set
up a trade network in order to obtain correct information reduces.
Furthermore, it becomes easier to monitor whether agents trade at
reasonable prices. The wholesaler becomes less dependent on family
members, because hiring unknown employees involves less risk. As a
result, trade networks may evolve from networks in which gathering
information is important, to networks in which assembly and
distribution of cereals is the main task. Moreover, producers,
consumers, and small, independent traders will have a stronger
negotiation position with the larger traders if they have more accurate
price information. They can more easily choose for the trader offering
or demanding the best prices. As a consequence their transaction costs
decrease (one could say that their negotiation costs decrease or that the
losses incurred by a bad negotiation position decrease). It is expected
that more will be traded on the spot market and less with familiar
traders.
Thirdly, consider the effect of improved credit facilities. The difficulty
of obtaining a credit at a reasonable interest rate is one of the major
problems at the cereal market. Missing credit markets prevent small
traders from extending their trade network or storing their
merchandise. Especially the capital costs of cereal trade are
considerable. Credit facilities were promised to be set up for cereal
traders after the market liberalisation. However, conditions imposed on
credit granting are still too stringent for most traders. If credits can be
obtained more easily, local traders can purchase larger quantities of
cereals without being pre-financed by wholesalers. Consequently,
wholesalers can purchase from them and do not have to set up
networks of local assemblers, with all the accompanying costs and
risks. As a consequence, costs associated to uncertainty on the
assemblers behaviour will decrease, but negotiation costs with otherinfrastructure, market information, and credit
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traders will increase. Moreover, farmers will not be forced to take pre-
harvest loans from traders against usury interest rates if they can obtain
formal credits. They will become less dependent on the few traders
who offer credits, but they can sell to the traders offering the best
prices. As a consequence their transaction costs will decrease. The
result of these changes will be that the relationships between the
different market actors will become looser. Wholesalers will purchase
more from independent assemblers, rather than employing them.
Farmers will choose the traders offering the best prices, rather than
selling each year to the same traders. These changes will only take
place slowly, due to the rigid social rules. Furthermore, competition on
the cereal market is expected to improve if market actors have more
freedom to choose trade partners.
In the next section, a mathematical model is set up, which can be used
to analyse quantitatively the effect of the above mentioned scenarios on
cereal trade and cereal prices.
A Stochastic, Equilibrium Model of Cereal Trade
Consider a situation in which a country is divided in n regions and a
year is divided in T periods, from one harvest to the other. In each
region is one market, numbered i = 1,2,…,n. Markets are competitive,
implying that no single agent can influence market prices. If a farmer
produces cereals, part of it may be stored for home consumption, the
rest is sold on the market in one of the periods t =1 , … , T.F a r m e r so f
region i sell only to traders at market i, not at other market places, and
not directly to consumers. In period t and at marketplace i,f a r m e r sg e t
a kg-price pit,c a l l e dt h eproducer price of region i. The total quantity
of cereals sold by the producers of region i in period t is called the
producer supply (of cereals) in region i. Consumers in region i buy
from traders at market i and have to pay in period t a kg-price π it,
called the consumer price. The quantity bought by the consumers of
region i in period t is called the consumer demand in region i. Traders
in region i purchase the producer supply in this region, may transport
cereals to regions j = 1,...,n, j ≠ i, where they sell the consumer demand
to the consumers, or store the supply to sell in one of the later periods.
Samuelson (1952) and Takayama and Judge (1971) were the first who
analysed such a situation using an optimisation model. Ever since,
these methods have been applied frequently, especially for agricultural,
energy and mineral resources problems (see e.g. Takayama and Judge,
1971; Judge and Takayama, 1973; Labys et al., 1989; Guvenen et al.,154
1990; Roehner, 1995; Van den Berg et al., 1996). Dealing with
equilibrium on spatially separated, competitive markets, Takayama and
Judge use the term ‘Spatial Price Equilibrium’ (SPE) for a situation
where prices and quantities satisfy the following properties: 1) in each
region, there is only one producer and one consumer price, pit and π it;
2) commodities purchased in one region will be transported to another
region if the difference between the consumer price in the importing
region and the producer price in the exporting region is at least equal to
transport costs (Van den Bergh et al., 1996, p.50, see also Takayama
and Judge, 1971, p.34); 3) commodities purchased will be stored if the
difference between the consumer price in the selling period and the
producer price in the purchase period is at least equal to storage costs.
If a finite time horizon is considered, it is usually assumed that no
stock remains after the last period. Takayama and Judge optimise in
their equilibrium models ‘semi-welfare’, subject to supply-demand
equilibrium on the market. The welfare optimal prices and quantities
satisfy the properties of a SPE. Because Takayama and Judge assert
that an SPE describes accurately price formation on a competitive
market, they conclude that the models are suitable for analysing price
formation. Why an SPE describes accurately price formation on a
competitive market, usually receives little attention. In my opinion, in
their argumentation why this should be the case, Takayama and Judge
give one important aspect too little attention. They only consider the
behaviour of producers and consumers. The other market actors
playing a role in market price formation, the traders, are not taken into
account explicitly. However, the economic foundations of the SPE and
the equilibrium models of Takayama and Judge can be better
comprehended, if also the behaviour of traders is integrated in the
model.
Before discussing the design and properties of a spatial equilibrium
model to analyse cereal trade in Burkina Faso in Section 0, the
strategies of the market actors will be discussed: consumers, producers,
and traders. These results are important in order to verify whether
optimal equilibrium results are in line with individual behaviour of the
market agents. The equilibrium model discussed in Section 0 takes into
account three important features of grain trade in Burkina Faso:
transport costs, storage costs and price uncertainty. For an extensive
discussion of these elements, I refer to Ruijs (2002).
Consumer, producer, and trader strategies
Consumer strategies
Assume that in a region i and a period t, each consumer chooses a
cereal consumption level which is affordable with his budget andinfrastructure, market information, and credit
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which gives him an optimal utility. Anticipating on the empirical
implementation of the model for cereal trade in Burkina Faso, it is
assumed that demand in period t only depends on current prices, and
not on prices in previous, or expected prices in future periods. If the
given cereal consumer price is π it, and if consuming a quantity of
cereals yit gives utility uit(yit), (with u’ it(yit)>0 ,u” it(yit) < 0, and π it >
u’ it(0)) then it can be derived that at the optimal consumption level yit
u’ it(yit)=π it.( 1 )
From (1) follows for each consumer the demand function as a function
of consumer prices, yit(π it). Due to the differentiability properties of the
utility function, inverse demand functions may be written, π it(yit).T h e
assumptions u” it(yit)<0 ,uit(0) = 0, and (1), imply that
() it it y π ′ <0 a n d () ( )  =
it y
it it it d y u
0
ξ ξ π (2)
These properties play an important role in the equilibrium model to be
set up in the next section.
Producer strategies
To describe the strategies of cereal producers in Burkina Faso, an
approach is followed that differs from standard supply theory. In
standard theory, a producer is assumed to maximise net revenues. The
net revenue function is set up in such a way that a supply function can
be derived, which gives optimal supply as a function of current
producer prices. In this paper, however, it is assumed that supply not
only depends on current producer prices, but also on uncertain future
prices.
Some general characteristics of cereal producers in Burkina Faso are
that 1) a large part of the cereal harvest is consumed by the farm
members and only a small part is sold; 2) annual cereal supply hardly
reacts on cereal prices; 3) almost all producers, rich as well as poor,
sell and purchase cereals in each quarter; these sales may be ‘forced
sales’ to satisfy urgent cash needs (see Ruijs (2002) for a more detailed
discussion of the strategies of burkinabè farmers).
On the basis of these characteristics, I assume that the amount of
cereals each producer can supply in one year is equal to a fixed portion
of the available cereal harvest. The size of the stock of cereals they can
supply, called wi0 for i =1 , … , n, is known at the beginning of the first
period. The question to be analysed is how a producer in region i can156
best spread his annual supplies wi0 over the T periods if future prices
are uncertain. Before modelling the sequential supply decision process
of the producers, I first introduce some factors constraining their
supply levels and the random future prices.
Call xit the producer supply in period t in region i. Supplies in period t
are constrained by two sales restrictions. First, the producer can not sell
more than what remains from previous periods. Introduce for i =1 , … , n
and t =1 , … , T, the variables wit, which reflect the quantity in stock at
the end of period t by the producers in region i. Assume that in each
period a fraction 1-δ of the stock is lost, 0≤ δ ≤ 1. The stock at the end of
period t is wit = δ wi,t-1 – xit. Secondly, each producer in region i sells in
each period t at least a minimum quantity x
−
it to satisfy urgent cash
requirements. This implies that xit ≥ x
−
it.
I ti sa s s u m e dt h a ti np e r i o dt ∈ {1,...,T}, prices are known for the
periods 1,...,t. Future prices for the periods t+1,...,T are random
variables, the probability distributions of which are assumed to be
known. Introduce Pit, the random future producer price for period t in
region i,f o ri = 1,...,n and t = 1,...,T.F o rt h ep e r i o d st =2 , … , T,I
postulate Pit as Pi,t-1, plus a given price increase ∆ pit, plus a random
disturbance Θ it.
Pit = Pi,t-1 + ∆ pit + Θ it.( 3 )
Assume that Pi1 is given, and has the level Pi1 = pi1. The random
variables Θ i1,…,Θ iT are assumed to be independent variables, with
EΘ it = 0. They all have a discrete distribution with K possible
realisations, called θ
k
it,f o ri =1 , … , n, t =2 , … , T,a n dk =1 , … , K.T h e





it it f = = Θ θ Pr (4)
for k =1 , … , K, with probabilities fit
k . For a given level of Pi,t-1 = pi,t-1,
the range of possible realisations of Pit is specified by (3) and (4).
Define p
k
it as the possible realisations of the random variable Pit,f o ra
given level of Pi,t-1 = pi,t-1,f o ri =1 , … , n, t =2 , … , T,a n dk =1 , … , K.I t
follows from (3) and (4) that the conditional probability distribution
function of Pit, for a given level of Pi,t-1 = pi,t-1 is,
() ()
k
it t i t i
k
it it t i it t i t i
k
it it f p P p P P p P p P = = + ∆ + = = = = − − − − − 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , Pr Pr θ (5)infrastructure, market information, and credit
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Knowing the factors constraining the producer’s supplies and the
random future prices, the producer’s supply decisions can be modelled.
At the beginning of the first period, producers do not make final
decisions on the optimal supplies for all periods. For each period, the
producer has a different decision problem. In the decision problem for
period 1, producers decide on the optimal supplied quantity xi1,b a s e d
on wi0, the observed price pi1, and the distribution of random future
prices Pi2,…,PiT. In the decision problem for period t ∈ {2,...,T}, they
decide on the optimal supplies xit for that period. These decisions
depend on the quantity remaining from the previous period, δ wi,t− 1,t h e
observed price pit, and the probability distribution of the random prices
Pi,t+1,…,PiT for the periods t+1 to T.
Consider the producers’ decision problem for period t. To choose
between selling now or later, the producer balances net revenues from
current sales and discounted expected net revenues from selling later.
Define σ the discount rate. The discounted expected future net
revenues can be interpreted as the present value of expected future net
revenues. Net revenues depend on the costs, cit(xit), which have been
made to produce and sell xit. It will be assumed that the cost function is
linear. For i =1 , … , n and t =1 , … , T,
cit(xit)=citxit,( 6 )
with cit > 0 a constant. In a period t ∈ {1,…,T-1}, knowing the stock
δ wi,t-1 remaining from the previous period and the observed price pit,a
producer optimises his net revenues for that period plus discounted
expected net revenues for future periods. In the final period T,o n l yn e t
revenues for that period are optimised. It is assumed that cereals
remaining at the end of period T can not be sold next year. Supplies in
a certain period should not be less than the minimum sales and not
exceed the available stock. Define for i =1 , … , n and t =1 , … , T,
() it t i
pr
it p w z , 1 , − the optimal current plus discounted expected future
net revenues of the producer in region i for period t;
() () it it t i it
pr
t i p P P w z E = + + 1 , 1 , , the expectation of zit
pr
, +1 with respect to
the random price Pi,t+1, for a given level of Pit = pit,
i.e. the expectation of the optimal net revenues for
period t+1 plus discounted expected future net
revenues for the periods t+2 to T.
The sequential decision process can be modelled using a so-called
recourse model. The producer’s decision problem for period t ∈158
{1,…,T} can be formulated as the following maximisation problem in
the variables xit and wit.
() () () () {
} it t i it t i it it
it it t i it
pr
t i it it it it t i
pr
it
x w w w x x
p P P w z E x c p Max p w z
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i,t+1 the supply level in period t+1 and w
k
i,t+1 the stock level at
the end of period t+1 if the producer price is p
k
i,t+1,f o rk =1 , … , K and i
= 1,…,n. In (7),
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i,t+1 for all k =1 , … , K. It will be
assumed that remaining stocks at the end of period T do not yield any
future revenues, i.e. Ez w P P p iT
pr
iT i T iT iT ,, , ++ = 11 c h d i = 0. The supply problem
(7) changes into the following maximisation problem with the decision
variables xit, x
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In Ruijs (2002), this model is worked out in more detail. The producer
supply model (7) and (9) will be used in Section 0 to set up the
stochastic, equilibrium model.
Trader strategies
The traders on the n markets maximise their net revenues. The traders
together are called here the aggregate trader. In period t, he purchases a
quantity qit from the producers in region i, transports a quantity qijt
between the markets i and j, stores a quantity vit in region i, and sells a
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Suppose that vi0 =0a n dviT = 0. The purchases and sales of the
aggregate trader are constrained by the supplies and demands of the
producers and consumers, qit ≤ xit and rit ≤ yit. Transporting one unit of
cereals from region i to region j costs him τ ijt, and storing one unit in
period t costs him kit. It will be assumed, for simplicity, that
transporting from a region i to a region j costs more if transport goes
via another region s ≠ i ≠ j: τ ijt <τ ist + τ sjt. Furthermore, assume that in
period t, the trader knows the prices pit and π it, but that future prices
are random variables of which the probability distributions are known.
As for the producers, the basic characteristic of the trader’s strategy to
cope with uncertain prices, and uncertain supply and demand, is the
sequential nature of the decision process. The trader’s decision
problem has many similarities with the producer supply problem
discussed above. In period t ∈ {1,...,T}, he decides on the optimal
strategies for this period, taking into account the strategies which he
expects to be optimal in future periods. His decisions in period t are
based on the observed current market prices, pit and π it, and the
probability distribution of possible prices for the future periods τ =
t+1,…,T.
Like in the producer problem, it is assumed that traders know the
probability distributions of the stochastic future prices, which have a
discrete distribution. Introduce, for i ∈ {1,…,n},t∈ {1,…,T}, Pit and
Π it, the random future producer and consumer price for period t in
region i and Φ t the random disturbance in period t. Furthermore,
introduce for i =1 , … , n, t =2 , … , T, the parameters ∆ pitand ∆ π it ,w h i c h
reflect the fixed increase of the producer and consumer price,
respectively. Assume for i =1 , … , n and t =1 , … , T, like in (3), that
random producer prices Pit and random consumer prices Π it depend on
Pi,t-1 and Π i,t-1, a given price increase ∆ pit and ∆ π it , and a random
disturbance Φ t. I assume, for simplicity, that the disturbance Φ t is the
same for all regions. Assume that Pi1 and Π i1 are given, and that Pi1 =
pi1 and Π i1 = π i1. Then, for i =1 , … , n,a n dt =2 , … , T,
Pit = Pi,t-1 + ∆ pit + Φ t (11)
Π it = Π i,t-1 +∆ π it + Φ t
The random variables Φ 1,…,Φ T are assumed to be mutually
independent with EΦ t = 0. They have a discrete distribution with K
possible realisations, defined by φ t
k. The discrete probability





t t g = = Φ φ Pr (12)
for k =1 , … , K, with probabilities g
k
t. For given levels of Pi,t-1 = pi,t-1 and
Π i,t-1 = π i,t-1, the range of possible realisations of Pit and Π it are
completely specified by (11) and (12). Define p
k
it the possible
realisations of Pit for a given level of Pi,t-1 = pi,t-1,a n dπ
k
it the possible
realisations of Π it for a given level of Π i,t-1 = π i,t-1,f o ri =1 , … , n, t =
2,…,T,a n dk =1 , … , K. It follows from (11) and (12) that, for t =
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In each period t ∈ {1,…,T} the aggregate trader optimises his current
revenues for period t, plus the expected future revenues for the periods
t+1 to T, depending on the known current producer and consumer
prices, pit and π it, the known stock vi,t-1, and the stochastic future
prices, Piτ and Π iτ .D e f i n ef o rt ∈ {1,…,T}, zp v t
tr
it it i t π ,, , − 1 c hthe optimal
current plus expected future revenues of the trader in period t.L i k et h e
producer supply problem, the trader’s sequential decision process can
be modelled using a recourse model. For period t the problem can be
written as a maximisation problem in the variables rit, qit, qijt,a n dvit,
for all i,j =1 , … , n, i ≠ j.
{} () ()
{} {} ()
} i j n j i v q y r x q
v q r v q q
n i p P n i v P EZ
v k q q p r Max n i v p z



















ijt ijt it it it it t i it it
tr
t
≠ = ≥ ≤ ≤ ≤ ≤
+ + = + +






























, ,..., 1 , , 0 , ; 0 ; 0
;
,..., 1 , , ,..., 1 , , ,









τ α π π
(14)
with α trader’s transaction costs, which have to be made for each unit
sold. These costs include e.g. taxes and personnel costs. The quantities
24 (13) is a short notation for Pr(Π 1t = π
k
1t, P1t = p
k
1t,…, Π nt = π
k
nt, Pnt = p
k
nt | Π 1,t-1 =
π 1,t-1, P1,t-1 = p1,t-1,…, Π n,t-1 = π n,t-1, Pn,t-1 = pn,t-1), for k ∈ {1,...,K}.infrastructure, market information, and credit
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vi,t-1 are the known stocks remaining from the previous period. () ⋅ +
tr
t EZ 1
refers to the expectation of () ⋅ +
tr
t z 1 , with π i,t+1 and pi,t+1 replaced by the
random prices Π i,t+1 and Pi,t+1. Note that () ⋅ +
tr
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τ the upperbounds on the purchases and sales, if producer and
consumer prices in period τ and region i are pi
k
τ and π τ i
k for τ ∈
{t+1,...,T}. We can write
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Solving the above model gives the optimal trader strategies. Some
properties of these strategies are derived in Ruijs (2002). These models
and its results are used in the next section to set up the spatial
equilibrium model, and to verify whether results of that model are in
line with the optimal strategies of the traders.
Spatial equilibrium on n markets: a stochastic, multi-period model
In this section a stochastic, multi-period, spatial equilibrium models
will be set up. For each period t = 1,...,T, a different model will be set
up in which optimal strategies for the current period t are determined.
In the model for the period t, the optimal values of the following
variables are determined for i = 1,...,n: producer prices pit and
consumer prices π it, producer supply xit, consumer demand yit,t o t a l
transported quantities xijt to the various regions, and stock levels sit at162
the end of period t. These quantities depend on known stock levels at
the end of period t-1, si,t-1, on the available producer stock wi,t-1,a n do n
uncertain future prices. In the equilibrium model also future transacted
quantities are determined, which are expected to be optimal at the
stochastic future prices.
In the stochastic, multi-period, spatial equilibrium model for period t,
current semi-welfare for period t plus expected future semi-welfare for
the periods t+1 to T are optimised. In welfare theory, semi-welfare is
defined as the sum of consumer, producer, and trader ‘net revenues’.
Given some suppositions on supply and demand behaviour this can be
written as the, well known, sum of producer and consumer surplus, see
e.g. Varian (1992) and Ruijs (2002). Since I adopted different
suppositions in the producer supply problem, see above, it is not
possible to write producer surplus as the integral of the inverse supply
function. The net revenues of the different market actors for period t
are
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see (14).
Due to the properties of integrability of the utility function (see (2)),
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where the variables, yit, xit, xijt,a n dsit have to satisfy the constraint and
non-negativity conditions:
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0 ≤ xit ≤ δ wi,t-1, yit ≥ 0, sit ≥ 0, xijt ≥ 0, i,j =1 ,2 ,. . . ,n; j ≠ i. (18)
for given stocks si,t-1 and wi,t-1. Assume that siT =0a n dsi0 =0 .
Expected future semi-welfare for the periods t+1 to T is the sum of
expected consumer, and expected producer, and expected trader
revenues, with regard to random future producer and consumer prices
prices Piτ and Π iτ ,f o rτ = t+1 to T. The perception of probability
distributions of future prices may differ between producers, consumers
and traders, depending on the information they have. Assume that
producers perceive a price probability distribution function which is
defined by (5), and that the price probability distribution for the traders
is defined as in (13). For consumers in region i,i ti sa s s u m e dt h a tt h e
random future consumer prices Π it and probability distribution are




it,w i t hπ
k
it possible price realisations and
with probabilities h
k
it,f o rk = 1,...,K. Optimal expected future revenues
for the consumers for the the periods t+1 to T, can be defined as:
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in which y
k
iτ = yiτ (π
k
iτ ) ,t h ed e m a n di np e r i o dτ , τ = t+1,...,T, if the
consumer price is π
k
it,f o rk = 1,...,K. These revenues are a constant,
since all elements are constants. Define EZ
c
i,T+1(.) = 0. Expected future
producer and trader revenues have already been discussed in Section 0,
see (8), (9) and (15).
Define for each period t ∈ {1,…,T}, zt(si,t-1,wi,t-1) the optimal current
plus expected future semi-welfare, knowing the producer and trader
stocks available at the beginning of period t, wi,t-1 and si,t-1. Optimising
the sum of current semi-welfare for period t plus expected future semi-
welfare, subject to the market equilibrium condition (17) for period t
and the supply upperbound xit ≤ δ wi,t-1, results in the following
stochastic, multi-period, spatial equilibrium model for period t ∈
{1,...,T-1}:164
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(19)
The model for period T is similar to (19), but with siT = 0, and without
the terms for the expected future revenues.
From the Lagrangian and the Kuhn-Tucker conditions, it is possible to
prove that the optimal equilibrium producer price is equal to the
Lagrange multiplier (or shadow price) of equilibrium constraint (17) of
the equilibrium model. At this price, it is optimal for the producers to
supply the equilibrium supplied quantity xit.F u r t h e r m o r e ,a tt h e
equilibrium prices, the optimal supplied, demanded, transported and
stored quantities resulting from model (19) (xit,y it,x ijt,s it) are equal to
the optimal purchases, sales, transport flows, and stock levels of the
traders (qit, rit,q ijt,v it) (see Ruijs, 2002). Moreover, it can be proved
that if in a certain period goods are purchased and sold in one region,
or purchased in one and sold in another region, then the difference
between consumer and producer prices is equal to the marketing costs
(transaction and transport costs: π it = pit + α it and π jt = pit + τ ijt + α jt).
To conclude, the future price uncertainty has an influence on the
current price levels. The results of the model will be such that a trader
will store if this is expected to be profitable.
Parameter estimates
In this section, it is discussed how the parameters used in model (19)
are estimated. Estimation of these elements is based on a careful
review of existing literature on cereal trade, production, and
consumption in Burkina Faso.
25 For a detailed discussion of the
25 The data used and surveys consulted include data from the Ministère de
l’Agriculture et de l’Elevage (1984-1999) and from INSD (1995a,b, 1996a,b,
1998); surveys from the Universities of Michigan and Wisconsin, in particular Saul
(1986, 1987), McCorkle (1987), Pardy (1987), Sherman et al. (1987), Szarleta
(1987), and Ellsworth and Shapiro (1989); surveys by ICRISAT, in particular Lang
et al. (1983), Lang (1985), Reardon et al. (1987, 1988a,b, 1989, 1992); and surveys
by Broekhuyse (1983, 1988, 1998), Roth (1986), Thiombiano et al. (1988), Pieroniinfrastructure, market information, and credit
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parameter estimates, I refer to Ruijs (2002). The exogenous elements
of the equilibrium model are the cereal supply and demand functions,
the storage costs and losses per stored kg per unit of time, and the
transport costs per transported unit of weight between the various
markets.
For the analysis a planning period of one year is considered. The
planning year is divided in four periods of three months each, starting
with the harvest period from October to December (see Figure 2 in the
appendix). The regions distinguished in this study are the 12 Burkinabé
administrative regions (the CRPA: Centre Regional de Promotion
Agricole), see Figure 1 in the appendix. It is assumed that cereal
harvest levels are known at the beginning of the planning year. For
each period and each region aggregate producer supply and consumer
demand functions will be estimated for the reference year October
2000 to September 2001.
The estimation of the model parameters for the reference year is based
on the following information. 1) The size of the rural and urban
population in the reference year, see Table 1; 2) Forecasted mean
production levels per person in the reference year, see Table 1; 3) Sales
and 4) purchase patterns in different regions, which have been
discussed in several surveys performed in the past in Burkina Faso; 5)
Rural and urban household revenues and expenses, which have been
analysed by INSD (1996a,b), to estimate sales income and purchasing
capacity; 6) Seasonal price patterns, see Table 2; and 7) Marketing
costs. For the marketing costs, I make a distinction between transport
costs, storage costs, and transaction costs. Transaction costs include
among other things costs to purchase bags, market taxes, and personnel
costs. To estimate transport costs between the main cities in each
CRPA, I used surveys executed by Sirpé (2000), Bassolet (2000) and
Déjou (1987) – see Table 3 in the appendix. Storage and transaction
costs are estimated on the basis of surveys by Bassolet (2000),
Sherman et al. (1987) and Déjou (1987). Storage costs include renting
costs, surveillance costs and also capital costs, which account for the
forgone revenues if a trader had invested his capital in other activities
instead of storing cereals. Storage costs are estimated at 300 FCFA per
bag of 100 kg, capital costs per period are estimated at 3.5% of the
producer price given in Table 2. Storage losses for traders are observed
to be higher than for farmers: 12% per year. Transaction costs include
costs for bags, market taxes and personnel costs, and are estimated at
(1990), Maatman et al. (1996), Yonli (1997), Maatman (2000), Bassolet (2000),
and Sirpé (2000).166
1500 FCFA per 100 kg bag of cereals. Finally, the discount rate is
estimated at 0.97 per period.
Using the data mentioned above, cereal demand functions can be
estimated as a function of cereal prices. The cereal demand functions
per period and per CRPA opted for in this paper are derived from the
widely applied Linear Expenditure System (LES) (see e.g Roth (1986)
for a discussion and application of the LES). The LES demand function
assumes that for each good, demand in each period consists of a
minimum required quantity and a part which depends on income and
consumer price. A difference must be made between the demand
function of a rural and of an urban household. Define the set of time
periods (see also Figure 2): T={t1,t 2,t 3,t 4}, the set of twelve CRPA J,
and the set of household types H = {urban, rural}. Introduce for each
period t ∈ T,e a c hC R P Aj ∈ J and each household of type h ∈ H: the
cereal demand level of a consumer,y
h
jt; the minimally required cereal
purchase level of a consumer, γ
h
jt; the cereal consumer price in period t,
π jt; minimally required expenses on all other commodities but cereals,
ξ
h







interpreted as the supernumerary income level of a consumer which
remains after due allowance for the minimum requirements of all
commodities but cereals. We define the share of supernumerary
income spent on cereals, b
h
jt. The quarterly demand functions for urban
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The estimates of the parameters of the demand function are based on
both quantitative and qualitative evidence presented in the sources
discussed in above. In Ruijs (2002) it is discussed in detail how they
are estimated. It is assumed for the minimally required purchase levels
for rural households that γ
r
jt = 0. They take a subtantial part of their
consumption from their own production and do not have to purchase a
minimum quantity of cereals. For rural households, it is supposed that
a large part of their food consumption consists of rice and other non-
cereal commodities. It is assumed that in each period γ
u
jt =5 0k gf o r
urban consumers in Ouagadougou and Bobo-Dioulasso, and γ
u
jt =6 0k g
for other cities. Average income levels per period per consumer, m
h
jt,




jt, and the share of
supernumerary income spent on cereals, b
h
jt, are mainly based on INSDinfrastructure, market information, and credit
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(1996a,b) and Roth (1986). The estimates are discussed in detail in
Ruijs (2002).
Producer supply behaviour has been discussed in Section 3.1. The
parameters used for this analysis are the annual supply wi0, minimally
required supply per period x
-
it supply costs cit, storage losses δ ,a n d
discount rate σ . In Ruijs (2002) these estimates are discussed in detail.
4. Effects of Institutional Improvements on Cereal Trade
In this section, the model discussed in the previous section will be used
to analyse the effects of the three scenarios of institutional
improvements formulated in Section 2. First, the results of the model
with the parameter values as discussed in the previous section will
briefly be discussed. This model is called the base model. These results
serve as a benchmark with which the results of the scenario analysis
will be compared. Next, for each of the three scenarios, some of the
parameter values or model equations are adapted in order to analyse
their effect on cereal trade.
Base model
The results of the base model reflect actual prices and trade flows on
the cereal market in Burkina Faso fairly well (see Table 4 in the
appendix). They show that optimal equilibrium prices are highest in the
shortage areas Centre, Sahel, Nord, and Centre Nord, and lowest in the
surplus areas Mouhoun, Hauts Bassins, and Sud Ouest (see Figure 1 in
the appendix). The optimal equilibrium prices reflect the costs which
are made by the traders and seasonality well. Prices increase gradually
during the year, due to storage costs and the forces of supply and
demand.
In some of the regions (Comoé and Sahel), the producers only
sell the minimally required quantity of cereals, because they expect to
earn more if they sell in the next periods or because selling is
unprofitable for them. In some regions the largest quantity is sold
during the post-harvest season, but in most regions producers supply
their largest quantity later in the year when prices are higher. This does
not correspond with the common view that farmers in developing
countries sell when prices are low and purchase when prices are high.
It corresponds, however, with observations by Sherman et al. (1987),
who conclude that, although the number of selling households is
largest during the post-harvest season, the sales per selling household
are lower during the post-harvest season than during the seasons later168
in the year. This indicates that households which do not have to sell
cheap, prefer to wait until prices increase. This result also corresponds
to observations by Armah (1989) for Ghana, Lutz (1994) for Benin,
and Bassolet (2000) for Burkina Faso, that most goods are stored by
the producers and that only a few traders store for a longer period. Note
that the results only show aggregate supplies. If more classes of
producers were distinguished in the ana l y s i s ,i ti sw e l lp o s s i b l et h a tt h e
results would show that poor farmers have a different supply pattern.
In the optimal solution, traders transport the surpluses from the
surplus regions to the shortage regions. About 41% of the marketable
surplus is transported to other regions. Especially transport from the
largest surplus zones Mouhoun and Hauts Bassins towards the shortage
regions Centre, Sahel, Nord, and Centre Nord are important. The
transported quantities are high especially during the lean season, from
July to September, when the farmers’ stocks get depleted. Traders only
store a small part of the total quantity transacted (4%). No data are
available to verify this percentage. The general picture, however,
corresponds to observations mentioned above that only a few
wholesalers invest in long-term storage, because farmers have a
comparative advantage for storage.
Improved infrastructure
The first scenario deals with the influence of road and communication
infrastructure on cereal trade. If the quality of infrastructure improves,
transport costs will decline which may stimulate more traders to
transport to remote areas. The model results show that if transport costs
decline, transport is stimulated indeed. However, the direct effect on
the quantity transported is small if only transport costs between the
main cities in the different regions decrease. It is considerably less than
the effect attributed to transport costs by a number of Worldbank
studies. For example, in Worldbank (2000), it is argued that a drop of
transport costs of 10% will increase trade by 25%. The model results,
however, show that if overall transport costs decrease with 25%,
transport flows increase only with 0.8%. Also prices hardly change.
The price change ranges between –1.7% in the shortage region Sahel to
+2.4% in the surplus region Mouhoun. In most regions, equilibrium
prices change between –1% and +1%. The effect of transport costs on
prices is weak, because the transport costs for the main routes only
make up a small part of prices. Due to the forces of supply and
demand, prices in the importing regions fall, but the prices in the
exporting regions rise. The price decrease in the importing regions can
only be modest because of the inelasticity of supply. If the fall of
consumer prices would be larger, demand would increase. This can,infrastructure, market information, and credit
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however, not be satisfied because supply hardly reacts on small price
changes. As a result, prices in the importing regions decrease with a
small percentage, prices in the exporting regions increase with a larger
percentage, and transport flows increase only a little bit. Due to the fall
in production costs, overall welfare increases a bit. However, in the
regions in which prices fall (especially the regions which import
cereals from other regions), consumers will profit and producers will
lose. In the regions in which prices increase (especially the surplus
regions), it is the reverse.
If only specific routes are asphalted, transport costs between the
regions connected by the new road may decline considerably. For
example, by asphalting the road from Dédougou to Dori (see Figure 1),
transport costs from Mouhoun to Sahel will drop by 30%. In that case,
transport to and from remote regions may show some unexpected
changes. Optimal equilibrium prices in the shortage regions along the
newly asphalted roads will decline, and quantities transported over
these roads will rise, although the effects are small. However, traders
will transport less to the other shortage regions, where prices will rise.
This has negative consequences for the consumers and retailers in these
regions. For example, by asphalting the above mentioned route,
equilibrium prices in the shortage region Sahel decrease by 3.9%, and
transport to the region Sahel increase with 7.6%. Prices in the region
Centre, however, increase with 0.5% and transport to Centre and
Centre Nord will fall. More important, however, transporting from the
regions which are not along the new road becomes relatively more
expensive. As a result, the optimal solution shows that some of the
surplus regions in the rest of the country may lose their competitive
position. Wholesalers will be more inclined to purchase in the regions
from which transport is cheaper. Especially producers and assemblers
in the remote surplus regions may notice this effect. For example, if the
road from Bobo-Dioulasso via Dédougou to Ouahigouya is asphalted,
the producers in the surplus region Comoé supply less than in the base
scenario. Cereals transported to Hauts Bassins, which came from
Comoé in the base scenario, now originate from Mouhoun.
Consumption levels can increase if producers in Comoé supply more.
However, the extra utility obtained from a higher consumption, does,
apparently, not outweigh the extra transport costs if more is
transported. This aspect may even be stronger if also spin off effects of
improvements of infrastructure are considered. If economic activity
increases in the regions connected by the new road, demand in these
regions may increase at the expense of the consumers in other regions.
The impact of improvements in infrastructure will be more
pronounced if also transaction costs are affected. Due to better170
infrastructure (especially rural roads, telephone and fax lines),
assemblers can more cheaply purchase and sell in remote regions and
wholesalers can hire non-relatives with less risk of breach as they can
monitor their agents more easily. If transport and transaction costs
decrease with 25%, the model results show that producers, consumers,
and traders will benefit from these changes. Consumer utility will
increase for almost all consumers and revenues will increase for almost
all producers. Traders can offer higher prices to the producers, demand
lower prices from the consumers, and transact larger quantities
(+4.7%). Compared with the base results, the consumer prices decrease
on average by 1.2% and the producer prices increase by 2.4%. The
decrease of consumer prices is highest in the shortage regions, whereas
the increase of producer prices is highest in the main surplus regions.
Compared with the scenario in which only transport costs fall by 25%,
the situation is better now for almost all market actors. Those who are
worse off, only see their situation deteriorate by a small percentage.
The result that infrastructure has a considerable influence on the
situation of the rural population is supported by Fan et al. (2000). They
conclude for the case of India, that poverty is reduced substantially if
the government invests more in rural roads. Also the Worldbank
(1994) concludes that infrastructural improvements (which not only
include roads but also electricity, telecommunication, ports, and
sewerage) have a considerable effect on GDP.
More accurate price expectations
In the second scenario, the role of information with respect to future
price developments in cereal trade is examined. Having adequate future
price expectations is important to make trade decisions. However, it is
difficult for cereal traders and producers in Burkina Faso to make good
price expectations because of the difficulty to obtain correct and up-to-
date information on market developments. Having access to better
price and market information and knowing how to interpret this
information, may result in more adequate price expectations. For this
scenario the stochastic equilibrium model is compared with a model in
which producers and traders are in a hypothetical situation where they
have perfect foresight with regard to future market prices (the so-called
perfect market model).
The results of this analysis show that having better price expectations
is important. If better information is available, price developments over
the year will be smoother. The model results show that the total price
increase within a year may not change a lot if the market functions
perfectly, but the price changes between the different periods are more
equal in the perfect market model than in the base scenario. If priceinfrastructure, market information, and credit
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expectations are better, producers can better spread their supplies,
which results in a smoother price development and less drastic changes
in the last period. Also traders may operate more efficiently. Transport
to surplus regions that also export abates, and storage is done by the
producers, who can store at lower costs than traders. These changes are
detrimental for transport agencies who see their markets decrease or
traders who have invested a lot of time and effort in setting up private
trade and information networks. Organisations aiming at improving
public market information systems have to be aware of the possibility
that traders do not want to share their information or provide wrong
information to thwart the plans.
The importance of correct market information becomes even more
clear if the situation is considered in which traders and producers have
wrong expectations. Consider a situation in which cereal production is
10% lower than expected but in which traders and producers do not
adapt their price expectations for the future periods. In that case,
producer prices in the first three periods only change a little bit.
However, prices in the last period increase suddenly with 45.5%
compared to the base scenario. If producers and traders adapt their
expectations and expect prices to be 10% higher than in the base
scenario, the price increase in the last period will only be 25.7%. So, if
they do not know about the change in supply, they may sell too much
during the first periods, which then leads to an immense shortage at the
end of the year and prices rocketing up in the lean season.
Improved credit facilities
In the third scenario the accessibility of credit is analysed. Credit is
generally considered to be one of the main constraining factors of
cereal trade. A lack of credit opportunities would prevent small traders
from extending their businesses and prevent employees of wholesalers
to start their own cereal trade business. If credit is more easily
accessible, the need for setting up extensive trade networks with pre-
financed agents will be less an issue. In that case, it is expected that
trade between individual traders will augment, and competition will
increase. In this case, several types of traders have been distinguished
in the model, each with different marketing costs. Furthermore, two
different situations are distinguished. In situation A, an unlimited
amount of capital can be borrowed. In situation B, each trader can only
borrow a limited amount of capital. It is assumed that the banks lend
only 75% of the money that has been borrowed by the traders in
situation A. In fact, in situation A credit facilities function perfectly.
The results of the analyses clearly show that the level of competition
rises if the availability of capital improves, indeed. If not enough172
capital is available to finance new entrants on the market, traders can
make excessive profits. They may offer low producer prices and
demand high consumer prices. Due to the lack of capital, no traders can
enter the market to offer higher prices to the producers and in this way
attract all supplies. Due to the low producer price, supply will be low (-
8% compared to situation A), resulting in high consumer prices. In
situation B, in the periods April – June and July – September,
consumer prices are respectively 13% and 48% higher whereas the
producer prices are 7% lower than in situation A. In situation A, the
situation is better for all producers and consumers. Also the transport
companies will benefit from the better availability of capital, as this
will result in a higher demand for transport services (transport flows
increase with 11%). On the other hand, the traders which do have
capital will be better of in situation A than in situation B.
Furthermore, the analysis also shows that in the case of a restricted
availability of capital, transport and storage are not necessarily done by
the most efficient trader. If capital is not constraining, each trader
makes the transactions for which he has the lowest costs. The traders
who have a comparative advantage for a certain activity will perform
this activity, because they can offer or demand the best prices. The
others will be priced out of the market. For example, consider a
situation with two types of traders. Transaction costs for traders of type
1 are equal to 15 FCFA/kg whereas those for type 2 are 25% lower
(11.25 FCFA/kg). In situation A, in which capital is not constraining,
the difference between consumer and producer prices is 11.25 FCFA
per kg. This is equal to the transaction costs of the traders of type 2.
Since the transaction costs for the other traders are equal to 15 FCFA
per kg, they will not purchase and sell any cereals. In Case B, in which
capital is constraining, the difference between the consumer and
producer price in the regions in which only traders of type 2 operate, is
a little less than 15 FCFA/kg in the period October – March. This
difference is equal to 15 FCFA/kg in the other regions. Because of the
capital constraint, the traders of type 2 do not have to fear the entry of
new traders of type 2. Therefore, they can demand consumer prices
which exceed the producer prices with more than their transaction
costs. On the other hand, they will not ask a price which is more than
15 FCFA/kg higher than the producers price, because this would give
the other traders the opportunity to profitably take over a part of their
trade. So, in this case, traders can abuse their market power to ask too
high prices. To conclude, if credit is more easily accessible, more
cereals will be supplied, consumed, transacted, and transported, and
prices will be fairer. Especially the remote regions will profit from the
improved level of competition.infrastructure, market information, and credit
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Conclusions
The results of the stochastic equilibrium model set up in this paper,
clearly reveal the effects of some important institutional deficiencies
on the cereal market in Burkina Faso. For example, taking into account
the uncertainty of future prices has shown how wrong information may
result in large shortages and unnecessary price fluctuations; analysing
the role of credit has shown that competition is at stake if capital is
constraining; inefficiencies by traders may not only result in a loss of
capital, but also affect the competitive position of producers in remote
regions. Furthermore, an important result of the model is that some
claims on the effects of market changes, which have become widely
accepted, need some critical reflection. For example, improving
infrastructure in one region may unintentionally aggravate the situation
of the poor in other parts of the country.
One of the contributions of the model presented here is that it also
shows the nuances of how institutional changes may affect cereal
prices and cereal distribution and how they may affect the relationships
between the market agents. For individual producers or traders, not the
overall effects of institutional changes are important, but the way how
they are affected individually. Market agents who are affected
negatively by institutional developments may frustrate or even block
these developments. The evolution of market developments may be
governed more efficiently if potential problems are known and tackled
beforehand.
Without the use of the equilibrium model and especially the insights it
provides about the interaction between the market agents, it would be
difficult to explain convincingly some of the results. Adverse effects of
seemingly positive market changes, like improvements in road
infrastructure, are easily overlooked if cereal trade is analysed in a
more general way. The influence of specific costs or behavioural
constraints on market prices and quantities traded, can not be entirely
understood if they are not studied in an integrated analysis of the
behaviour of all producers, consumers, and traders on the cereal
market. On the basis of a qualitative study alone, the functioning of the
cereal market can not be fully explained. By interviewing market
agents, one does not learn exactly how the market works. They may
know their own strategies and problems, but they do not know exactly
how interactions between agents or certain developments on the market
affect prices and transactions in other regions of the country. Only by
using an instrument with which the interaction between the market
agents can be represented, the complex nature of cereal trade can be
explored in an integrated way.174
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Figure 1: Map of Burkina Faso, the main cities, and the 12
agricultural regions (CRPAs)
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Table 4 :Results of the base model: Consumer price levels and
supply and demand per person



























Centre 110 113 119 128 118 23 123 115
Centre Nord 112 115 123 132 120 13 165 101
Centre
Ouest
104 107 112 129 113 36 181 104
Centre Sud 105 107 118 122 113 47 238 104
Sahel 113 121 127 140 125 12 163 99
Mouhoun 98 104 108 115 106 82 221 107
Est 104 103 110 121 109 38 197 106
Centre Est 109 108 115 124 114 32 164 104
Nord 107 111 117 126 115 11 145 103
Sud Ouest 99 98 105 116 104 80 211 108
Hauts
Bassins
101 109 115 131 114 84 220 118
Comoé 106 104 118 126 113 65 217 104
Average
price





88.3 88.1 90.4 117.9 385
Quantity transported (in 1000 tonnes)
From To Total From To Total
Quantity stored (in
1000 tonnes)
Cen. Ouest Centre 12.1 Est Centre Est 5.1 Cen.
Ouest
2.9
Centre Sud Centre 8.1 Centre Est Centre 6.5 Cen. Sud 2.3
Centre Sud Cen. Nord 5.8 Sud Ouest Centre 13.7 Mouhoun 7.4
Mouhoun Centre 21.0 Sud Ouest Cen. Nord 2.2 Est 1.4





Mouhoun Sahel 11.9 Sud Ouest Comoé 0.8 Total 17








Est Centre 5.0 Comoé Hauts
Bass.
5.8
Est Sahel 1.0 Total 157.5
Notes: 1) The producer price is equal to the consumer price minus 15 FCFA; 2)
Total supplies per inhabitant are not equal to the annually available quantity, wi0,
because of storage losses;
3) Total supply is the sum over all regions of supply per person multiplied with the
rural population per region; 4) Recall that urban consumers are assumed to
consume about 80 kg of rice.